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Chapter 1 | General introduction
INTRODUCTION TO EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
Infectious diseases are a continuing threat to all persons, regardless of age, sex, lifestyle, 
ethnic background, and socioeconomic status [1, 2].  The World Health Organization 
(WHO) defines Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) as “diseases of infectious origin whose 
incidence in humans has increased within the recent past or threatens to increase in the 
near future”. These also include those infections that appear in new geographic areas or 
increase abruptly. The new infectious diseases and those which are re-emerging after a 
period of quiescence are also grouped under emerging infectious diseases” [3]. Three 
conditions are considered to identify a disease as emerging infectious disease: (a) they 
affect human beings for the first time, (b) they have happened in the past, involving only 
few persons in remote areas, however, have recently gained new epidemiological features, 
or (c) they have happened along the course of mankind history, but have only recently 
been identified as distinct diseases due to a contagious organism [1]. There are two main 
groups of emerging pathogens: newly emerging and reemerging infectious diseases [4]. 
According to the definitions and categorization used in literature, newly EIDs include new, 
previously indeterminate diseases (combining categories a and c), whereas reemerging 
infectious diseases are old diseases with new features (category b). By definition, these 
features would involve new geographical territories and/or populations, and different 
epidemiological and clinical attributes [5].
Historical background
Historically, it is believed that communicable diseases have been emerging and reemerging 
over millennia. While emergence of diseases can vary from country-to-country, location-
to-location or population-to-population, their occurrence in populations has significantly 
increased within the recent past or the near future. Nevertheless, EID comprise a substantial 
proportion of the most lethal pandemics in human history, including the smallpox epidemic 
of 1520-1521, and the epidemics of measles [5]. 
Recently in the twenty-first century, SARS was reported to be the first severe EID. This 
followed from the new civet cats’ coronavirus in Guandong province, China in 2003. In 
March 2009, H1N1 influenza was reported in Mexico, USA, followed by spread to the rest 
of the world [6]. The detection of the MERS-CoV in human Saudi Arabia during 2012 was 
the first reported novel epidemic in the Arabian Peninsula, an event that has affected up-
to-date 27 countries worldwide. 
The most silent modern example of an EID is HIV/AIDS, which is thought to have 
emerged a century ago, and caused 35 million deaths so far [4]. From 1940 to 2004, 335 
EID outbreaks have likely emerged worldwide [11], and over 30 new infectious agents were 
reported globally over the last thirty years [5]. Recently, H5N1 and H7N9 avian influenza, 
the pandemic H1N1 influenza A, SARS, Ebola, MERS, West Nile fever, measles, Nipah virus, 
dengue, and Zika have got much international focus for the significant morbidity and 
mortality in some [5,6,8,9]. Despite these examples, infectious diseases were no longer 
13
Chapter 1 | General introduction
1
considered as the major cause of death in the industerialized countries since the middle of 
the 20th century, [5].
Burden and cost
It is generally accepted that EID account for 26% of annual deaths worldwide [10]. 13% 
(177/1,407) of the accounted human pathogens are regarded emerging or re-emerging. 
Of these, 37% are viruses and prions and 25% protozoa [5]. Of the 335 observable EID 
events, over 60% were considered zoonotic [11] and more than 75% of these EID have 
arisen from the wildlife [5]. Epidemics or pandemics resulting from these emerging and 
re-emerging agents typically cause high mortality and mobidity rates. Their potential to 
spread fast over large geographical areas is a regular cause for panic. In less than 9 months, 
SARS infected 8,439 persons, 812 of them died. Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus 
– although considered to be relatively mild- resulted in 17,000 deaths; of which, 12,000 
were in the United States of America alone [6]. MERS-CoV caused 2399 cases and 827 
deaths worldwide since March, 2019 when it was first detected in 2012 [12]. Apart from the 
health impact, EID also may lead to severe economic consequences exemplified by reduced 
tourism, business and export; reduced developmental and security challenge. Should an 
epidemic of avian influenza hits Southeast Asia, the costs might mount to US$283 billion, 
according to the estimations of the world bank [13]. SARS was associated with lost economic 
activity, estimated to cost around $40 billion [14]. The 2014 epidemic of Ebola resulted in 
28,639 reported cases along with 11,316 deaths in West Africa, and the 2015 epidemic has 
estimated to cost Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone $2.2 billion in GDP [15].
Dynamics of emerging infectious diseases
For a variety of reasons, it is obvious that novel pathogens have the potential to keep 
emerging and spread across the globe, straining public health authorities. Emergence and 
re-emergence of a given pathogen is a consequence of host-pathogen interactions that 
change with alterations in a range of environmental factors [7]. This includes adaptation 
of pathogens originating in animals, rendering them transmissible to human beings [5], 
but many more factors can change disease dynamics [2, 4, 16]. These include demographic 
factors, international travel, socioeconomic factors, environmental factors, animal and 
human health, man-made ecological changes, global warming and inadequate public 
health infrastructure [3]. With special reference to zoonosis, Liu et al. [9] considered seven 
determinants affecting emergence and reemergence; livestock production, pathogen 
mutation, population growth, food safety, urbanization, climate change, and deforestation.
Public health interventions to prevent EIDs 
While the availability of reliable epidemiological data are important to launch an effective 
prevention and control measures to combat EID, fostering public health strategies that 
ensure elimination of a organisms from its reservoir or blocking its route of infection is 
essential. These interventions should include food safety, sewage treatment and disposal, 
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safe water, control of animal movement, as well as vaccination programs [1]. A rapid 
response mechanism [5], availability of strategic surveillance plan, strengthening of the 
laboratory networking, research partnership and information sharing [5,7], a prepared 
regulatory framework, effective reporting system, health education [9] are important for 
controlling and preventing EID [1].
As many EID are zoonoses, the control of zoonotic diseases in the animal reservoir and 
prevention of transmission to humans can be useful as well as cost-effective to both human 
and animal populations. However, particular interventions, like culling, are hard to implement 
without collaboration from farmers’ who, in turn, may not coooperate if the compensation 
granted to them was perceived to be insufficient, as experienced in the H5N1 avian influenza 
outbreak back in 2006 [13]. The choice of an effective means of communication, education 
and advocacy is imperative to ensure that public health messages reach stakeholders. Long-
term socio-economic negative consequences can occur if such strategies were not followed. 
The reaction to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in England in the 1990s sets a good 
example for the potential to lasting economic losses [7].
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
Coronaviruses (CoVs) are group of viruses under the Coronaviridae family [17] that can 
infect a wide variety of hosts, including birds, domestic and wild animals and humans [18, 
19]. It is estimated that about 30% of common cold cases in the human population are 
caused by CoVs. 
Since the first detection of a Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) case in 2012 [20], studies were done on the possible source of infection. As a result, 
dromedary camels were identified as the main source of human infection of MERS-CoV 
[21-23]. Like Ebola in West Africa [24], MERS-CoV, which until now occurs sporadically 
across the Middle East, could transmit among humans and under certain conditions could 
potentially cause harm to many people. Some large outbreaks of community and healthcare 
associated infection have been reported, but all of them are secondary or tertiary in nature 
and mostly in healthcare settings [25]. It has been found that the Arabian Peninsula is the 
hot spot of MERS index cases [26], and that MERS-CoV antibody is shown to be common 
in persons with close camel contact [27]. However, there are many indices of MERS-CoV 
cases in human, where the route of infection is still unknown [28, 29].  In view of the above, 
evidence-based prevention and control of MERS-CoV needs knowledge of the human-
animal interface. 
History of MERS-CoV infection
A novel coronavirus was isolated from a Saudi man, who was suffering from severe acute 
pneumonia and died in June 2012 [20]. Subsequently, another Qatari man got severe 
pneumonia. Coronavirus isolated from the Qatari man was similar to the isolate reported 
the first case. On 30 November 2012, WHO has reported a similar case in Jordan [30,31]. 
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By 2013, additional cases were confirmed from UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Italy, Tunisia, French, 
Spain, and UK. It was found that the origin of the disease was Arabian Peninsula and the 
reports in Europe and Africa were linked to Arabian Peninsula by travel. In 2013, the 
Coronavirus Study Group of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) 
has agreed to give the new virus the name: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) [32].
Initial evidence on the possible association with animals came from the detection of 
anti-MERS CoV antibodies in dromedary camels’ sera, urine and milk [33]. In 2014 MERS-
CoV RNA was identified in nasal swabs from camels owned by a Qatari man (first case 
of MERS in Qatar) who was suffering from severe acute respiratory syndrome. The viral 
genome from samples collected from the camels and the Qatari man was similar [34]. 
Subsequently, MERS-CoV antibodies were reported from camels in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA) [35,36], Egypt [37], and Kenya [38]. By 2017, MERS-CoV has been found 
widespread distribution in dromedary world throughout the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, 
South Asia, and Canary island of Spain [39].
MERS in Humans 
Six known human coronaviruses (HcoVs) have been identified so far. These are divided 
into α-coronaviruses, represented by HcoV-229E and HcoV-NL63, and β-coronaviruses 
represented by HcoV-HKU1, HcoV-OC43, SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV [17]. In humans, MERS-
CoV infection may be asymptomatic, or symptomatic causing signs ranging from mild 
complaints to severe acute respiratory syndrome [40-44]. The incubation period varies 
from 2-14 days [45]. Symptomatic illness may include cough, shortness of breath, fever, 
sore throat, headache, hemoptysis, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and serious complications 
might ensue leading to multi organ failure and death [42-44]. 
WHO was notified of 2428 confirmed human cases that caused 838 deaths in 27 countries 
in the world- as of 5th of June, 2019 [25]. Asia, Europe, Africa, and North America all reported 
MERS cases. Till July 21, 2017, the highest prevalence of cases has been reported from 
the Middle East, mainly from the KSA where 1672 were confirmed cases. The Republic of 
Korea ranks second highest scoring 185 cases due to a large healthcare associated outbreak 
following a case imported from KSA [46]. A national serosurvey was conducted in KSA to 
determine the seroprevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies among the general population, and 
in particular those in contact with camels found an overall prevalence of 0.15% (15/10009). 
Antibodies were more prevalent in men (0.25) than women (0.05%), and higher in camel 
workers (2.3%) and abattoir workers (3.6%)[47]. In an another study in hospitalized patients 
in KSA, seroprevalence of MERS CoV in suspected patients was 0.7% (384/57363). In Kenya, 
2 persons out of 1122, not directly linked to camels but living in an area where camels are 
widespread, were seropositive for MERS-CoV antibodies [48].
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MERS in camels
To date, three types of coronaviruses were identified in camels; human OC43-related camel 
coronavirus, human 229E-related camel alpha-CoV, and MERS-CoV HKU23 [49, 50]. There is 
also camel coronavirus, UAE-KKU23 that is under β-coronavirus 1 [51]. It was hypothesized 
that camels are the intermediate animal host that allowed the ancestral MERS-CoV in bats 
to cross the species barrier to enter humans [49]. In camel, MERS-CoV causes asymptomatic 
to mild respiratory tract disease. If symptoms appear, mucopurulent lacrimal and nasal 
discharges are common [52-54]. The nasal passage, trachea, bronchioles can be involved 
with mild inflammation but pneumonia has not been observed [52]. More than 70% of 
the dromedary camels tested worldwide are positive for MERS-CoV antibody [35]. Based 
on surveillance that relied on the detection of MERS-CoV antibody or the RNA, Asian 
and African countries in addition to Canary Islands of Spain have all reported MERS-CoV 
syndrome in camel population. MERS-CoV antibody and/or nucleic acid has been detected 
in camels of KSA [35,54], Qatar [34,55], UAE [56], Jordan [57], Oman [58], Iraq [59], Iran, 
Pakistan [60], Sudan, Somalia, Egypt [37,61], Nigeria, Tunisia [62,63], Burkina faso, Morocco 
and Ethiopia [62,64], Kenya [38] , Mali [65] and Canary Islands of Spain [33,66]. Given that 
only MERS-CoV antibodies and not the virus was detected in camels in Chad, Libya, Mali, 
Sudan and Ethiopia, there is a possibility that the disease is enzootic in these countries 
[37,63]. Seroprevalence of MERS-CoV antibody is higher in adult than young camels 
[56,57,60,64,67-69]. However, while the dromedary camels of Kazakhstan are livestock 
camels they were found negative for MERS-CoV prevalence [70]. This may be due to lack of 
contact with camels of the Arabian Peninsula or Africa. Conversely, young camels observed 
more often shed virus than adults [35,64,69,71,72]. They are considered to facilitate virus 
amplification in dromedary camel populations [38,64]. 
The prevalence of MERS-CoV in camels is also related to their management. Restriction 
of movement can reduce MERS-CoV transmission in camel herds [35,65]. Transmission of 
the virus is believed to be density dependent, as higher seropositivity rate is proportionate 
to the herds’ size. [64]. Studies showed that imported camels are more seropositive with 
higher rate of PCR detection compared to local camels in Egypt [61] suggesting that camel 
movement and trade constitute a key risk factor to transboundry transmission of MERS-
CoV to low prevalence countries. Since winter is the season of calving, and that higher rates 
of MERS-CoV infections among young camels is documented [56,57,60,64,67-69], chances 
for the virus transmission are higher when large numbers of young camels which shed the 
virus moved [37,54]. Large quantity of viral shedding through nasal secretions. Therefore, 
the virus can spread via direct contact between camels and to humans. Additionally, 
transmission can occure through fomite, milk, and feces or even by the large nasal droplets 
[52, 35, 69].
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MERS in other animals 
MERS-CoV nucleic acid was detected from one Egyptian tomb bat in KSA [73]. MERS-CoV 
replicated efficiently in Jamaican fruit bats (Artibeus jamaicensis). Despite no clinical signs 
were seen among the infected bats, yet they shed virus from its intestinal tract as well as 
its respiratory system for up to 9 days [74]. In China, studies on Vespertilio superans bats 
Lineage C betacoronavirus was identified [75]. Natural infection of MERS-CoV was detected 
in alpaca [76]. Upon experimental infection, alpaca were found to shed virus through oral 
and nasal routes [77]. Domestic pigs replicate low levels of the virus and may shed it [78]. 
Asymptomatic MERS-CoV infection along with viral shedding has been detected in rabbits 
[79]. No Bactrian camel was yet found positive to MERS-CoV infection either by antibody 
or RNA detection [70,80,81]. Other domestic animals like cattle, goat, buffalo, horse, and 
donkey were considered refractive to MERS-CoV infection [33,35,56,61,69,82-85].
Viral shedding
Viral shedding from humans
MERS-CoV is shed through respiratory secreta, urine, and stool [86,87]. Tracheal aspirates, 
sputum, nasal and throat swabs, bronchoalveolar fluids were used by researchers to 
diagnose MERS cases [42,43,86,88] indicating shedding of the virus through respiratory 
system. Several studies affirmed that samples taken from the lower respiratory tract yield 
higher viral loads compared to samples taken from the upper respiratory tract [86,89]. Viral 
load or nucleic acid concentration was higher in respiratory samples than urine or stool 
samples. In urine or stool samples, the viral RNA concentration was close to the lowest 
detection limit of the assay [86]. 
After symptoms onset, MERS-CoV continued to be detected in samples collected from 
respiratory specimens till day 25. [88]. Investigating the viral load and shedding duration 
from day 37 of MERS-CoV patients, Corman et al. [87] could detect the virus throughout 
the duration of the investigation. Viral RNA was detected from 14.6% of the stool samples 
up to day 23, and from 2.4% of the urine samples up to day 5 [89]. He also concluded that 
the intensity as well as the timing of the respiratory viral shedding in patients with MERS is 
similar to that of patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). He attributed this 
to insufficiency of the resulting neutralizing antibodies to clear the infection.
Various environmental surfaces, in particular those that are frequently touched, were 
found to play a role in MERS-CoV transmission: bed sheets, patient rooms, bedrails, IV fluid 
hangers, anterooms, air-ventilating equipment, x-ray devices, and medical devices were 
found to be contaminated by MERS-CoV [88,90]. The identified secondary transmission rate 
among house hold contacts of MERS-CoV patients were only 5% [86] and blood samples 
seems to contain no virus particles [86,89].
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Viral shedding from camel
Investigating MERS-CoV replication and viral shedding pattern in camels, it was found 
that the respiratory, digestive and reproductive systems of camels can support MERS-CoV 
replication throughout the silent course of infection [35,58,61,91]. This has been evidenced 
by retrieval of viral nucleic acids from nasal, conjunctival nasopharyngeal and rectal swabs 
as well as milk samples from apparently healthy camels. Additionally, the virus was isolated 
from samples collected from nasal secretions and faeces [50,55,92]. Airborne infection 
was evidenced also via the detection of virual RNA from air samples collected from a barn 
owned by an infected patient [93]. Viral antibodies were also demonstrated in milk samples 
of camels [21]. Viral loads were found to be higher in nasal samples, but less shedding was 
dectected in oral and rectal samples [91]. Small, yet not infective, quantities of viral nucleic 
RNA particles were detected in exhaled breath [53]. 
Evidence of camel to human of transmission MERS-CoV  
A wide body of research documented the zoonotic nature of MERS-CoV [94]. The sequenced 
genomes of camel MERS-CoV were similar to those of human MERS-CoV [34,36,95,96]. 
Serological studies showed that MERS-CoV was circulating in camels before human infection 
was recognized [22]. The successive investigations of Memish et al. [36] and Haagmans et 
al. [34] are supporting this assumption.
Summary and knowledge gaps
MERS-CoV was isolated from both young and adult camels. Thus, the risk of cross species 
MERS-CoV transfer from camel to human is higher from calves than from adult. Direct 
contact with infected camel, especially contact with camel excreta like nasal discharge, 
feces, milk, contaminated air (Figure 1) increase the risk of camel human infection. Kissing 
of camels is a tradition among Arabian people as they cheer their camels [44]. This tradition 
increases the risk of direct transmission of MERS-CoV. 
Raw milk consumption directly after milking is another tradition that implies high risk 
of transmission, as raw milk can be a source of infection for consumers [84]. In comparison 
with camel farm workers, camel workers handling camels in quarantine at live animal 
markets and slaughterhouses have higher risk of infection, most likely due to intensity of 
contact and density of animals, but other factors like animal stress can not be ruled out. 
Given the epidemiology of MERS-CoV, it is likely that camel farms with low or no biosecurity 
get more MERS-CoV infection; subsequently the workers of these farms have increased 
chances to get MERS-CoV infection than those serve in farms characterized with strong 
biosecurity standards. An example is the risk for MERS-CoV incursion on camel farms with 
frequent import of camels from other farms or countries.
The possible epidemiological role of other species in perpetuation of MERS-CoV remain 
to be investigated. Observingly, increasing contacts between human and animals from 
one side and between animals and animals from the other side have been brought about 
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Figure 1: Speculated MERS-CoV infection sources. Figure (1A) shows routes of MERS-CoV transmission 
from Camel to Human; ‘A’ direct contact with camel, ‘B’ household, family or community contact, ‘C’ 
hospital or nosocomial contact, ‘U’ unknown source rather than A, B or C and ‘X’ through travel to 
Arabian Peninsula and infection by A, B, C or X route. Figure (1B) shows source of infection of MERS-
CoV from camel to human ‘N’ infection through nasal discharge, ‘F’ feces, ‘M’ milk, and ‘A’ airborne 
infection.
Figure 2: Anticipated future threat of MERS-CoV being a multi-species complex disease (pink round). 
This might be expected through the scenario that MERS-CoV have been speculated to derive from bat 
to dromedary camel (a). Human get the infection from dromedary camel (b). Alpaca, llama, pig and 
monkey have been found susceptible to MERS-CoV having the possibility of getting infection from 
human (c) and/or camels (d). There is chance for Bactrian camel to be susceptible to MERS-CoV and 
get infected from exposure to dromedary camel (g), alpaca, llama, pig and monkey (d) or human (f).
Figure 1: Speculated MERS-CoV infection sources. Figure (1A) shows routes of MERS-CoV 
transmission from Camel to Human; ‘A’ direct contact with camel, ‘B’ household, family or 
c mm nity contact, ‘C’ hospital or nosocomial contact, ‘U’ unknown source rather than A, B or C 
and ‘X’ through travel to Arabian Peninsula and infection by A, B, C or X route. Figure (1B) shows 
source of infection of MERS-CoV from camel to human ‘N’ infection through nasal discharge, ‘F’ 
feces, ‘M’ milk, and ‘A’ airborne infection.
Figure 2: Anticipated future threat of MERS-CoV being a multi-species complex disease (pink 
round). This might be expected through the scenario that MERS-CoV have been speculated to 
derive from bat to dromedary c mel (a). Human get the infection from dromedary camel (b). 
Alpaca, llama, pig and monkey have been found susceptible to MERS-CoV having the possibility 
of getting infecti  from human (c) and/or 
1A
A
B
A
M
F N
X
C
U
1B
a
b
c
d
ef
g
Figure 1: Speculated MERS-CoV infection sources. Figure (1A) shows routes of MERS-CoV 
transmission from Camel to Human; ‘A’ direct contact with camel, ‘B’ household, family or 
community contact, ‘C’ hospital or nosocomial contact, ‘U’ unknown source rather than A, B or C 
and ‘X’ through travel to Arabian Peninsula and infection by A, B, C or X route. Figure (1B) shows 
source of infection of MERS-CoV from camel to human ‘N’ inf ction through nasal discharge, ‘F’ 
feces, ‘M’ milk, and ‘A’ irborne infection.
Figure 2: Anticipated future threat of MERS-CoV being a multi-species complex disease (pink 
round). This might be expected through the scenario that MERS-CoV have been speculated to 
derive from bat to dr medary camel (a). Human get the infection from dromedary camel (b). 
Alpaca, llama, pig and monkey have been found susceptible to MERS-CoV having the possibility 
of getting infection from human (c) and/or 
1A
A
B
A
M
F N
X
C
U
1B
a
b
c
d
ef
g
vastly for commercial and/or industrial purposes. Theoretically, among other factors, this 
might offer the virus an appropriate epidemiological chance to gain the capability to cross 
the species barrier (Figure 2). At this junction, an increase risk of the MERS-CoV might be 
established.
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There are persistent critical gaps in what we know about MERS-CoV. Particularly, 
factors precipitating MERS-CoV emergence and transmission at the human-animal interface 
needed to be indentified and better elucidated. This research proposal aims at addressing 
some of these critical gaps and establishing better understanding of the potential role that 
dromedary camels and other animal sources play turning MERS-CoV into an emerging 
zoonotic disease. Since MERS-CoV is an emerging zoonotic infectious disease, many studies 
recommend to embrace intersectoral collaboration between health, veterinary, and 
environmental disciplines including the private stakeholders, and adopt a collaborative 
one-health approach to shoulder the responsibility of combating the epidemic [97].
THE OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
While camels are recognized as a natural host for MERS-CoV and a source for zoonotic 
introductions to humans, only a small percentage of the primary cases with documented 
direct contact with dromedary camels can be explained, leaving the door open to other 
possibilities. These possibilities include food-borne transmission and other zoonotic 
origins. The studies presented here were done as part of the public health preparedness 
and response activities in Qatar and aimed to address essential knowledge gaps important 
for public health.
Objectives and main question of the studies: 
To understand MERS-CoV dynamics at the human-animal interface by identifying factors 
that potentiate the emergence, transmission and spread of MERS-CoV in Qatar.  
To explore the strengths and challenges faced by health system partners Qatar in preparing 
for and responding to MERS-CoV outbreak. 
In order to address the above objectives, we raised the following questions: 
1. What are the characteristics, risk factors for infection and outcome among the 
confirmed MERS-CoV cases in Qatar? (Chapter 2). 
2. What is the evidence of MERS-CoV infection in humans exposed to camels? (Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4) 
3. What are patterns of shedding of MERS-CoV in camels in different situation and uses? 
(Chapter 5 ). 
4. What are the challenges faced by health system partners in preparing for and 
responding to MERS-CoV outbreak? (Chapter 6).
5. How the One-Health approach was informative to surveillance and response to the 
emergence of MERS-CoV ? (Chapter 7).
6. What are the characteristics, risk factors and prevalence of MERS-CoV infection and 
outcome in camels? (Chaper 8)
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7. What are the drivers of MERS-CoV emergence and spread at the Camel-human 
interface in Qatar and how does that influence risk of exposure of humans to MERS-
CoV? (Chapters 9).
The objectives will be addressed through the following tasks:
To generate hypotheses about the drivers for MERS CoV emergence 
and human infection in Qatar, an in depth review was carried out to 
assess the history and trends of camel ownership and uses in Qatar, 
and structured interviews were done to map the patterns of camel 
movement, herd management/husbandry practices. The dynamics 
of infection and shedding of MERS CoV of camels in relation to their 
movements and farming practices were assessed by laboratory 
detection of MERS-CoV RNA and antibodies.
Sero- epidemiological studies were conducted on humans infected 
with MERS-CoV who were exposed to camels versus those who were 
not exposed to camels in order to evaluate the rate of infection and 
determine risk groups.
Further epidemiological studies were done to assess the possible role 
of food in the transmission of MERS-CoV to humans by measuring the 
shedding MERS-CoV in camel milk and other camel products.
The national response to MERS-CoV in Qatar was assessed to identify 
the challenges faced by the partners of the health system in preparing 
for and responding to MERS-CoV, with focus on the One-Health 
interactions.
The knowledge generated from these studies was discussed with the 
purpose to translate the research findings Into an integrated framework 
of public health interventions (farm biosecurity system and One-Health)
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ABSTRACT
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a human disease caused by a coronavirus 
(CoV). In the present study, we reviewed and investigated the laboratory confirmed MERS 
cases reported in Qatar between September 2012 and February 2019. Epidemiological, 
demographic, and clinical characteristics of MERS cases were obtained using a structured 
questionnaire and by reviewing the MERS-CoV surveillance reports at Ministry of public 
Health (MoPH), Doha, Qatar. A total of 24 individuals - all adults - were identified; 23 
were male and only 1 was female. Eight patients died and the case-fatality rate rose with 
age. Most patients (n=14) had underlying medical disorders, including diabetes (n=7), 
hypertension (n=6) and chronic artery disease (n=5). The average days of hospitalization of 
the MERS patients was 21.5 days and after confirmation, virus shedding continued for 11-13 
days. Different from the epidemiological patterns seen in KSA and Korea, the majority of 
cases (n=19) most likely resulted from direct or indirect camel exposure. The Qatar policy 
implemented in 2013 to test every hospitalized patient with camel contact regardless of 
the symptoms observed and the employment of a One Health team during routine MERS-
CoV cases investigations in the field, may have significantly reduced the subsequent spread 
of MERS-CoV in Qatar. The lack of transboundary camel and human movement between 
Saudi Arabia and UAE  with Qatar due to the 2017 blockade also may have limited the 
number of MERS cases in Qatar.   
Key words: MERS-CoV, epidemiological, demographic, clinical characteristics, transmission 
dynamics, Qatar
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INTRODUCTION
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first detected in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 2012 [1].  Subsequently, human cases were noted in Qatar 
and Jordan with similar clinical features [2, 3] and the first case of human to human MERS-
CoV transmission was reported from the United Kingdom in 2013 [4]. Between September 
2012 and April, 2019, a total of 2428 cases and 838 deaths have been reported in 27 countries 
across the world [5]. All cases reported outside the Gulf States had a travel history and/or 
residence in one of the Arabian Peninsula countries; Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) or Qatar [6]. The disease incubation period ranges from two days to two weeks [7] 
and the clinical manifestations represent a wide spectrum of disease ranging from mild 
to severe respiratory syndrome, influenza-like illness with mainly lower respiratory tract 
symptoms, complicated by pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and organ 
failure [7-10]. Asymptomatic MERS cases range from 0% to 28.6% [11]. 
MERS-CoV has been identified as a both community [12, 13] and hospital-acquired 
infection [14, 15]. Elderly persons and those with multiple comorbidities were found to be 
at a higher risk of acquiring the infection, developing complications and may succumb to 
the infection [16]. The epidemic focus of MERS in the Arabian Peninsula has been attributed 
to spill-over from the widespread population of dromedary camels [17] with amplification 
during hospital outbreaks in KSA, Korea, Jordan and UAE [15]. High viral loads are typically 
detected in nasal fluids of infected dromedaries [18] suggesting direct contact can be a 
source of infection from camel to camel [18] and camel to human [19]. Several studies 
suggested that the camel-breeding season, which occurs during winter, plays an important 
role in MERS-CoV spread, as young camels are typically found to shed the highest loads of 
MERS-CoV [17, 18, 20, 21]. It remains to be seen, which other factors influence transmission 
and subsequently play a role in the epidemiology of MERS. 
Unlike the documented epidemiological patterns seen in KSA where MERS-CoV was 
reported to have spread in hospitals or household settings, in Qatar the pattern observed 
seems to be sporadic in nature. Several factors were suggested to have driven MERS-CoV 
emergence in Qatar including the economic boom that paved the road for flourishing 
camel-related sports and business, enlarged population density with growing number 
of expatriates and the transformation of Qatari communities from Bedouin to urban 
sedentary lifestyle with rising records of co-morbidities like Type 2 diabetes, hypertension, 
dyslipidemia, obesity and other chronic illnesses. It is believed that the increasing number 
of camels and the ban of open grazing owing to the exacerbating impact of desertification 
were key to the virus spillover from camels to humans as large number of camels were 
placed in compact barns in which their care givers also live [22, 23]. 
This is the first paper to provide a descriptive review for all laboratory-confirmed MERS 
cases reported in Qatar 2012-2019 in attempt to contribute insight on the understanding 
of the human MERS-CoV transmission, epidemiology and the potential risk factors in Qatar 
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[22, 23]. The extrapolation of Qatar situation can be helpful for regional and global public 
health and veterinary scholars to foster a collaborative One-Health approach and hospital 
settings to manage emerging infections [22].
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data collection
The data of all laboratory confirmed cases of MERS, reported between September 2012 
and February 2019, that were investigated by the MERS-CoV One Health Investigation team 
[45] at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), Doha, Qatar were included in the present 
study. 
Patient clinical data included co-morbidities, duration of clinical sign(s), date of 
hospitalization, disease outcome, and date of discharge/died. Patients epidemiological 
data such as patient’s demographic characteristics, age, sex, occupation, travel history to 
Saudi Arabia or other countries in the Middle East, history of camel contact, nature and 
place(s) of camel contact, contact history (and nature) with possible other MERS patients, 
and camel related information such as area and type of the farm, farm biosecurity, camel 
breeding season, camel movement, camel health status and other risk factors related to 
camels were obtained by a structured questionnaire and field investigation. 
Ethical approval: 
As this research was doen as part of the outbreak investigation efforts, ethical approval was 
waived from the Health Research Governance Department
Confirmation of MERS-CoV cases
All the clinical samples were screened using the Fast Track diagnostics real-time reverse-
transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) assay, targeting the upE and ORF1a 
genes, respectively, as previously described [25].  A case was considered confirmed when 
both targets were detected according to the WHO guideline [26, 27] at the Influenza 
laboratory in the National Influenza Centre of Hamad Medical Corporation, Qatar.
Definitions
Confirmed case: A person with laboratory confirmation of MERS-CoV infection irrespective 
of clinical signs and symptoms [28].
Primary case: cases with laboratory confirmation of MERS-CoV infection with no direct 
epidemiological link to a human MERS case [19].
Secondary case: cases with laboratory confirmation of MERS-CoV infection, and with a 
direct epidemiological link to a human MERS case [19].
Unclassified case: cases with insufficient information, based on potential prior exposures 
to allow classification as a primary or non-primary case [19].
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Direct camel contact: any physical contact (e.g., touching, feeding, cleaning, slaughtering, 
milking, assisting with birth, or other activities involving physical contact with dromedaries) 
with camels in the 14 days before symptom onset or when laboratory confirmation was 
reported [19]. 
Indirect camel contact: indirect exposure to dromedaries such as visiting camel areas 
(e.g., markets, racing tracks, farms) without directly touching a camel, or consumption 
of dromedary products (e.g., raw/unpasteurized dromedary milk, raw or undercooked 
dromedary meat, or other products derived from dromedaries, including urine) in the 14 
days before symptom onset, or when laboratory confirmation was reported [19]. Moreover, 
cases who did not have direct camel contact but had contact with persons who had “direct 
camel contact” in the 14 days before symptom onset or when laboratory confirmation 
reported, was also considered as indirect camel contact.
No contact: any case that could not be defined as direct or indirect contact [19]. 
Travel history: travel history was considered if the patient traveled in any country of 
the Middle East in the 14 days before symptom onset, and laboratory confirmation was 
reported [26].
Risk factor and Comorbidity: any attribute, characteristic or exposure of an individual 
that increases the likelihood of developing a disease or injury was considered as risk factor 
[29]. Presence of additional diseases in relation to an index disease in one individual was 
considered as comorbidity [30]. Risk factors of MERS-CoV infection described previously, 
such as camel contact, increased age, different comorbidities were considered in this 
present study [10, 15, 16, 31-34]. Alcohol and smoking habit was also considered as risk 
factor.
Statistical analysis
All the data were inserted on Microsoft excel worksheets and the descriptive analysis, and 
frequencies were calculated using SPSS statistical program (v22.0, SPSS, Chicago, IL). 
RESULTS
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the study population
A total of 24 cases and 8 associated deaths were reported during September 2012 to 
February 2019 in MoPH, Qatar. The highest numbers of positive cases (n=7) were detected 
in 2013. The majority of cases were male (n=23), with a mean age of 49 years (ranges from 
22 to 74). The case fatality rates were higher (n=7) for persons >45 years of age and for 
Qatari (n=5) versus non-Qatari patients (n=3). 
The majority of patients (n=19) were primary cases. Among the three secondary cases, 
case no 3 probably got the infection from Madina (KSA) [35]. Case no 7 (camel worker) 
was considered a secondary case as this patient had direct epidemiological link with case 
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no 6 (camel owner) [36]. However, three camels linked with patient no 6 and 7 were found 
positive for MERS-CoV [37]. Consequently, case no 7 can be considered as a primary case 
too. Case no 23 got the infection from case no 22 while sharing the living room. Seven 
cases traveled to KSA within two weeks before showing sickness. Three patients (Case 
no 7, 17 and 23) were detected by the One Health team during routine MERS-CoV case 
investigations; details were presented previously [24]. Two patients (Case no 7 and 23) 
were found MERS-CoV positive through contact tracing at the field level. Case no 23 was 
hospitalized for other health problems such as hypertension, diabetes, other respiratory 
disorders and later confirmed MERS-CoV positive. The Qatar One Health investigation 
team policy is to test MERS-CoV infection for every hospitalized patient with direct camel 
contact, regardless of the MERS symptoms. Case no 7 and 17 were asymptomatic at the 
time of hospital admission. 
Figure 1 shows the course of infection of all patients. Upon testing suspected cases, 
the Qatar policy is to admit them to the hospital for isolation and to discharge when two 
consecutive screening assays (upE and ORF1 by rTR-PCR) are found negative for the virus. 
Hospitalization lasted on average 21.5 days. The patients had symptoms for less than a 
week before diagnosis and hospital admission. The most common observed symptoms 
were fever (n=21) followed by cough (n=18) and shortness of breath (SOB) (n=9) (Table 
1). A total of 14 patients were identified with co-morbidities (Table 1). The most common 
co-morbidity factors of infected patients were diabetes mellitus (n=7), followed by 
hypertension (n=6), and coronary artery disease (n=5). In addition, associated risk factors 
were smoking (n=8) and alcohol use (n=5). Out of 14 patients with comorbidities, 5 died 
within 17 days of hospitalization. The others (n=9) were discharged on average 36 days 
after hospitalization. 
Of the 10 patients without comorbidity and associated risk factors, 8 were discharged 
after on average 26 days hospitalization. The majority of the patients (n=20) started to 
shed virus at around 5 days upon start of symptoms and shed viral RNA for at least 2 weeks 
or more. Five patients died while still shedding viral RNA but three patients died after 
seemingly clearance of the infection. The median duration of shedding was 11 to 13 days.
MERS-CoV Epidemiology
The MERS cases in Qatar were reported with residency and putative exposure from Al-
Shahanyia (13 from camel racing area, 2 from Al-Shahanyia camel market), followed by 7 
cases from Doha (2 from Doha camel market, other 5 were living in different parts of Doha) 
and 1 case of each was from Abu Nakhla and Dukhan (Figure 2).
Cases were not evenly distributed over the year. In Figure 3, we show the number of 
cases in relation to camel activities as described previously [22]. We found that 12 cases 
were reported during August-October, coinciding with the weaning and training of young 
racing camels, whereas 7 cases occurred between March-June, which is the resting season 
for camels after the return from international races. Most of the patients had a history of 
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Table 1: Epidemiological characteristics of MERS-CoV cases and outcome in Qatar between 
September 2012 and December 2017.
Variable/Characteristics
MERS-CoV Positive 
n
Outcome (Expired/
Recovered)
Occupation
Camel related occupation
Camel owner 6 2/4
Camel worker 8 1/7
Others occupation
Construction worker 1β 0/1
Courier service employee 1γ 1/0
Driver 1β 0/1
Fish market worker 1β 1/0
Geologist 1γ 0/1
House wife 1γ 1/0
Retired person 2δ 1/1
Trader 1ε 1/0
Unemployed 1α 0/1
Symptoms
Fever 21 7/14
Cough 18 6/12
Shortness of breath (SOB) 9 5/4
Fever and cough 17 5/12
Fever and cough and SOB 7 4/3
Others $ 10 3/7
Comorbidity
Comorbid 11 5/6
Diabetes mellitus 7 3/4
Hypertension 6 3/3
Coronary artery disease 5 3/2
Cardiovascular accident 2 2/0
Renal 2 1/1
Liver 1 1/0
Obesity 2 2/0
Asthma 2 2/0
Thyroid 1 0/1
Dyslipidemia 2 0/1
Others 1 0/1
Non-comorbid 13 3/10
Other risk factors
Alcoholic 5 2/3
Smoker 8 4/4
Non alcoholic &/or smoker 16 4/12
$ Sore throat, body ache, back pain, dysuria, dyspnea, dizziness, abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea, urinary 
complaints, skin rash; α Used to visit camel farm frequently; β Living with camel farm or slaughter house worker; 
γ No direct or indirect contact with camel; δ Family had camel farm, family members had frequent contact with 
camels; ε Patient visited his family and drank camel milk within two weeks of symptoms developed
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Figure 1: Admission, hospital stay, RT-PCR based diagnosis, viral RNA shedding and outcome of the 
confirmed MERS-CoV cases between September 2012 and February 2019 in Qatar.
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Figure 2: Spatial distribution of MERS-CoV cases in relation with camel and human population 
density distribution in Qatar. Figure 2: Spatial distribution of MERS-CoV cases in relation with camel and human population 
density distribution in Qatar.
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Figure 2: Spatial distribution of MERS-CoV cases in relation with camel and human population 
density distribution in Qatar.
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direct (n=16), followed by indirect (n=5) camel contact. The MERS-CoV patients had contact 
with 18 camel farms of which 16 were racing camel farms. None of the farms had any 
animal biosecurity system. All the 18 camel farms kept different species, including Qatari 
and non-Qatari camels, sheep, goats, and occasionally chicken, pigeons and dogs. Every 
farm had young camels less than one year, the owner’s majlis (resting places) and worker’s 
accommodation. Some of the camel farms had a history of hosting camels coming from 
other Gulf countries during the camel racing and show season. The majority of the camels 
had a history of movement outside the premises for racing practice, training, breeding, 
show competition and market. Some of the camels had history of international movement 
(mainly KSA and UAE). 
DISCUSSION
Knowledge of disease epidemiology is essential to develop effective control strategies. 
Hitherto, several MERS-CoV epidemiological studies were conducted in KSA and other gulf 
countries [10, 15, 34, 38, 39] but not in Qatar. In the present study, we have been able to 
delineate 24 MERS cases in Qatar reported between September 2012 and February 2019.
As shown in figure 1, 16 cases had a direct contact with camels, while 5 reported an indirect 
contact with camels. In agreement with previous studies [40-42], risk of MERS-CoV infection 
was linked to exposure to camels. Although, Qatari camel owners usually experience less 
frequent contact with their camels, the young non Qatari camel workers are involved in 
Figure 3: Relation between the reported cases and season of camel’s activities in Qatar September 
2012 to December 2017 (n = 24).Figure 3: Relation between the reported cases and season of camel’s activities in Qatar September 2012 to December 2017 (n = 24)
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feeding, milking, riding, training, cleaning farms, and providing health care to the sick 
camels, serving owners and their visitors. As these activities largely being performed with 
complete ignorance to the hygienic measures coupled with poor risk perception, farm 
biosecurity will be central to all prevention and control efforts [22, 42].
Consistent with previous reports [10, 38], CFR was higher among the elderly group (>45 
years) in our population. Comorbidity patterns reflect the impact of MERS [41] and increasing 
age together with chronic morbidity were also emphasized in this study as risk factors. It 
was reported in KSA that more than 50% of cases aged 50 years old had diabetes [43], 
which was found compatible with our study. An additional explanation for the enhanced 
fatality rates in older patients could be the presence of senescence-associated immune 
vulnerability in these individuals and suboptimal immune reactivity following MERS-CoV 
infection. Further case-control studies are needed to define the effect of co-morbidities on 
susceptibility to and associated mortality from MERS-CoV infection. 
Further, a high percentage of patients were male adults, which corroborates previous 
reports from different parts of the world [8, 14, 44]. However, there is no evidence that 
MERS-CoV has gender predisposition [45]. The observed gender-related rates could be 
simply due to the higher male exposure to camel population than females [45, 46]. Aside 
from the history of contact with camels or visiting a camel farm, our results did not point to 
a specific profession as a risk for MERS.
A seasonality pattern in the transmission of MERS-CoV in both human and camel has 
been reported, particularly during early months of winter (August-October) when young 
camels are weaned and involved in race training [17, 21, 47], as young camels are typically 
found to shed the highest loads of MERS-CoV RNA [18, 20]. 
However, such pattern is not obvious in Qatar as the MERS cases in Qatar were reported 
in different seasons, with the majority of cases in summer. 
Unlike the documented epidemiological patterns seen in KSA and UAE [12, 14, 49] 
where MERS-CoV did spread in hospitals or household settings, Qatar cases were mainly 
primary and sporadic in nature.  [48]. Only three secondary cases were reported in Qatar, 
of which one case was imported from KSA [35] and two from the community inside 
Qatar. The absence of hospital clusters may be due to the Qatar One Health approach to 
combat MERS-CoV [24] and the IP&C (infection protection and control) system in health 
care settings located at high risk zones in Qatar. The multidisciplinary One Health team 
including the community people helped to detect MERS patients early in the community 
[24], resulting in reduced  secondary transmission of the virus from the primary cases. 
The IP&C settings may have helped to prevent nosocomial transmission of the virus in the 
hospital settings. The majority of cases (n=15) were reported from Al Sheehaniya area, 
where camel races take place. Since early epidemiological reports in 2013 suggested a link 
to camels in the MERS transmission, Al Sheehaniya Health Center implemented strict IP&C 
measures with a broader case definition for suspected MERS-CoV infection. According to 
this case definition, “Any person with an acute respiratory infection, with history of fever 
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and cough and indications of pulmonary parenchymal disease and any contact with a farm 
animal” will be considered a suspected case. This case definition is used in addition to 
WHO case definition for surveillance [28]. Any suspected case goes through strict triage, is 
admitted to isolation rooms where airborne IP&C standards are applied, and hospitalized 
till confirmed negative for MERS-CoV infection by rRT-PCR. The roles of every staff member 
at Al Sheehaniya health center to handle suspected and isolated MERS patients are clearly 
defined and strictly maintained. 
Despite the WHO recommendation standard and droplet IP&C measure to handle cases 
suspected with MERS-CoV, the Qatar experience could be compared with the experiences of 
the other affected countries to provide recommendations. The Qatar experience highlights 
a significant guide to surveillance practice and investigation of suspected cases particularly 
in countries where camels are raised or when persons with chronic illnesses return from 
countries affected with the epidemic. While triaging cases with chronic diseases such as 
diabetes mellitus, coronary artery disease, renal diseases or hypertension, a history of 
contact with camels or visiting a camel farm should be a key question. 
One MERS case was imported from KSA to Qatar  [35]. The history of 7 patients travel to 
KSA might suggest a transboundary disease transmission in Qatar [40]. The MERS cases 
in Qatar were linked mostly either by Al Sheehaniya area (the main hub for camel race) 
or to the wholesale market which is the main center for camel trade. These two areas 
were major hubs for international camel gathering. After the blockade on Qatar started in 
May 2017 by KSA, UAE and some other Arab countries [50], camel trade and movement as 
well as movement of humans (camel workers and camel owners) between these countries 
stopped. No MERS cases were reported in Qatar from that time till now, whereas, MERS 
is continuously being reported in KSA, UAE, and some other Gulf countries [51]. These 
countries are interlinked by human and camel movement. Previous studies have shown 
that transboundary movement of humans (owners and workers) and camel could be a 
source of MERS-CoV transmission [22, 52]. Therefore, it is essential to to study the origin 
and mode of transmission of MERS-CoV among the Gulf countries.  
Another aspect that might have several implications on surveillance, case management, 
laboratory workload, and infection control and prevention is the virus shedding. While we 
are not sure about starting of the viral shedding in the present study, MERS-CoV shedding 
persists on average for 11-13 days, consistent with the findings of previous studies that have 
tested MERS-CoV genomic RNA [53-56]. On the basis of these results, IP&C precautions 
should be thoroughly applied for at least 1 month after symptom onset of patient infected 
with MERS-CoV.  
There were several limitations in our study. First, patients were self-selected 
because of referral to hospital and being screened actively for MERS-CoV according to 
the seriousness of their clinical condition. Second, study is retrospective where reliance 
on clinical records was the only available choice of data and that has not been validated 
41
2
Chapter 2 | MERS cases in Qatar
or updated. Additionally, serology was not adopted as routine diagnostic measures for 
cases and contacts. Third, entry of case records was not done uniformly. The inconsistent 
approach in investigating the suspected cases is thought to have contributed to the lack 
of data related to the probable risk factors, based on the One-Health approach. These 
alterations caused some inconsistencies in the data acquired from the database that may 
limit the interpretation of the study results. 
Nevertheless, this study confirms the importance of direct and indirect contact with 
dromedary camels, age (>45 years of age), and comorbidities as risk factors for infection 
and disease. Smoking and alcohol consumption seem to worsen such vulnerability, 
however, they unlikely constitute a major risk factors alone. This is one of the areas that 
needs further study.  
The systematic inclusion of relevant animal exposure history in case ascertainment by 
clinicians is crucial to improve our understanding of zoonotic disease.  
The availability of detailed reports of every case of MERS-CoV infection will provide valuable 
information to the scientific community that may be used to track, contain, and possibly 
eradicate this disease more effectively and efficiently. Therefore, further epidemiologic 
studies are needed to investigate in more detail which aspects of contact with camels or a 
camel product constitutes a risk factor for MERS-CoV infection.
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ABSTRACT
The transmission routes and risk factors for zoonotic Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections are still unknown. We used the World Health 
Organization questionnaire for MERS-CoV case-control studies to assess risk factors for 
human MERS-CoV seropositivity at a farm complex in Qatar. Nine camel workers with MERS-
CoV antibodies and 43 workers without antibodies were included. Some camel-related 
activities may pose a higher risk of MERS-CoV infection, as may cross-border movements of 
camels, poor hand hygiene, and overnight hospital stays with respiratory complaints. The 
risk factors identified in this study can be used to develop infection prevention and control 
measures for human MERS-CoV infections. 
Keywords: MERS-CoV; coronavirus; risk factors; transmission; zoonotic
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BACKGROUND
In 2012, a novel coronavirus, later named “Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus” 
(MERS-CoV), was isolated from a patient with pneumonia in Saudi Arabia [1]. In 2013, the 
first serological evidence of dromedary camels as reservoir host species for MERS-CoV 
was published [2], followed by detection of highly similar viruses in dromedary camels and 
symptomatic humans in contact with these animals. Further support for zoonotic MERS-
CoV infection was provided by the detection of MERS-CoV antibodies in camel-exposed 
persons, but the transmission routes and risk factors for primary, zoonotic MERS-CoV 
infections are still not elucidated [3].
Therefore, using the World Health Organization (WHO) questionnaire for case-control 
studies, we assessed risk factors for the presence of MERS-CoV antibodies in camel workers 
at a farm complex with circulation of MERS-CoV in camels in Qatar [4]. Previously, a cross-
sectional MERS-CoV serosurvey at this farm complex revealed a 5.1% seropositivity rate 
among the camel workers [5]. The outcomes of this study can be used to further establish 
evidence-based infection prevention and control measures for primary human MERS-CoV 
infections.
METHODS
Study Cohort
The camel farm complex in the Dukhan area of West Qatar consists of 5 barns with 
approximately 6000 racing and milking camels. Each barn includes a communal dormitory 
for all personnel. The results of MERS-CoV–specific serologic tests of the camel workers 
were described in a broader Qatar-wide seroprevalence study by Reusken et al [5]. Nine 
camel workers with antibodies specific for MERS-CoV and 43 workers without such 
antibodies as previously determined by S1-based protein microarray testing were included 
in this study [5]. A total of 3–4 seronegative workers per seropositive worker were randomly 
selected, based on the proximity of their bed to a seropositive worker, their age, their sex, 
and the date they joined the farm. Exclusion criteria were hospital admission within 14 days 
before serum sampling or recent contact (ie, within 14 days) with a person confirmed to be 
infected with MERS-CoV or with a hospitalized patient with a respiratory illness of unknown 
cause. None of the selected workers refused to participate or met the exclusion criteria.
Data Collection
All study participants were subjected to the WHO questionnaire, which was slightly adapted 
to the local situation (Supplementary Materials). 
The interviews took place in April 2014 and were completed within 1 week. The 
questionnaires were conducted in Arabic or Urdu by trained staff from the Qatar Ministry 
of Health.
50
Chapter 3 | Risk factors for MERS-CoV infection in camel workers
Data Analysis
We compared the questionnaire results of seropositive and seronegative workers by using 
the Welch t test and the Fisher exact test, performed in Stata/SE 14.1 for Windows. The 
Mantel-Haenszel test was used for multivariate testing, performed in R-3.3.2 for Windows, 
with a maximum of 2 variables and with a minimum of 4 events each. When a question was 
left unanswered, we assumed a negative (ie, “no” or “never”) response. Likert scales were 
converted to binary answers (“never,” “rarely,” and “monthly” were converted to “rarely”; 
“weekly” and “daily” were converted to “frequently”).
Ethical Approval
The investigation was part of an official public health outbreak investigation. The joint 
investigation team obtained written informed consent from all participants, as well as 
written approvals from the Public Health Department of the Qatar Ministry of Health.
RESULTS
General Cohort Characteristics
The study subjects were all male, with a mean age of 28 years (Table 1). They originated 
from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan, Nepal, and India. On average, they lived in Qatar for 3 
years. Four of 52 (8%) smoked shisha, and 16 of 52 respondents (31%) smoked tobacco, 
either now or in the past. No subjects reported ravelledng disease.
A Three of 5 seropositive workers and 1 of 11 seronegative workers reported that they 
were former tobacco smokers.
Fifty percent (26 of 52) reported that they regularly cleaned animal housing facilities. 
Most subjects in this subset also indicated that they handled animal waste (25 of 26; P < 
.001) and cleaned farm equipment (15 of 26; P < .001; Table 2). Among all subjects, 25% (13) 
milked camels more than once per week, and 12% (6) frequently assisted with calvings; all 
of which were also involved in milking camels (P < .001). Thirteen percent of subjects (7) 
were involved in camel training.
Univariate Analysis
Regular involvement in training and herding of camels (44% of seropositive participants vs 
7% of seronegative participants; P = .01), cleaning farm equipment (67% vs 26%; P = .05), 
and milking camels (55% vs 19%; P = .03) were associated with MERS-CoV seropositivity 
(Table 2). Workers involved in milking consumed raw camel milk (55% vs 19%; P = .03) and 
raw milk products (55% vs 19%; P = .03) significantly more often than workers not involved 
in milking, but correcting for these 2 parameters did not change the association between 
milking and MERS-CoV seropositivity. MERS-CoV–seropositive workers also seemed to 
assist with calving more often than seronegative workers, although the difference was not 
significant (33% vs 7%; P = .08).
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Table 1: General Characteristics of the Study Participants with and Those without Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) Infection
Characteristic 
MERS-CoV–Seropositive 
Workers (n = 9) 
MERS-CoV–Seronegative 
Workers (n = 43) 
Male sex 9 (100) 43 (100) 
Age, y 30.9 (25.4–36.4) 27.0 (25.2–28.8) 
Nationality 
Bangladesh 4 (44) 18 (42) 
 Pakistan 2 (22) 16 (37) 
 Sudan 2 (22) 5 (12) 
 Nepal 1 (11) 3 (7) 
 India 0 (0) 1 (2) 
Tobacco usea 5 (56) 11 (26) 
Shisha use 1 (11) 3 (7) 
Data are no. (%) of subjects or mean value (95$ confidence interval).
Table 2: Selection of Possible Risk Factors for Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) Antibodies: Univariate Analysis
Risk Factor 
MERS-CoV– Seropositive 
Workers, No. (%) (n = 9) 
MERS-CoV– Seronegative 
Workers, No. (%) (n = 43) Pa 
Primary job 
 Animal care 7 (78) 28 (65) .70 
 Animal training 4 (44) 3 (7) .01 
 Housework 0 (0) 2 (5) >.99 
 Other 3 (33) 7 (16) .35 
Frequentlyb performed activities in past 12 mo 
 Touch animals 7 (78) 27 (62) >.99 
 Kiss animals 0 (0) 2 (5) .47 
 Clean animal housing 6 (67) 20 (47) .46 
 Handle animal waste 6 (67) 19 (45) .28 
 Clean farm equipment 6 (67) 11 (26) .05 
 Assist in birth of animals 3 (33) 3 (7) .08 
 Milk animals 5 (55) 8 (19) .03 
 Slaughter animals 0 (0) 0 (0) >.99 
 Administer vaccines and/or medicines 0 (0) 1 (2) >.99 
Other animals at the farm complex 
 Dogs 3 (33) 2 (5) .03 
 Cats 3 (33) 23 (53) .47 
 Rats 3 (33) 26 (61) .16 
 Mice 3 (33) 12 (28) .70 
 Chickens 0 (0) 1 (2) >.99 
 Pigeons 0 (0) 1 (2) >.99 
Contact with animal waste 
 Present around subjects’ living quarters 4 (44) 4 (9) .02 
 Touched animal wastec 6 (67) 21 (49) .47 
Contact with sick or dead camels 
 Present around sick camels 5 (58) 17 (40) .47 
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Risk Factor 
MERS-CoV– Seropositive 
Workers, No. (%) (n = 9) 
MERS-CoV– Seronegative 
Workers, No. (%) (n = 43) Pa 
 Present around dead camels 0 (0) 9 (21) .33 
 Touched sick/dead camels 1 (11) 9 (21) .67 
Participation in animal transport 
 New camel at the barn 5 (55) 25 (58) .71 
 Animal taken to another ravelle 4 (44) 6 (14) .06 
Personal protective equipment 
 None 5 (58) 30 (70) .45 
 Gloves 2 (22) 10 (23) >.99 
 Coveralls 0 (0) 5 (12) .57 
 Dust masks 2 (22) 6 (14) .61 
 Boots or boot covers 0 (0) 4 (9) >.99 
 Eye protection 1 (11) 5 (12) >.99 
Hand washing 
 At mealtime 5 (56) 22 (51) >.99 
 Before and after animal task 4 (44) 37 (86) .01 
 Beginning and end of the day 1 (11) 16 (37) .21 
 Bathroom time 5 (56) 16 (37) .46 
 Rarely 2 (22) 1 (2) .07 
Consumption of animal products 
 Any raw milk producte 6 (67) 26 (60) >.99 
 Raw camel milk 6 (67) 20 (47) .47 
 Raw cow milk 0 (0) 5 (12) .57 
 Uncooked meat 0 (0) 0 (0) >.99 
Travel outside Qatar in past 6 mof 2 (22) 2 (5) .13 
Respiratory complaints in past 12 mo 
 Required physician visit 3 (33) 5 (12) .13 
 Required overnight hospital stay 3 (33) 1 (2) .01 
Current complaints 
 Fever and cough 2 (22) 2 (5) .13 
 Shortness of breath 0 (0) 0 (0) >.99 
 Vomiting 2 (22) 0 (0) .03 
 Diarrhea 0 (0) 0 (0) >.99 
 Headache 2 (22) 0 (0) .03 
a By the Fisher exact test.
B Daily or weekly.
C All contact was with camel waste.
D Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.
E Among those who consumed any raw milk product, 94% consumed milk, and 3% consumed cheese; the type 
of raw milk products consumed by 3% was unknown.
F Both seropositive subjects ravelled to Saudi Arabia, 1 seronegative subject ravelled to Pakistan, and 1 
seronegative subjects ravelled to Bangladesh.
53
3
Chapter 3 | Risk factors for MERS-CoV infection in camel workers
Handwashing before and after animal handling was more common among seronegative 
workers (44% vs 86%; P = .01), and a greater percentage of seropositive workers indicated 
that they rarely washed hands, although the difference was not significant (22% vs 
2%; P = .07). MERS-CoV–seropositive workers were also more likely to be involved in 
the movement of the camels in their care to other locations (44% vs 14%; P = .06). Of 
the workers who reported such movements, 3 (75%) in the seropositive group reported 
international movements (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman), compared with 
0 seronegative workers. Two of these 3 seropositive workers also ravelled to Saudi Arabia 
without animals in the past 6 months.
Workers with MERS-CoV antibodies were significantly more likely to report the 
presence of animal feces (44% vs 9%; P = .02) and dogs (33% vs 5%; P = .03) around their 
living quarters. Four of 5 workers who reported the presence of dogs also reported animal 
feces around their living quarters (P = .001). Other animals frequently seen at the farm 
complex were cats (reported by 59% of respondents), rats (reported by 55%) and mice 
(reported by 28%). None of the 52 study subjects indicated the presence of bats. One 
seropositive respondent reported drinking camel urine, although rarely, and none of the 
workers reported eating uncooked meat.
Significantly more seropositive workers reported an overnight stay in a hospital 
with respiratory complaints in the past 12 months (33% vs 2%; P = .01). Two seropositive 
workers indicated that they had fever, cough, vomiting, and headache at the time of the 
questionnaire, and both had been admitted to the hospital in the last 12 months. Nasal 
swab specimens from both workers tested negative for MERS-CoV by polymerase chain 
reaction analysis when they were admitted to the hospital.
DISCUSSION
We looked at possible correlations between different putative risk factors for MERS-CoV 
infection and the presence of MERS-CoV antibodies in camel workers. The univariate 
analysis revealed a correlation between the presence of MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies 
in camel farm workers and cleaning farm equipment (P = .05), assisting in animal birth (P = 
.08), milking animals (P = .03), and training animals (P = .01). Cleaning farm equipment might 
represent an increased risk of MERS-CoV exposure through contact with camel saliva, feces, 
and/or urine on soiled equipment [6, 7]. All animal workers that were involved in calvings also 
milked camels more than once per week. The relative high number of workers with MERS-
CoV antibodies who assisted in the birth of camels and in milking animals may be explained 
by intensive contact with young camels. Although newborn calves are still protected by 
maternal antibodies, workers who assist in animal birth or milking often remain in close 
contact with mothers and their calves beyond the period of maternal protection [8]. For 
example, milking requires the presence of suckling young camels who trigger milk flow [9]. 
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Moreover, camel milk can contain MERS-CoV RNA [9]. An association between MERS-CoV 
illness and milking has been described before [10]. Camel training, which requires close 
contact between the animal and its trainer, also seemed to increase the risk for MERS-
CoV infection in camel workers. This is in agreement with previous reports that indicated 
that close contact with camels can be a risk factor for MERS-CoV illness or the presence of 
MERS-CoV antibodies [5, 10, 11].
In our cohort, we found a greater frequency of MERS-CoV seropositivity among 
workers who indicated that the camels they handled had recently ravelled abroad within 
the Arabian Peninsula. Movement of animals to and from the Dukhan farm area occur 
with high frequency, owing to races, trade, and breeding activities, and can contribute 
to continuous local MERS-CoV circulation and human exposure due to both a continuous 
introduction of naive animals and/or acutely infected camels. Two out of 3 workers who 
reported international movements of their camels also reported personal travel to Saudi 
Arabia in the past 6 months. It is possible that these workers were exposed to MERS-CoV 
during their personal travel, rather than via the camels they worked with.
Another association that was found was between the presence of MERS-CoV antibodies 
and overnight hospitalization because of respiratory complaints. It is possible that the 
admitted workers had MERS-CoV infection but were tested after virus shedding had 
stopped or that they acquired nosocomial MERS-CoV infection without severe symptoms. 
Two of 3 seropositive workers hospitalized with respiratory complaints also reported 
headache, vomiting, cough, and fever at the time of the survey.
A remarkable finding was that a significantly greater percentage of seropositive 
workers reported the presence of dogs around their barn. The reported presence of dogs 
correlated strongly with the presence of animal feces (origin unknown) around the subject’s 
living quarters (P = .001). There is currently no evidence of a role for dogs in MERS-CoV 
epidemiology. A possible explanation for the association between the presence of dogs and 
MERS-CoV–seropositive humans could be that dogs mechanically spread contaminated 
camel products (eg, feces and urine) around the farm complex.
The cohort with antibodies against MERS-CoV had a greater percentage of workers 
who rarely washed their hands, and washing hands before and after animal tasks appeared 
to have a preventive effect. Prevention of MERS-CoV infection or exposure by handwashing 
possibly indicates that MERS-CoV can be indirectly transmitted via fomites. Infectious 
MERS-CoV could still be detected on surfaces after 1 day at 30°C and in milk after 2 days 
at 22°C in experimental conditions [12, 13]. Contact with camel excretions and subsequent 
touching of mucous membranes may be an important source of infection. Nasal secretions 
have been shown more frequently to contain MERS-CoV and have higher viral loads as 
compared to camel urine, feces, and saliva [6]. Human-to-human transmission may also 
take place via fomites. This can explain why many individuals with a primary case of MERS-
CoV infection have not reported direct camel contact and, in some cases, have reported a 
household member who recently visited a camel farm [10, 14].
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While providing some interesting observations, this study has several limitations. First, 
owing to the number of respondents, the power of the study is limited. Therefore, we could 
only perform univariate analyses and very limited multivariate analyses to demonstrate 
significant associations between possible risk factors and MERS-CoV antibody presence in 
the respondents. Moreover, the retrospective study design may have resulted in significant 
recall bias among participants with regard to their and their camels’ activities and health 
in the last 12 months. Because workers share housing and sleeping areas, MERS-CoV may 
have spread from human to human. This means that not all seropositive workers may have 
been infected directly by camels, which may affect the analysis. Last, it is possible that the 
MERS-CoV immunoglobulin G we detected was a result of exposure in the worker’s country 
of origin rather than in Qatar, with MERS-CoV circulation known to exist among camels in 
some such countries.
A recent MERS-CoV WHO consultation on public health goals and global priority 
research activities called on researchers to address knowledge gaps related to, among other 
topics, animal reservoirs and transmission routes to humans of MERS-CoV [15]. This study 
adds to the understanding of MERS-CoV transmission on the human-animal interface and 
informs risk management. On the basis of these initial results, a larger study was initiated 
with the aim to include different segments of the population in Qatar.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at The Journal of Infectious Diseases online. 
Consisting of data provided by the authors to benefit the reader, the posted materials are 
not copyedited and are the sole responsibility of the authors, so questions or comments 
should be addressed to the corresponding author.
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ABSTRACT
We determined the presence of neutralizing antibodies to Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus in persons in Qatar with and without dromedary contact. Antibodies were 
only detected in those with contact, suggesting dromedary exposure as a risk factor for 
infection. Findings also showed evidence for substantial underestimation of the infection 
in populations at risk in Qatar.
Since Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first detected 
in 2012, approximately 1,000 human infections have been reported to the World Health 
Organization, all linked to residence in or travel to countries on the Arabian Peninsula 
(1). Dromedaries (Camelus dromedarius) are thought to play a central role in MERS 
epidemiology because widespread evidence of MERS-CoV–specific antibodies and virus 
shedding in camels was found (2), and highly similar viruses have been detected in humans 
and dromedaries at the same location (3,4). These data suggest a direct zoonotic risk for 
MERS-CoV infection among persons in contact with camels. We describe a comparative 
serologic investigation in Qatar among persons with and without daily occupational 
exposure to dromedaries.
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THE STUDY
We used 498 anonymized serum samples from persons in Qatar with and without 
dromedary contact (Technical Appendix) and control serum from Europe (National Institute 
for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, the Netherlands; and University of Bonn, 
Bonn, Germany). Sampling in Qatar was cleared by the Ethics and Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committees of the Medical Research Center, Hamad Medical Corporation (permit 
2014-01-001). Samples from the Netherlands were used in accordance with the Dutch 
Federation of Medical Scientific Associations’ code of conduct for proper use of human 
tissue. Samples from Germany were used in accordance with German national laws.
Of the 498 samples, 294 were from persons with daily occupational contact with 
dromedaries (cohorts A–D) and 204 were from persons without camel contact (cohorts 
E–G). Cohort A consisted of 109 healthy workers (5 camel slaughterers [subcohort A1] and 
104 sheep slaughterers [A2]) at the central slaughterhouse in Doha, Qatar. All workers lived 
together and had contact with camels and sheep at the central animal market (CAM). Cohort 
B consisted of 8 CAM workers. Cohort C consisted of 22 healthy men living and working at 
the Al Sheehaniya  barn complex near the international dromedary racing track, and cohort 
D consisted of 155 healthy men living and working on a dromedary farm in Dukhan, western 
Qatar; molecular data showed ongoing circulation of MERS-CoV in dromedaries in these 
locations (Technical Appendix). Cohort E consisted of 56 random samples from construction 
workers in Qatar. Cohort F consisted of 10 samples from persons working and living at 
a complex with 200 sheep barns in northern Qatar. Cohort G consisted of 138 samples 
for confirming specificity of the testing algorithm (66 samples from the Netherlands and 
Germany from persons with recent human CoV infection [subcohort G1] and 72 samples 
from the Netherlands obtained for routine testing from persons with suspected Bordetella 
pertussis infection [G2]).
We used microarray technology as described (3,5,6) to analyze samples for the 
presence of IgG reactive with MERS-CoV S1 antigen (Table). To avoid overinterpretation 
of data, we set the reactivity cutoff at 30,000 relative fluorescent units for subsequent 
analyses (6). Samples from 20 of 294 persons with camel contact were reactive; no control 
or noncontact samples were reactive. Among camel handlers at the Al Sheehaniya and 
Dukhan locations, 4 of 22 and 8 of 155, respectively, had antibodies to MERS-CoV S1. At 
the CAM, 1 of 8 handlers had antibodies. At the slaughterhouse location, 3 of 104 sheep 
slaughterers and 4 of 5 camel slaughterers were antibody-positive (Figure). 
Samples from subcohort G1 (n = 66) and from all camel-contact cohorts were tested 
for antibodies to CoV OC43 S1, a common human CoV; all showed high seropositivity (range 
89%–100%) (Figure). All 498 samples were tested for reactivity to severe acute respiratory 
syndrome CoV S1; none reacted (Figure).
We used a 90% plaque-reduction neutralization test (PRNT90) to confirm the presence 
of MERS-CoV–specific antibodies in serum samples from camel handlers. For testing, 
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Figure: Reactivity of human serum samples, from persons with and without dromedary contact, with 
S1 antigens of various coronaviruses (CoVs), Qatar, 2013–2014. A) Middle East respiratory syndrome 
CoV S1; B) human CoV OC43 S1; C) severe acute respiratory syndrome CoV S1. Relative fluorescent 
units (RFU) are shown at a serum dilution of 1:20. Black lines indicate median; dotted black lines at 
30,000 RFU depict cutoff for analysis. Human cohorts: A1, camel slaughterers; A2, sheep slaughterers 
who had contact with dromedaries and camel slaughterers; B, workers at the central animal market; 
C, barn workers at the international camel racing track; D, workers on camel farms; E, construction 
workers; F, sheep farmers; G1, persons recently infected with a common human CoV (serum samples 
from the Netherlands and Germany); G2, persons with suspected Bordetella pertussis infection 
(serum samples from the Netherlands).
 
 
 
 
Figure. Reactivity of human serum samples, from persons with and without dromedary contact, with S1 
antigens of various coronaviruses (CoVs), Qatar, 2013–2014. A) Middle East respiratory syndrome CoV 
S1; B) human CoV OC43 S1; C) severe acute respiratory syndrome CoV S1. Relative fluorescent units 
(RFU) are shown at a serum dilution of 1:20. Black lines indicate median; dotted black lines at 30,000 RFU 
depict cutoff for analysis. Human cohorts: A1, camel slaughterers; A2, sheep slaughterers who had contact 
with dromedaries and camel slaughterers; B, workers at the central animal market; C, barn workers at the 
international camel racing track; D, workers on camel farms; E, construction workers; F, sheep farmers; 
G1, persons recently infected with a common human CoV (serum samples from the Netherlands and 
Germany); G2, persons with suspected Bordetella pertussis infection (serum samples from the 
Netherlands). 
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we used the 20 samples that were reactive to MERS-CoV S1 and a random selection of 
nonreactive samples from camel-contact (n = 35) and noncontact (n = 48) cohorts. Results 
were positive for 10 of the 20 MERS-CoV S1 antibody–positive samples (reciprocal titers of 
20 or 40) (Table).
All but 1 of the 35 samples from persons with camel contact who had negative S1 ELISA 
screening results were negative by PRNT90; the positive sample had a reciprocal titer of 20 
(Table). All 48 samples from the noncontact cohorts were negative by PRNT90. This finding 
may indicate an underestimation of MERS-CoV seroprevalence by S1 testing. Furthermore, 
6 samples from S1-positive and 2 from S1-negative persons with camel contact showed a 
reciprocal titer of 10, but titers of 10 were not observed in the noncontact cohorts. Five of 
these 8 reactive samples were also positive in a whole-virus MERS-CoV immunofluorescence 
assay at dilution 1:100; however, we regarded these as negative to avoid overinterpretation 
of data (data not shown).
CONCLUSIONS
We detected MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies in healthy persons who had daily 
occupational contact with dromedaries but not in persons without such contact. Only 
limited evidence is available regarding the presence of MERS-CoV antibodies in the general 
human population or in specific population cohorts. However, an overall seroprevalence 
of 0.15% was found in a cross-sectional study in Saudi Arabia, and among slaughterhouse 
workers, neutralizing antibodies were detected in 5 of 140 participants (7). 
This finding is similar to our finding among slaughterhouse workers: 7 of 109 were 
MERS-CoV antibody–positive. Four other studies lacked serologic evidence of MERS-CoV 
infection in humans with occupational exposure to dromedaries (8–11). However, only 1 
of those studies documented actual MERS-CoV circulation in dromedaries during human 
contact, and it was concluded that MERS-CoV was not highly transmissible from camels 
to humans, although only 7 persons had regular contact with only 1 herd (8). On several 
occasions, the percentage of camels shedding MERS-CoV was high (60%) at the CAM and 
slaughterhouse (C.B.E.M. Reusken, unpub. data). Thus, locations with a continuous flow 
of dromedaries with different places of origin and different immune statuses may enable 
prolonged circulation of MERS-CoV and sustained exposure of dromedary handlers to the 
virus; in Qatar, such locations would include the CAM, slaughterhouse, and barns near the 
international racing tracks. 
In this study, PRNT90-derived antibody titers were relatively low compared with those 
from earlier studies of MERS patients and dromedaries (2; B.L. Haagmans, unpub. data). The 
lower titers might reflect the apparent asymptomatic manifestation of MERS-CoV infection, 
individual differences in susceptibility, or both (2). Also, primary infections may result in 
a short-lived antibody peak followed by a rapid waning of antibody, depending on virus 
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and host properties (12), as seen in influenza A(H5N1) virus infection: antibody levels are 
higher in symptomatic than asymptomatic H5N1-infected persons, and antibodies wane 
more quickly during asymptomatic infection (13). MERS-CoV antibody kinetics and the 
persistence of antibodies detected by different serologic methods are not known. Such 
parameters are needed to estimate the force of infection on the basis of serologic data (14).
MERS-CoV–seropositive participants in this study did not report severe health 
problems, giving evidence for frequent unrecognized human infections. Assuming the 
health histories are accurate, this finding implies that the current overall MERS-CoV–
associated death rate of 37.1% (1) is most likely an overestimation of the actual rate and 
that most infections may be asymptomatic or mild. A major issue to be resolved is whether, 
and to what extent, asymptomatic cases contribute to the spread of MERS-CoV; it is well 
recognized that variability in disease transmission exists among humans (15).
Dr. Reusken is a public health virologist at the Viroscience department of Erasmus 
Medical Center. Her research interests include viruses operating at the animal–human 
interface.
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Table: Results of MERS-CoV serologic testing of humans with and without dromedary contact, Qatar, 
2013–2014*
Exposure type, cohort Country
Serum samples tested by
S1 assay, no. 
positive/no. 
tested 
† PRNT90, no. positive/no. tested†
S1-positive S1-negative 
Dromedary contact 20/294 10/20 1/35
A, slaughterhouse workers
A1, camel slaughterers Qatar 4/5 2/4 (40, 20) NT
A2, sheep slaughterers (contact 
with camels/camel slaughterers)
Qatar 3/104 2/3 (20, 20) 1/16 (20)
B, central animal market workers Qatar 1/8 0 NT
C, barn workers at international 
camel racing track
Qatar 4/22 3/4 (40, 40, 20) NT
D, camel farm workers Qatar 8/155 3/8 (40, 40, 20) 0/19
No dromedary contact 0/204 NA 0/48
E, construction workers Qatar 0/56 NA 0/48
F, sheep farmers Qatar 0/10 NA NT
G, specificity controls
G1, recent infection with a 
common hCoV
GER, NL 0/66 NA NT
G2, suspected infection 
with Bordetella pertussis
NL 0/72 NA NT
*GER, Germany; hCoV, human coronavirus; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; NA, not 
applicable; NL, the Netherlands; NT, not tested; PRNT90, 90% plaque-reduction neutralization test; S1, MERS-
CoV S1 antigen. †Nos. in parentheses are reciprocal antibody titers in PRNT90.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2108.150481
Description of Human Serum Cohorts 
The human serum cohorts consisted of the following: 
A) Anonymized serum samples from 109 healthy males (immigrants) collected in 2014 
and working at the central slaughterhouse in Doha, Qatar. Only five workers exclusively 
work in camel slaughter in Qatar, with 3–20 years of experience (A1). All five were sampled. 
The other workers exclusively slaughter sheep (A2). However, all workers live together and 
have contact with the animals (camels, sheep) at the central animal market. The percentage 
of camels presented for slaughter that shed MERS-CoV was high at several occasions (1) 
(C.B.E.M. Reusken, unpub. data). 
B) Anonymized sera from eight healthy males (originally from India, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sudan) working at the Central animal market and collected in 2014. The market 
serves mainly camels and sheep but goats, cows, horses and donkeys as well. The market 
comprises – 100 pens for camels, with – 20 animals per pen. The camels originate from 
Australia, Iran, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Syria, and are sold 
for slaughter or use (pet, breeding, milk production) in Qatar. Animals introduced from 
Australia are presumed to be naive for MERS-CoV (2). This cohort has daily close contact 
with animals and their secretions. 
C) Serum samples from 22 healthy males living and working at the Al Shahaniya barn 
complex near the Qatar international dromedary racing track. During the racing season 
from October through March, camels from around the Gulf area visit and stay together 
with Qatari camels at the Al Shahaniya barn complex. The barn complex consists of 749 
barns with an estimated total of 14,000 camels. These persons originate from India, Nepal, 
Pakistan or Sudan and have daily close contact (nurturing, cleaning, grooming, training 
for racing) with camels residing at the barns. The sera were collected in 2013 and 2014. 
Published and unpublished molecular data of camel samples taken in the period 2012–2014 
and the connection of the first two human cases in Qatar in 2015 with this barn complex 
show ongoing circulation of MERS-CoV in the complex (3–6). 
D) Serum samples from 155 healthy males living and working at a camel farm in the 
Dukhan area, West Qatar, collected in 2013 and 2014. The farm consists of milking, breeding 
and racing herds with an estimated 6.000 camels (4). The camel handlers originated from 
India, Nepal, Pakistan or Sudan, were 20–35 years of age and had daily, intensive contact 
with camels (nurturing, cleaning, grooming, veterinary care, training for races). The herds 
at the Dukhan farm showed molecular evidence for circulation of MERS-CoV at several 
occasions during 2013 and 2014 (A.K. Ibrahim, unpub. data). 
E) Random, anonymized serum samples collected in 2014 from 56 males working for 
construction companies (laborers, metal workers, guards, plumbers, crane operators, 
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drivers) and living in company camps in Doha, Qatar. All workers were healthy when 
samples were collected. The workers were <35 years of age and of Asian origin. There is no 
occupational contact with dromedaries, no ownership of dromedaries. 
F) Anonymized serum samples from ten healthy males (immigrants) working and living 
at a complex with 200 sheep barns in North Qatar. At the barns >95% of the animals are 
sheep, other animals are goats, chickens, ducks. There is no contact with camels. Samples 
were collected in 2014. 
G) Control group for specificity of the testing algorithm. G1) Anonymized serum 
samples from patients with a recent common human coronavirus (hCoV) infection (n = 
66). Serum samples of 10 children, ages ranging from 9–14 months (2x hCoV-HKU1, 2x 
hCoV-OC43, 3x hCoV-229E and 3x hCoV-NL63 IgG positive sera) and obtained in 2001 in 
the Netherlands. Four anonymized hCoV-OC43 PCR positive sera from adults obtained in 
Germany in 2013. Fifty-four anonymized serum samples from adults obtained in Erasmus 
MC, the Netherlands in the period 2010–2014 and taken >2wks-<1 year after a respiratory 
tract sample tested positive for hCoVs using real-time RT-PCR technology (23x hCoV-
OC43, 16x hCoV-229E, 15x hCoV-NL63. Serum had been collected at a later stage during 
hospitalization and subsequent routine visits to the out-patient clinic, the majority of 
these patients had recurrent health problems due to immune-deficiency, and was stored 
at Erasmus MC at 20°C. The study was approved by the local medical ethical committee 
(MEC approval: 2014–414). G2) Anonymized serum samples from 72 persons ranging in age 
from 0.1 year to 95.3 years sampled during 2008 for routine Bordetella pertussis serology 
in the Netherlands. This serum set represents a cohort biased toward patients with non-
influenza–like respiratory symptoms (7). 
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ABSTRACT
Two of the earliest Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) cases were men who had 
visited the Doha central animal market and adjoining slaughterhouse in Qatar. We show 
that a high proportion of camels presenting for slaughter in Qatar show evidence for nasal 
MERS-CoV shedding (62/105). Sequence analysis showed the circulation of at least five 
different virus strains at these premises, suggesting that this location is a driver of MERS-
CoV circulation and a high-risk area for human exposure. No correlation between RNA loads 
and levels of neutralizing antibodies was observed, suggesting limited immune protection 
and potential for reinfection despite previous exposure.
Keywords: zoonoses, camels, MERS-CoV, respiratory infections
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Dromedary camels are likely the primary source of Middle East respiratory syndrome virus 
(MERS-CoV) infection in humans, but further evidence is needed to support their role in 
zoonotic transmission. Two of the earliest diagnosed cases in Qatar were men who had 
visited the Doha central animal market and the adjoining central slaughterhouse (Farag, 
pers. comm.). Therefore, pre- and postmortem sampling was conducted on dromedary 
camels (n=105) at the central slaughterhouse in Doha, Qatar. Nasal, oral, and rectal swabs 
collected prior to slaughter were tested for the presence of MERS-CoV RNA. Most of the 
camels that were sampled showed evidence for MERS-CoV shedding at the time of slaughter 
(59%). Sequence analysis showed the circulation of at least five different virus strains at 
the slaughterhouse premises. An understanding of the extent and pattern of MERS-CoV 
shedding by dromedaries presenting for slaughter provides insight into the risks for MERS-
CoV exposure of persons with occupational contact with live camels and their carcasses.
BACKGROUND
Illness associated with infection with MERS-CoV is characterized primarily by mild-to-
severe respiratory complaints, most requiring hospital admission for pneumonitis or acute 
respiratory distress syndrome. As of June 11, 2015, ECDC has reported 1,288 laboratory-
confirmed cases, including 498 deaths (1). Human-to-human transmission seems limited 
to family and health care settings. Overall, a large proportion of MERS cases is suspected 
to be a result of zoonotic transmission (1) with growing evidence for dromedary camels 
(Camelus dromedarius) as a reservoir. MERS-CoV-specific antibodies have been detected 
in camels across the Middle East and the African continent, suggesting a geographically 
widespread distribution (2). Analysis of an outbreak associated with a barn in Qatar found 
dromedaries and humans to be infected with nearly identical strains of MERS-CoV (3) 
and further support for camels as reservoir came from a study in Saudi Arabia (KSA) that 
found widespread circulation of different genetic variants of MERS-CoV in camels, with 
geographic clustering of human and camel MERS-CoV sequences (4). However, few other 
studies provided evidence for zoonotic transmission of MERS-CoV from camels (5). The 
routes of direct or indirect zoonotic transmission are yet unknown. We investigated the 
rate of MERS-CoV circulation in dromedaries at the slaughterhouse in Qatar, previously 
linked to two MERS cases in Qatar.
MERS virus shedding at slaughterhouse
A random group of 105 camels that presented for slaughter in February (n=53) and March 
(n=52) 2014 were sampled for MERS-CoV analysis (Table 1). Animals either had come directly 
from within Qatar or KSA, or had been sold through the central animal market (CM). Swabs 
and lymph nodes were tested for MERS-CoV RNA by internally controlled RT-PCR targeting 
UpE and N genes, as described (3, 6). The first camel isolate of MERS-CoV as described by 
Raj et al. (7) was obtained from the first group of 53 samples and among others sequences 
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generated from this group have been used to define a general MERS-CoV typing fragment 
(8). In total, 59% of the camels showed evidence for virus shedding in at least one type of 
swab at the time of slaughter (Table 1). The percentage positive samples was the highest 
for nasal samples, followed by oral swabs, fecal swabs, and bronchial swabs. All but one 
animals with virus shedding from any sample had a positive nasal swab. For saliva (oral), 
the percentage of positive samples was the highest for animals between 7 and 12 months 
of age. Lymph nodes from 53 animals were tested, yielding five positives. Approximation of 
the viral loads in the samples using the Ct values obtained with the UpE target showed no 
significant differences between types of samples and age groups (Fig. 1) It should be noted 
that viral loads with ΔCt>20 were observed only in the nasal swabs and the nasal swab 
sample with the highest viral load was found to contain infectious virus (7).
Diversity in MERS-CoV circulation
To obtain further insight in the diversity of the viruses that circulated in dromedary camels 
at the slaughterhouse, MERS-CoV strains were sequenced according to a recently developed 
technique that enables the identification of divergent MERS-CoV types [sequences and 
technique in (8)]. In total, five different sequence types were identified with three different 
types found at both sampling moments (Table 2). Camels either came from the large Al-
Shahaniya international racing complex (ASH) or from different sources elsewhere in 
Qatar (indicated by the initial arrow for animals 6–8 and 10–12 in (Table 2). Subsequently, 
they were either brought to a showing area (Al Mazad, AM), to the barns at the CM for a 
holding period, or immediately sent to the slaughterhouse (SH). Therefore, the sampling 
for animals 1–5 and 9–13 reflects MERS-CoV sequence diversity as a result of import from 
other regions in Qatar, whereas virus circulation at the CM more likely explains the virus 
diversity for animals 6–8.
Serology
Antibodies to MERS-CoV S1 were found in 100 out of 103 animals tested by micro-array 
technology (9). For 53 animals, antibody levels were also determined by virus neutralization 
Table 1: MERS-CoV detection in pre- and postmortem samples from camels presented for slaughter 
in Doha, Qatar (n=105)
Sample type
All 
(n=105)
0–6 months 
(n=41)
7–12 months 
(n=35)
>1 years 
(n=29)
Nasal 60 (61/101)a 63 (24/38) 74 (26/35) 39 (11/28)
Oral 23 (23/102) 18 (7/39) 35 (12/34) 14 (4/29)
Rectal 15 (15/103) 15 (6/39) 17 (6/35) 10 (3/29)
Bronchial 7 (7/101) 8 (3/38) 6 (2/34) 7 (2/29)
Lymph nodes 9 (5/53) 0 (0/19) 20 (4/20) 7 (1/14)
A Percentage positive for MERS-CoV RNA as detected by two RT-PCR targets, followed by (absolute number of 
samples positive/ total number tested).
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Table 2: Summary of background information from slaughter camels for which sequences could be 
obtained from nasal swabs
Animal ID # Origin Age Sampling moment Sequence type
1 ASH→AM→SH 6 months 1 1
2 ASH→AM→SH 6 months 1 1
3 ASH→AM→SH 6 months 2 1
4 ASH→AM→SH 8 months 2 1
5 ASH→AM→SH 7 months 2 1
6 →CM→SH 6 months 1 2
7 →CM→SH 6 months 1 3
8 →CM→SH 8 months 1 3
9 ASH→SH 2 years 1 3
10 →AM→CM 6 months 2 3
11 →AM→CM 10 month 1 4
12 →AM→CM 6 months 2 4
13 ASH→SH 8 months 2 5
ASH=Al-Shahaniya, AM=Al Mazad, SH=slaughterhouse, CM=central market.
Figure 1: MERS-CoV RNA shedding by dromedary camels at the central slaughterhouse, Qatar, 
depicted by sample type (a) and age group for nasal swabs (b). Viral loads in samples are approximated 
using Ct values obtained with the Up-E target and are expressed as ΔCt (40-Ctsample). Black lines 
indicate medians.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: MERS-CoV RNA shedding by dromedary camels at the central slaughterhouse, Qatar, depicted by sample type 
(a) and age group for nasal swabs (b). Viral loads in samples are approximated using Ct values obtained with the Up-E target 
and are expressed as ΔCt (40-Ctsample). Black lines indicate medians. 
 
Table 1: MERS-CoV detection in pre- and postmortem samples from camels presented for 
slaughter in Doha, Qatar (n=105) 
Sample type All (n=105) 0–6 months (n=41) 7–12 months (n=35) >1 years (n=29) 
Nasal 60 (61/101)a  63 (24/38) 74 (26/35) 39 (11/28) 
Oral 23 (23/102) 18 (7/39) 35 (12/34) 14 (4/29) 
Rectal 15 (15/103) 15 (6/39) 17 (6/35) 10 (3/29) 
Bronchial 7 (7/101) 8 (3/38) 6 (2/34) 7 (2/29) 
Lymph nodes 9 (5/53) 0 (0/19) 20 (4/20) 7 (1/14) 
A Percentage positive for MERS-CoV RNA as detected by two RT-PCR targets, followed by (absolute number of samples positive/ 
total number tested). 
76
Chapter 5.1 | High proportion of MERS-CoV shedding dromedaries at slaughterhouse
assay as described earlier (9). Almost all animals had detectable neutralizing antibodies 
with no obvious age pattern and no significant difference in proportion of animals with low 
antibody levels (<20) (Fig. 2a) . There was no correlation between antibody levels and the 
viral load as reflected by Ct values (Fig. 2b).
DISCUSSION
A high proportion of dromedary camels shed MERS-CoV RNA when presented for slaughter 
on two occasions at the central abattoir in Qatar. Co-circulation of multiple MERS-CoV 
variants demonstrates multiple virus introductions through flow of new animals traded 
into this group of animals, reflecting the virus diversity in wider Qatar, including animals 
Figure 2: Reciprocal MERS-CoV-neutralizing antibodies titers by age group (a) and correlated with 
ΔCt (40-Ctsample) (b) for 53 camels at central slaughterhouse, Qatar.
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Antibodies to MERS-CoV S1 were found in 100 out of 103 animals tested by micro-array 
technology (9). For 53 animals, antibody levels were also determined by virus neutralization assay 
as described earlier (9). Almost all animals had detectable neutralizing antibodies with no obvious 
age pattern and no significant difference in proportion of animals with low antibody levels (<20) 
(Fig. 2a) . There was no correlation between antibody levels and the viral load as reflected by Ct 
values (Fig. 2b). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Reciprocal MERS-CoV-neutralizing antibodies titers by age group (a) and correlated with ΔCt (40-Ctsample) (b) for 
53 camels at central slaughterhouse, Qatar. 
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imported from Australia, the Middle East region and East Africa. This suggests that CM is a 
driver of MERS-CoV circulation and a high-risk site for human exposure. Indeed two cases 
in Qatar were linked to visits to this area, and serology data on the only five workers that 
exclusively work in camel slaughter in Qatar illustrated this potential burden as four of the 
five slaughterers had IgG antibodies specific for MERS-CoV (10) 
A study at four slaughterhouses in Egypt showed an overall RNA prevalence in nasal 
swabs of 3.6% among 110 camels (11), which is significantly lower than in our study. A 
comparison of the organization of the meat markets between Egypt and Qatar could provide 
insight in the observed differences. The camels that are put together for a holding period of 
weeks prior to slaughter in Doha have a wide variety of origins with varying initial immune 
status, which might provide a platform for extensive virus circulation. These include naïve 
camels from Australia (12) and camels from areas in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf region 
with known differences in immune status (2, 13, 14). We observed a positivity rate in rectal 
swabs of 15 out of 103 animals that were analyzed (of which 61 were positive in nasal 
swabs). Other studies observed none to very low numbers of camels shedding MERS-CoV 
RNA in feces (3, 15). However, the total numbers of animals in these studies were too low to 
make a significant comparison with the data presented here. In the current views on MERS-
CoV epidemiology, young camels (≤1year) with primary infections are thought to play a 
bigger role in MERS-CoV transmission than older animals for which less frequent shedding 
is observed (4, 15) and who demonstrate higher rates of seroconversion (reviewed in (Ref. 
2). However, we observed no significant differences in MERS-CoV RNA shedding between 
different age groups. Moreover, the lack of correlation between viral RNA loads and levels 
of neutralizing antibodies in the animals suggests limited protection and potential for 
reinfection despite previous exposure, similar to the situation in humans with the four 
common human CoVs and as observed in a camel herd in KSA (15). A problem is that the 
time since onset of infection could not be determined as the animals did not show overt 
symptoms. Therefore, it remains to be determined how the kinetics of infection are. In 
theory, the observed shedding of virus in the presence of neutralizing antibodies could 
represent sampling toward the end of an infection cycle. Alternatively, the data may reflect 
limited mucosal immunity as has been shown for other animal coronaviruses (16). The 
possibility of camel vaccination has been suggested as a possible approach to controlling 
MERS-CoV transmission to humans. However, this may prove to be a challenging task in 
light of the above observations.
Given the high numbers of animals shedding these viruses in dynamic environments 
like the Doha market and abattoir, potential human health risks need to be considered 
and the implementation of management alternatives (e.g. separation of naïve animals 
from previously exposed animals and personal protective equipment for employees) might 
reduce the burden of MERS-CoV exposure to humans.
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ABSTRACT
We obtained the full genome of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) from a camel in Qatar. This virus is highly similar to the human England/Qatar 1 
virus isolated in 2012. The MERS-CoV from the camel efficiently replicated in human cells, 
providing further evidence for the zoonotic potential of MERS-CoV from camels.
Keywords: coronavirus, MERS, camel, viruses, Qatar
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BACKGROUND 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a novel coronavirus that can 
cause severe lower respiratory tract infection in humans (1,2). MERS-CoV clusters with 
viruses in the genus Betacoronavirus; the closest relative to this virus is bat CoVs clade 
2c (3). Although bats are believed to carry different CoV ancestors, antibody reactivity 
against MERS-CoV has been found in serum from dromedary camels from countries within 
the Arabian Peninsula (4–7), Egypt (8), and the Canary Islands (4). More recently, MERS-
CoVs that phylogenetically cluster with human MERS-CoVs were detected in camels from 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (7,9–12). To further characterize MERS-CoV from camels, we 
screened nose swab samples from camels in Qatar .
The Study
In February 2014, nasal swab samples were collected from 53 healthy dromedary camels in 
Doha, Qatar. After sampling, swabs were put into tubes containing viral transport medium 
and stored at −80°C until shipment to the Netherlands on dry ice, as described (9).
Total nucleic acids from nasal swabs were isolated by using the MagnaPure 96 total 
nucleic acid isolation kit (Roche, Mannheim, Germany), and samples were tested for MERS-
CoV by using 2 TaqMan assays: 1 for the envelope (upE) and 1 for the nucleocapsid gene 
(N), as described previously (9,13). In each assay we detected MERS-CoV RNA in a sample 
from an 8-month-old camel. The cycle threshold of the positive sample was 12.9 in the upE 
assay and 11.3 in the N assay.
For further genomic characterization, RNA was isolated from 50 μL of 1 swab sample 
with the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany), eluted in 60 μL water, 
and reverse transcribed with the Superscript III First-Strand Synthesis System (Life 
Technologies (Bleiswijk, the Netherlands) with random hexamers. The MERS-CoV genome 
was amplified by using MERS-CoV–specific overlapping primer sets as described previously 
(3). Amplified MERS-CoV fragments were sequenced directly on both strands by using 
the BigDye Terminator version 3.1 Cycle Sequencing kit on an ABI PRISM 3100 genetic 
analyzer (Applied Biosystems, Bleiswijk, the Netherlands). To obtain the 5′ and 3′ ends, 
we used the FirstChoice RLM-RACE kit (Ambion, Bleiswijk, the Netherlands) according to 
the manufacturer’s protocols. Using overlapping sequence fragments, we assembled the 
complete MERS-CoV genome, except for 1 nt potentially missing at the 5′ end.
The genome was 30,117 nt long, including 12 nt at the 3′ poly A tail (MERS-CoV 
camel/Qatar_2_2014, GenBank accession no. KJ650098). Similar to the genome of human 
MERS-CoV isolates, the genome of camel MERS-CoV isolates contains 10 complete open 
reading frames (ORFs) (ORF 1ab, spike, ORF3, ORF4a, ORF4b, ORF5, envelope, membrane, 
nucleocapsid, and ORF8b), 8 transcription-regulatory sequences, and 2 terminal untranslated 
regions. The alignment of the camel MERS-CoV with known human MERS-CoVs, including 
1 near-complete camel MERS-CoV (NRCE_HKU205) sequence, showed overall nucleotide 
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Figure 1: Phylogenetic analysis of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronaviruses (MERS-CoVs). 
Genome sequences of representative isolates were aligned by using ClustalW, and a phylogenetic 
tree was constructed by using the PhyML method in Seaview 4 (all 3 software packages can be found 
at http://pbil.univ-lyon1.fr/software/seaview) and was visualized in FigTree version 1.3.1 (http://tree.
bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). Values at branches show the result of the approximate likelihood 
ratio; values <0.70 are not shown. The MERS-CoV isolated from a dromedary camel in Qatar in 2014 
is depicted in a rectangle. Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site.
identities of 99.5%–99.9% between camel and human MERS-CoV isolates from different 
geographic regions.
Phylogenetic analysis of the complete genome clearly showed that MERS-CoV camel/
Qatar_2_2014 is highly similar to human MERS-CoV; the closest relative to camel MERS-
CoV was England/Qatar1 2012 (99.9% identity) (Figure 1), and it was clearly distinct from 
the camel MERS-CoV (99.5% identity) isolated from camels at a different location in Qatar 
and in Egypt (9,11). Comparison of spike protein amino acid sequences from various 
human and camel isolates showed that this protein is highly conserved between this camel 
virus and other human isolates (online Technical Appendix Table, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/20/8/14-0663-Techapp1.pdf).
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: CoVs). Genome-respiratory syndrome coronaviruses (MERSPhylogenetic analysis of Middle East  
sequen es of representative isolates were aligned by using ClustalW, and a phylogenetic tree was constructed 
-univby using the PhyML method in Seaview 4 (all 3 software packages can be found at http://pbil.
lyon1.fr/software/seaview) and was visualized in FigTree version 1.3.1 
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). Values at bran s show the result of the approximate likelihood 
dary camel in Qatar in 2014 is depictedCoV isolated from a drome-ratio; values <0.70 are not shown. The MERS 
in a rectangle. Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site.  
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In addition, most amino acid residues critical for receptor binding (14) are identical in 
human and camel isolates, except for L506F in England/Qatar1. The biologic relevance of 
this mutation has not been investigated. The presence of arginine at position 1020 in the 
camel virus isolate might indicate that selective pressure at this site has probably not taken 
place as previously postulated. The fact that a MERS-CoV from a camel is highly similar 
to that from a human patient who probably became infected >1 year earlier in the same 
region suggests that this virus is maintained within camel populations and further supports 
the hypothesis that MERS-CoV can be transmitted from camels to humans.
To test for the presence of infectious virus, we titrated the swab sample on Vero cells 
(ATCC no. CCL-81). After 48 hours, we observed cytopathic changes in cells (320 50% tissue 
culture infectious dose/mL). After isolation, the passage-3 virus stock was used for all 
subsequent experiments.
To check for adaptive mutations obtained during cell culture, we used 454 deep-
sequencing technology (Roche, Indianapolis, IN, USA) to analyze the full-genome sequence 
as described elsewhere (3). A total of 57,655 sequence reads were obtained, of which 17,056 
were specific for MERS-CoV, revealing ≈99.77% of the virus genome. Genome coverage 
ranged from 1 to 2,082 reads at single nucleotide positions. Gaps or regions with coverage 
of <4 reads were confirmed by Sanger sequencing. When the genome of the passaged virus 
was aligned with the genome of the initial clinical isolate, we did not observe any mutations 
acquired during passaging.
To further functionally characterize this virus isolate, we subsequently inoculated 
human hepatoma (Huh-7) cells with MERS-CoV camel/Qatar_2_2014. After 2 days, virus-
induced cytopathic effects were observed in the inoculated cell cultures (Technical Appendix 
Figure). In addition, a strong increase in virus titer was measured in the cell supernatant 
(Figure 2, panel A); produced virus could be passaged (not shown). Virus production in Huh-
7 cells was blocked by preincubating camel MERS-CoV with a 1:200 dilution of serum from 
MERS-CoV antibody–positive camels (9) but not with seronegative camel serum (4) (Figure 
2, panel A). Infection of Huh-7 cells could also be blocked by preincubation of cells with 
polyclonal antiserum against human DPP4 but not with control serum (Figure 2, panel A). 
Furthermore, transfection of nonsusceptible MDCK cells with human DPP4 (Figure 2, panel 
B), but not with empty vector, conferred susceptibility to infection with camel MERS-CoV 
(Figure 2, panel C). These data demonstrate that the MERS-CoV obtained from a dromedary 
camel is able to replicate in human cells and uses DPP4 as entry receptor, similar to MERS-
CoV isolates obtained from human patients (15)
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Figure 2: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) from camel replicates in human 
hepatoma (Huh-7) cells and uses human DPP4 as entry receptor. Huh-7 cells were inoculated with 
camel MERS-CoV and left for 1 h. Next, cells were washed twice, and supernatant was collected at 
2 h (open bars) and 20 h (closed bars) before being tested for MERS-CoV RNA by using a TaqMan 
assay. We analyzed control camel MERS-CoV–infected cells, cells inoculated with camel MERS-
CoV in the presence of normal camel serum (NCS), MERS-CoV–antibody positive camel serum (Ab-
positive CS), normal goat serum (NGS), and anti-DPP4 polyclonal antibody–treated cells. Results are 
expressed as genome equivalents (GE), 50% tissue culture infective dose (TCID50/mL) (A). MDCK 
cells transfected with plasmid-encoding human DPP4 or a control plasmid (pcDNA) were stained 
with polyclonal antibody against human DPP4 (B) or inoculated with camel MERS-CoV and fixed 20 h 
after inoculation (p.i.) and stained for viral antigen (C).
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CONCLUSIONS
We isolated MERS-CoV from the nasal cavity of 1 dromedary camel and demonstrated its 
infectiousness. Further studies are needed to test whether camels infected at a young age 
are more likely than adult dromedary camels to excrete infectious virus, possibly because 
of the MERS-CoV seronegative status of the younger camels. In addition, our results add 
to recent findings that MERS-CoVs from camels and humans are nearly identical (9–11). As 
might be expected from the high level of conservation in the critical interacting amino acids 
in the receptor-binding domain of the camel and human MERS-CoV isolates (online Technical 
Appendix Table), we show that camel MERS-CoV can infect human Huh-7 cells by using the 
same entry receptor as the human MERS-CoV isolates (15). Collectively, combined with 
the observation that the sequence of this virus was most closely related to that of a virus 
from a human patient who acquired MERS-CoV in Qatar a year earlier, these data support 
the hypothesis that dromedary camels are a reservoir for MERS-CoV and can transmit the 
infection to humans. However, whether exposure of humans to camels directly can lead to 
human infection cannot be concluded from our data. We are not aware of a connection 
between the camel population sampled in this study and the patient infected with MERS-
CoV England/Qatar 1. Future epidemiologic studies are needed to investigate whether 
contact with camels or camel products constitutes a risk factor for MERS-CoV infection.
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Appendix Figure. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) from camel replicates 
in human hepatoma (Huh-7). Mock-inoculated cells (A) or cells inoculated with camel MERS-CoV (B) 
were fixed 40 hours after inoculation and stained with crystal violet.
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LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Dromedaries (Camelus dromedarius) are reservoirs for zoonotic transmission of Middle-
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) but even six years after its discovery 
the transmission route(s) of MERS-CoV from dromedaries to humans has not been fully 
elucidated.  
The World Health Organization recommends that groups at high risk for severe MERS 
should avoid contact with dromedary camels, consumption of raw camel milk or camel 
urine, as well as eating meat that has not been properly cooked (WHO, 2018). Although 
MERS-CoV RNA has been detected in dromedary camel nasal secretions, saliva, feces and 
milk (Farag, 2014;Reusken, 2014;Haagmans, 2015), and in human urine samples (Corman, 
2016), so far no evidence has been obtained for the presence of the virus in dromedary urine 
(Adney, 2014; Ali, 2017). However, it has been speculated that, amongst others, collection 
and consumption of urine from acutely infected camels might create circumstances for 
cross-species transmission event (Gossner, 2016;MacKay, 2015).  Dromedary camel urine 
plays an ancient traditional and religious role in daily life in the Middle East and North 
Africa region as well as in parts of Asia. Camel urine is believed to have therapeutic effects 
in the treatment of cancer, diabetes, certain infectious and cardiovascular diseases as well 
as in the treatment of hair and skin problems. Hence, fresh urine is consumed, used to wash 
body and hair, and is a component in ointments (Gader, 2016; Alkhamees, 2017); e.g. it has 
been described that Bedouins in the Middle-East have a daily consumption of 100 ml camel 
urine while a study among 156 Saudi cancer patients showed that 15.7% drank camel urine 
(Al-Yousef, 2012;Abuelgasim, 2018).
Here, we investigated the presence of MERS-CoV RNA and specific antibodies in urine 
of camels that were offered for slaughter at the central slaughterhouse in Doha, Qatar in 
March 2014. Qatar has reported 19 MERS cases as of August 2018 (WHO, 2018).  Camels 
at the Doha slaughterhouse were shown to have a high prevalence of MERS-CoV RNA 
shedding. A previous study showed that 59% of the camels had evidence for virus shedding 
in at least one type of swab at the time of slaughter (Farag, 2014). Urine from 23 camels, 
aged 4 months to 10 years (median 6 months), was collected aseptically post-slaughter 
from intact bladders using 20 ml syringes. The collected urine was stored at -80°C until RNA 
extraction as described before (Reusken, 2014).   The urine was analysed for the presence 
of MERS-CoV using a screening RT-PCR targeting the UpE region and a confirmatory RT-PCR 
targeting the N-gene as described before (Farag, 2014). We interpreted the urine results 
in the context of the presence of MERS-CoV RNA and antibodies in each respectively 
same-time collected nasal swab and serum sample (data in Farag, 2014).  In none of the 
23 urine samples MERS-CoV RNA could be detected while of the corresponding 23 nasal 
swabs 11 camels tested positive using both tests. The same urine samples were analysed 
for the presence of MERS-CoV specific antibodies using micro-array technology (Reusken, 
2013a,b). We found MERS-CoV specific antibodies in 16 of 23 urine samples while all 
95
5.3
Chapter 5.3 | Failure to detect MERS-CoV RNA in camel urine
camels showed such evidence for a (previous) MERS-CoV infection in serum. Based on the 
observed relative fluorescence the overall reactivity of the antibodies in sera was higher 
than of those present in urine (Data not shown). The specificity of the antibodies detected 
in the serum samples was confirmed by virus neutralization (Reusken, 2013b).
Although 11 camels showed evidence for an acute MERS-CoV infection at the time of 
urine sampling and all camels showed evidence for a (past) infection based on the presence 
of antibodies in serum, we found no evidence for shedding of MERS-CoV RNA in urine. 
These results are in line with data obtained from another field study and experimentally 
infected dromedaries, indicating the absence of MERS-CoV in camel urine (Adney, 2014; 
Ali, 2017). It should be noted that failure to detect the virus in urine in the former field 
investigation (Ali, 2017), in contrast to our study, was not linked to dromedaries with MERS-
CoV RNA in their nasal swab. Together the studies imply the absence of a role of camel 
urine in MERS-CoV transmission to humans. However, to establish unequivocally that 
urine does not play a role in zoonotic transmission of MERS-CoV a large cohort study may 
be needed including animals of different age groups and at different stages of infection 
with simultaneous and longitudinal sampling of urine, serum and swabs. In the absence of 
results of such a systematic study, prudence towards consumption of raw camel urine is 
still indicated. 
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ABSTRACT
Antibodies to Middle East respiratory syndrome coro- navirus (MERS-CoV) were detected 
in serum and milk collected according to local customs from 33 camels in Qatar, April 2014. 
At one location, evidence for active virus shedding in nasal secretions and/or faeces was 
observed for 7/12 camels; viral RNA was detected in milk of five of these seven camels. The 
presence of MERS-CoV RNA in milk of camels actively shedding the virus warrants measures 
to prevent putative food- borne transmission of MERS-CoV. In April 2014, serum, nasal 
swabs and rectal swabs were taken from 33 milking dromedary camels at two locations in 
Qatar (Al Sheehaniya and Dukhan), areas with known Middle East respiratory syndrome 
corona- virus (MERS-CoV) circulation in camels [1] and data not shown. In addition, milk 
was collected from these ani- mals according to local customs. Serum samples and milk 
were tested for the presence of MERS-CoV-specific antibodies by protein microarray, with 
confirmation by virus neutralisation. Swabs and milk were tested for the presence of MERS-
CoV RNA by real-time reverse tran- scription (RT)-PCR testing for multiple genomic targets. 
Antibodies to MERS-CoV were detected in serum and milk from all camels at both locations. 
At the Dukhan location, none of the 21 animals tested was actively shedding viral RNA from 
the nose and/or in faeces and no evidence for the presence of MERS-CoV RNA in milk was 
observed. At the Al Sheehaniya location, evidence for active virus shedding was observed 
for seven of the 12 camels tested. Viral RNA was detected in milk of five of the seven camels 
with active virus shedding. 
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BACKGROUND 
In 2012, MERS-CoV was identified in patients with severe respiratory illness in the Middle 
East [2]. As of 11 June 2014, a total of 683 cases including 204 deaths have been reported to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) [3]. All cases have had an epidemiological link to the 
Middle East, with confirmed cases in Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Human-to-human transmission seems limited to 
family and healthcare settings and is assumed to have contributed to the recent upsurge of 
cases [4]. Overall, however, a large proportion of cases of MERS-CoV infection is commu- 
nity acquired, with suspected zoonotic transmission, although the extent thereof remains 
to be determined [5]. Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are the prime suspects to 
serve as an animal reservoir for MERS-CoV, although alternative sources remain pos- sible 
[6-11]. 
In August 2013, dromedary camels were implicated for the first time as a possible 
source of the virus leading to human infection on the basis of the presence of MERS- CoV 
neutralising antibodies in dromedaries from Oman and the Canary Islands of Spain [6]. 
Since then, MERS- CoV-specific antibodies have been detected in camels across the Middle 
East and in several African countries [7-9]. Analysis of an outbreak of MERS-CoV infection. 
in humans associated with a barn in Qatar in October 2013 found dromedaries and humans 
to be infected with nearly identical strains of MERS-CoV [1] and the virus was isolated from 
dromedaries shortly after [10]. Further support for camels as a reservoir came from a study 
in Saudi Arabia that found widespread circula- tion of different genetic variants of MERS-
CoV in cam- els, and antibodies in samples taken since the early 90s [11]. 
Although camels are suspected to be the primary source of MERS-CoV leading to 
human infection, the routes of direct or indirect zoonotic transmission remain unknown. A 
possible route might be food-borne transmission through consumption of raw camel milk 
or undercooked meat. Here we report on our investiga- tions into virus shedding of milking 
camels, in relation to the presence of MERS-CoV RNA in milk, as a first assessment of a 
potential role of consumption of raw camel milk in MERS-CoV transmission. 
Analysis of dromedary serum, milk, nasal and rectal swabs 
Sample collection 
In April 2014, serum, nasal swabs, rectal swabs and milk were collected from 12 dromedary 
camels in three barns at the Al Sheehaniya barn complex and 21 drom- edary camels from 
a milking herd in the Dukhan area, Qatar. The milking camels at the barns at Al Sheehaniya 
were kept together with racing camels that have reg- ular contact with camels outside the 
barn at practice and racing events. Barn 1 held 22 racing and nine milk- ing camels. Barn 
2 held 18 racing and four milking camels, while Barn 3 held 15 racing and three milking 
camels. Each milking camel (dam) had their calf pre- sent. The age range of the calves was 
three to eight months (Table). 
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The herd in the Dukhan area was in a secluded area far from other animals. The age 
range of the calves was three to seven months. Both locations had known circulation of 
MERS-CoV in dromedaries at the end of 2013/beginning of 2014 [1] and data not shown.
No samples were collected from the calves. Serum and swabs from the dams were 
collected wearing a disposable gown, gloves, goggles and FFP2 mask, as described [1]. Milk 
was collected according to local cus- toms as follows: dromedary calves were not weaned 
after delivery but kept at the farm in paddocks adja- cent to their dams throughout lactation. 
Dams were reunited with their calf to trigger milk production. Once milk production was 
initiated, the milk samples were collected by the camel owner or handler accord- ing to 
regional customs. No specific hygienic precau- tions were taken (Figure). All samples were 
stored at −80°C until shipment to the Netherlands on dry ice. All sera and swabs were 
shipped in agreement with Dutch import regulations for animal samples from foot-and- 
Table: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) analysis of serum, nasal and rectal 
swabs and milk of dairy dromedary camels, Al Sheehaniya , Qatar, April 2014 (n=12)
Barn 
number 
Camel 
dama 
number 
Age 
camel 
dam 
(years) 
Age 
calf 
(months) 
Real-time reverse  
transcription-PCRb Serology 
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l s
w
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ilk
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ilk
 t
ot
al
c 
Se
ru
m
d 
M
ilk
d 
Se
ru
m
e 
M
ilk
e 
1 1 8 3 – – – – – – – + + ≥1,280 80 
2 7 4 + – + – – – + + + 640 Eq. 
3 10 4 – + – – – – – + + ≥1,280 80 
4 8 5 + – – – – – – + + ≥1,280 Eq. 
5 7 6 + + + – + + + + + ≥1,280 40 
6 9 7 + – + – + + + + + ≥1,280 40 
7 9 7 + – + – + + + + + ≥1,280 40 
2 8 10 5 – + + – + + + + + ≥1,280 40 
9 8 3 – – – – – – – + + ≥1,280 40 
3 10 15 8 – – – – – – – + + ≥1,280 NT 
11 12 5 – – – – – – – + + ≥1,280 20 
12 10 7 – – – – – – – + + ≥1,280 80 
Total 
number 
positive 
NA NA NA 5 3 5 0 4 4 5 12 12 12 9 
Eq.: equivocal (titre between ≥5 and <20); NA: not applicable; NT: not tested due to lack of sample. A dash 
represents that the test was negative. 
a  A dam is the femal parent of a livestock animal. 
b  A sample is considered PCR positive for MERS-CoV when >2 targets (UpE, Orf1a and/or N) are reactive. 
c  Summary results of whole milk, milk fat, skimmed milk and cell pellet. 
d  Serology based on MERS-CoV S1 protein-microarray. Cut-off value 4,000 relative mean fluorescent intensity. 
e  Serology based on MERS-CoV neutralisation assay. Starting dilution 1:5. Neutralising antibody titres are shown. 
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mouth disease-endemic regions and stored and han- dled in a biosafety level 3 laboratory 
until inactivation by incubation for 4 hours at 56 °C or addition of lysis buffer, respectively. 
Sample testing 
Total nucleic acids from swabs were isolated using an automated MagNAPure 96 extraction 
with the total nucleic acid isolation kit (Roche, Mannheim, Germany). Swabs were tested 
for MERS-CoV RNA by internally controlled real-time RT-PCR targeting UpE and N genes, as 
described [1,12]. Initial observations of reduced nucleic acid recovery when whole milk was 
extracted using routine protocols for clinical samples triggered us to test milk fractions, 
besides whole milk, for puta- tive increase of sensitivity [13,14]. Total RNA was manu- ally 
extracted from whole milk, skimmed milk, cellular pellet and cream components of milk 
samples using the High Pure RNA isolation kit (Roche, Mannheim, Germany). Extracts of 
whole milk and milk fractions were tested for MERS-CoV RNA by internally controlled real-
time RT-PCR targeting Orf1A and UpE genes, as described [1, 12]. 
According to international consensus, samples were considered positive for MERS-CoV 
RNA when at least two different targets were reactive [15].  At Al Sheehaniya , seven of the 
12 camels tested were actively shedding viral RNA from the nose (n=5) and/ or faeces (n=3) 
with threshold cycle (Ct) values rang- ing between 23.0 and 29.7. Overall, milk obtained 
from five of the seven virus-shedding animals demonstrated presence of MERS-CoV RNA 
(Table) with Ct values rang- ing from 29.2 to 37.9. Sequence analysis of the PCR products 
from the milk fraction with the highest viral load confirmed the presence of MERS-CoV (data 
not shown).  At the Dukhan location, none of the 21 animals tested was actively shedding 
viral RNA and no evidence for the presence of MERS-CoV RNA in milk was obtained (data 
not shown). Milk fractions of bulk milk collected from dairy dromedaries in the Netherlands 
tested neg- ative for MERS-CoV RNA (data not shown).  Serum and milk samples were tested 
for the presence of IgG antibodies reacting with MERS-CoV (residues 1–747), severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS)-CoV (residues 1–676) and human coronavirus (HCoV)-OC43 
Figure: Milking camels according to local customs, Al Sheehaniya barn complex, Qatar, April 2014 Milk 
production is triggered by the calf: the calf is then set aside and the milk is collected. Photographs 
by E. Farag. 
 
 
 
Figure: Milking camels according to local customs, Al Sheehaniya barn complex, Qatar, April 2014 
Milk production is triggered by the calf: the calf is then set aside and the milk is collected. 
Photographs by E. Farag.  
 
No samples were collected from the calves. Serum and swabs from the dams were collected 
wearing a disposable gown, gloves, goggles and FFP2 mask, as described [1]. Milk was collected 
according to local cus- toms as follows: dromedary calves were not weaned after delivery but kept 
at the farm in paddocks adja- cent to their dams throughout lactation. Dams were reunited with 
their calf to trigger milk production. Once milk production was initiated, the milk samples were 
collected by the camel owner or handler accord- ing to regional customs. No specific hygienic 
precau- tio s were taken (Figure). All sample  were s red at −80°C until shipment to the 
Netherlands on dry ice. All sera and swabs were shipped in agreement with Dutch import 
regulations for animal samples from foot-and- mouth disease-endemic regions and stored and 
han- dled in a biosafety level 3 laboratory until inactivation by incubation for 4 hours at 56 °C or 
addition of ly is buffer, respectively.  
Sample testing  
Total nucleic acids from sw bs were isolate  using an automated MagNAPure 96 extraction with 
the total nucleic acid isolation kit (Roche, Mannheim, Germany). Swabs were tested for MERS-
CoV RNA by internally controlled real-time RT-PCR targeting UpE and N genes, as described 
[1,12]. Initial observations of reduced nucleic acid recovery when whole milk was extracted using 
routine pro ocols for clinical samples tri gered us to test milk fractions, besides whole milk, for 
puta- tive increase of sensitivity [13,14]. Total RNA was manu- ally extracted from whole milk, 
skimmed milk, cellular pellet and cream components of milk samples using the High Pure RNA 
isolation kit (Roche, Mannheim, Germany). Extracts of whole milk and milk fractions were tested 
for MERS-CoV RNA by int rnally controlled r al-time RT-PCR targeting Orf1A a d UpE genes, 
as described [1, 12].  
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(residues 1–760) spike domain S1 antigens using exten- sively validated protein-microarray 
technology, as described [6,16-18]. HCoV-OC43 S1 was used as proxy for bovine CoV (BCoV), 
which is known to circulate com- monly in dromedaries [19,20]. All serum and milk sam- ples 
from Al Sheehaniya  and the Dukhan location had MERS-CoV S1 binding antibodies (Table 
and data not shown).  Confirmation of array results from Al Sheehaniya  was done by MERS-
CoV neutralisation assays, as described [6]. Neutralising antibody titres varied between 640 
and ≥1,280 for serum and between 10 and 80 for milk with 9 out of 11 having titres fourfold 
above the start- ing dilution of 1:5 (Table). Control serum (n=3) and bulk milk collected 
from dairy dromedaries in the Netherlands were negative (data not shown). All serum and 
milk samples from both locations in Qatar and the Netherlands reacted with HCoV-OC43 
S1 confirming common circulation of BCoV in camelids. All samples tested negative for 
SARS-CoV (data not shown). To gain insight into possible faecal contamination of the milk 
samples, the samples were analysed for the pres- ence of Escherichia coli by a quantitative 
PCR based on the E. coli uidA gene, with a limit of quantification of <103 genome copies 
per ml [21]. The presence of E. coli was not consistently detected in repeated testing (data 
not shown). 
DISCUSSION 
Raw milk from dromedaries has been consumed by humans for thousands of years and is 
thought to have healing properties when consumed ‘hot’, directly out of the udder [22]. 
Nowadays, dromedaries are still an important source of milk in rural areas of arid countries 
such as Qatar and other countries in the Middle East and parts of Africa [23]. 
Food-borne transmission is a putative route of zoonotic transmission of MERS-CoV that 
needs further investigation. Recent data demon- strated that MERS-CoV experimentally 
introduced into camel milk can survive for up to 72 hours at 4 °C and 22 °C and it has been 
suggested that consumption of MERS-CoV-containing milk might result in introduction of 
the virus into the oral cavity and subsequent infec- tion of the lower respiratory tract [24]. 
Here, we detected the presence of MERS-CoV RNA in five milk samples collected 
from seven animals shedding MERS-CoV from the nose and/or feces at Al Sheehaniya. 
Although shedding of infectious virus in ruminant milk and infection of humans due to 
the con- sumption of raw milk have been described for several viruses [25,26], it cannot 
be concluded from our data that this holds true for MERS-CoV as well. The milk samples 
were collected according to local customs in which camel udders are not normally cleaned 
before milking and hygienic conditions are such that udders and milk can be contaminated 
with nasal secretions or faeces from the camel, saliva of the calves, which are allowed to 
suckle prior to milking to initiate the milk flow, or dirt from the bowl or the hands of the 
milker. Additional studies under controlled hygienic conditions are ongoing to determine 
whether MERS-CoV replicates in the udder or could be introduced as contaminant during 
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the milking process.  It remains to be seen if the results reflect the pres- ence of infectious 
virus in the milk samples. The RNA loads in the milk samples were too low to attempt virus 
isolation; we have observed that samples containing MERS-CoV RNA with Ct values >30 in 
general do not contain infectious virus particles. Experiments aiming at determining the 
amount of infectious virus present in milk samples such as those collected in our study 
should be conducted locally, avoiding detrimental effects of shipment and freeze-thaw 
cycles on virus via- bility. In addition, the presence of substantial levels of MERS-CoV 
neutralising antibodies in the milk samples might neutralise any infectious virus present 
during in vitro testing, which may differ from the in vivo situa- tion, particularly if the virus 
is resistant to gastric juice and passage of infectious virus through the stomach occurs 
[27]. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the presence of MERS-CoV RNA in raw milk 
as consumed locally might represent a source for zoonotic transmis- sion of MERS-CoV 
and prudence is called for. Munster et al. showed that heat treatment (30 minutes at 63 
°C) of MERS-CoV-containing camel milk reduced levels of infectious virus below detection 
level [24]. Boiling milk before consumption could be an easy, achievable local measure to 
prevent transmission and to preserve con- sumption of camel milk. 
An interesting observation is the difference in virus shedding between the herds at 
Al Sheehaniya and Dukhan (7/12 and 0/21, respectively) although virus cir- culation had 
been detected in the Dukhan location ear- lier (data not shown). While the current study 
provides only a snapshot, it suggests that herd management practices may influence virus 
circulation. In addition, the nasal and/or faecal shedding of MERS-CoV by ani- mals with 
high levels of neutralising antibodies sug- gests that the presence of antibodies does not 
confer sterilising immunity. 
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ABSTRACT
The emergence of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus (MERS-CoV) 
in the Middle East in 2012 was associated with an overwhelming uncertainty about its 
epidemiological and clinical characteristics. Once dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) 
was found to be the natural reservoir of the virus, the public health systems across the 
Arabian Peninsula encountered an unprecedented pressure to control its transmission. 
This view point describes how the One-Health approach was used in Qatar to manage the 
MERS-CoV outbreak during the period 2012-2017.
One-Health focuses on the association between the human, animals and environment 
sectors for total health and wellbeing of these three sectors. To manage the MERS outbreak 
in Qatar through a One-Health approach, the Qatar National Outbreak Control Taskforce 
(OCT) was reactivated in November 2012. The animal health sector was invited to join the 
OCT. Later on, technical expertise was requested from the WHO, FAO, CDC, EMC, and PHE. 
Subsequently, a comprehensive One-Health roadmap was delivered through leadership 
and coordination; surveillance and investigation; epidemiological studies and increase of 
local diagnostic capacity. 
The joint OCT, once trained had easy access to allocated resources and high risk areas 
to provide more evidence on the potential source of the virus and to investigate all reported 
cases within 24-48 hours. Lack of sufficient technical guidance on veterinary surveillance 
and poor risk perception among the vulnerable population constituted major obstacles to 
maintain systematic One-Health performance. 
Keywords: One-Health, MERS-CoV, Qatar
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THE PROBLEM
The emergence of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in the 
Middle East in 2012 [1] has remained a public health concern particularly in the Arabian 
Peninsula till the present time. Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) have been found 
to be the natural reservoir from which the viral spill-over to humans can occur. Camels 
show no or minor clinical signs if infected with MERS-CoV [2]. As of the end of February 
2019, 2,374 laboratory confirmed human cases worldwide, including 823 associated deaths 
(case-fatality rate: 34.6%), have been reported. The majority of these cases were reported 
from Saudi Arabia (1983 cases, including 745 related deaths) [3]. In Qatar, a total of 24 
human cases have been reported along with 8 related deaths. At the beginning of the 
MERS outbreak in 2012, the  lack of knowledge, particularly on the mode and speed of 
transmission of this novel virus, challenged the healthcare systems in Qatar as well as the 
entire Gulf region , amid fears that transmission could readily happen between humans. 
The unfamiliarity of the responding agencies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with 
such an extraordinary threat heightened the concerns of the affected communities in Qatar 
as MERS cases continued to be reported from all neighbouring GCC countries. Moreover, 
the GCC countries are characterised with intensive movement of people and camels across 
the borders. 
An eager race was started to establish the epidemiology of the disease. The 
epidemiological link of MERS-CoV with camels was revealed in October, 2013. Two patients 
had frequent contact with animals, including camels, and had no history of travel outside 
Qatar in the two weeks before they became ill. MERS-CoV was detected from nasal swabs 
of three camels with which the patients had contact [4]. A huge pressure was placed on 
the Qatar National Outbreak Control Task Force (OCT) to find answers for the novel disease 
to control the outbreak and inform the public. During the early phase of the MERS-CoV 
epidemic, the OCT had to decide from where to start and which methods to follow. 
The One-Health approach focuses on the association and interconnection between 
three sectors: human, animal and environmental health, and recognizes the total health 
and wellbeing of these three sectors [5].  One health is defined as “A collaborative, 
multisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach - working at the local, regional, national, 
and global levels - with the goal of achieving optimal health outcomes recognizing the 
interconnection between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment” [6]. This 
view point describes how the One-Health approach was used in surveillance and response 
to MERS-CoV in Qatar during the period 2012 to 2017. It could be useful to similar authorities 
to inform their preparedness plans for the next potential emerging zoonotic epidemic in 
light of the strengths and challenges experienced by Qatar.
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ACTION TAKEN
The OCT was reactivated in Qatar in November 2012 following the detection of the second 
MERS-CoV case (sixth worldwide) in the country. The OCT was established before as 
a requirement of the International Health Regulation (IHR) (2005). It is a joint outbreak 
investigation team composed of public and animal health experts lead by the Ministry 
of Public Health (MoPH) in Qatar, applying the One-Health approach and dealing with 
zoonotic infections. The OCT played a fundamental role in the national response to the 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Influenza (H1N1) virus pandemic in 2009. 
The new OCT involved multidisciplinary and multisectoral representation primarily from 
the MoPH and the Ministry of Municipality and Environment (MME) in Qatar. To develop 
a coherent investigation and response strategy, the MoPH leaders decided to support the 
OCT with technical expertise from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention of the United States (CDC), Public Health England (PHE), and Erasmus Medical 
Centre (EMC) in the Netherlands.
Experts from these institutions engaged the OCT in an extensive risk assessment of the 
MERS outbreak situation. A comprehensive road map was developed to provide guidance 
on surveillance, investigation and response, using a joint One-Health approach. This 
road map included: (1) Coordination and joint leadership, (2) Joint surveillance and field 
investigation, (3) Epidemiological studies, and (4) Increase of local diagnostic capacity.
Coordination and joint leadership: The road map emphasized the fostering of a conjoined 
leadership in terms of planning and decision making. An improved level of coordination was 
witnessed thereafter between authorities across a number of areas; sharing of information 
turned into timely practice, the process for decision making and approval of plans became 
quicker, access to allocated resources and high risk areas (e.g., slaughter house, animal 
holdings, camel racing areas, hospitals etc.) became easier, and communicating the risk to 
the public reflected one voice for joint authorities.
Joint surveillance and field investigation: A joint Rapid Response Team (RRT) was 
assigned from the MoPH and the MME to carry out field investigation after being subjected 
to refresher training on skills and principles of outbreak investigation. To initiate One-
Health surveillance it was agreed to build the RRT on the already functioning Severe Acute 
Respiratory Infections (SARI) surveillance team in the Public Health Department. The SARI 
team routinely searches for SARS and Influenza virus among suspected cases admitted to 
hospitals with respiratory symptoms. Importantly, the community was also engaged in this 
form of surveillance as family members, friends and co-workers of the suspected cases 
were educated about MERS symptoms and how to report them 
The ability to access and investigate all of the 24 reported cases within 24-48 hours 
of reporting was one of several fruits of the One-Health surveillance, permitting to yield 
further epidemiological evidence on the potential role camels play in the virus transmission. 
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Whenever a human case was suspected with MERS infection, a patient investigation was 
conducted, which included contact tracing, work and movement of the patient and history 
of camel contact. If the patient had direct or indirect camel contact, the RRT informed their 
veterinary counterpart. The veterinary team tested the camels around the patient.  The 
public health team tested all human contacts around the patient. Later on, a complete 
report of that patient was prepared. Based on these reports, a complete One-Health 
approach was developed and implemented. At least 3 MERS cases were detected during 
routine case investigations and contact tracing at the community settings.
Epidemiological studies: The One-Health road map recommended to start with a 
case-control study and seroepidemiological surveys targeting at-risk populations including 
humans and camels besides testing the stored human respiratory samples retrospectively 
to determine whether the virus was totally novel to Qatar population. The outcome of 
joining forces in carrying out these studies was outstanding. First and foremost it helped 
facilitate the access of the joint RRT to the camel barns and the farms hosting race camels. 
Collection of samples and data of camels and their caregivers became easier, allowing a 
series of subsequent fundamental epidemiological, veterinary and clinical studies to take 
place. 
Through these studies it was possible to provide the first global molecular evidence 
that camels are a potential source for MERS-CoV [4]. The door was opened to a number 
of research studies that ensued thereafter to yield insights into some essential aspects of 
MERS-CoV. While some studies focused on exposure to camels and the husbandry practices, 
others addressed the mode of transmission to humans, and possible risk factors [4, 7-14]. 
These findings have been used to provide further guidance for studies and prevention 
measures in Qatar and other affected countries. 
Increase the local diagnostic capacity: During the early days of the outbreak, the 
Influenza laboratory in the National Influenza Centre of Hamad Medical Corporation, Qatar 
was the primary destination to examine MERS-CoV samples. As the epidemic evolved 
and the OCT reactivated, the workload to diagnose human or camel specimens gradually 
increased. Joint training activities for both human and animal labs were organized on lab 
detection of MERS-CoV. MERS-CoV sample storage and the test capacity in both human 
and veterinary laboratories were scaled up. A network including international reference 
laboratories was initiated and this alliance is maintained to date to tackle other zoonotic 
diseases like Influenza, Rabies etc. To improve coordination and communication, a focal 
person was assigned from  human and veterinary laboratories to ensure timely data and 
sample  sharing. 
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FACILITATORS AND BARRIERS
The commitment of the MoPH and MME in Qatar to the One-Health approach that governed 
the response to MERS-CoV was largely due to the previous experiences with SARS and 
H1N1 pandemic as these experiences helped to show the feasibility and advantages of joint 
efforts to policy-makers. The joint strategic technical collaboration between the Qatari 
authorities and the international technical bodies such as the WHO, FAO, CDC, PHE and EMC 
have greatly facilitated the preparation and implementation of the road map. Community 
engagement was another key factor that improved the investigation of suspected cases.
Yet, these achievements were not without obstacles. As camels infected with MERS 
only show asymptomatic or mild respiratory tract disease, camel owners and workers 
doubted the link between camels and the disease. Moreover, the veterinarians showed 
insufficient interest in mounting a large scale outbreak operation similar to the one initiated 
by the public health sector, as they have a shortage of technical guidance on surveillance 
and other technical areas including  laboratory tools and diagnostic kits. The One-Health 
approach needed more local and international support to ensure a systematic and 
sustained implementation. Furthermore, one study on risk perception suggested that some 
camel owners have poor risk perception of MERS [15]. Additionally, both public health and 
veterinary sectors were accustomed to work in a solo vertical way and only occasionally 
engaged with each other in short term research projects. Apart from the SARS and H1N1 
epidemics, the two sectors worked independently, making joint technical work a difficult 
task. Therefore, the livestock sector did not appear to feel the same pressure as the public 
health sector. However, further studies are required to explore areas for improvement to 
ultimately make the One-Health approach more appealing to all sectors involved.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE FIELD
The One-Health approach, despite lacking the appropriate technical guidance, was 
already functional and helped address some zoonotic diseases including Influenza and 
Brucella. Although capabilities and funding were unequal between the public health and 
the veterinary sector, the available competencies, supported with a substantial political 
will to join efforts and improve coordination, were sufficient to jointly address MERS-CoV. 
The adopted inter-sectorial collaboration for surveillance has been vital to obtain a better 
understanding of MERS-CoV in Qatar. Obtaining the reliable evidence about transmission 
between camels and humans could have never been achieved without the prompt and 
timely joint investigation. Building local One-Health technical capacity to investigate and 
confirm MERS-CoV in humans and animals helped the early detection of cases in humans 
and animals. Such practices minimized the time and costs for public health control measures. 
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Community engagement has been key to establishing One-Health surveillance in Qatar. 
Self-reporting of disease compared with the previous rejection and denial was an important 
change of behaviour among the people at risk, particularly those exposed to abattoir, camel 
race areas and the ports of entry. Furthermore, the positive community response to the 
MERS-CoV outbreak control policy was due to the constant transparent emergency risk 
communication which allowed the community to be well-informed of the situation. It also 
helped to maintain public trust in the competency of national authorities.
The One-Health approach has been essential for generating evidence and implementing 
control measures to restrain MERS-CoV and other zoonotic diseases. The same approach 
needs to be maintained to assess the effectiveness of the control measures. As emerging 
zoonotic viruses continue to be a challenge, One-Health surveillance must be adopted and 
fostered at all levels [5].
Finally, as the human MERS-cases seemed to uniquely emerge from the Arabian 
Peninsula, regional collaboration in sharing clinical and surveillance data besides the 
results of scientific research is indispensable to finding answers to the remaining gaps 
in our knowledge about the disease. The unexpected disruption of the GCC countries 
undoubtedly hindered an effective regional collaboration in sharing data and carrying out 
sequencing studies. International agencies are required to call upon them to consider the 
One-Health approach building on the Qatar experience which displayed a practical way of 
sharing resources and avoiding obstacles to work in the Arabian community. Establishing 
a regional committee for coordination and emergency risk communication is an important 
element to build capacities required for zoonosis control. We suggest that a regional ‘One-
Health Centre of Excellence (OCE)’ would help to develop unified standards and integrative 
guidelines for control of zoonoses including MERS-CoV. 
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ABSTRACT
In 2015, a One Health Working Group was established in Qatar to conduct a survey in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Egypt, and Jordan to monitor preparedness of 
public health and veterinary health authorities in response to the Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus epidemic. All but 1 country indicated they established joint 
One Health policy teams for investigation and response. However, the response to the 
questionnaires was largely limited to veterinary authorities. Critical barriers and limitations 
were identified. National and regional leaders, policy makers, and stakeholders should be 
prompted to advocate and enhance adoption of the One Health framework to mitigate the 
risk for Middle East respiratory syndrome and other emerging zoonotic diseases.
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BACKGROUND
Human infections with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) continue 
to be reported from the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East after the September 2012 
World Health Organization (WHO) notification of 640 deaths from 2,040 laboratory-
confirmed cases (1). Although typical symptoms of MERS-CoV infection include fever, 
cough, and labored breathing, pneumonia and diarrhea also were reported. Asymptomatic 
persons with laboratory-confirmed cases were observed as well (2). Saudi Arabia, the first 
country to report a confirmed MERS-CoV case, has had the most reported cases. Studies in 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia established the link between MERS-CoV and dromedary camels (1).
Camels are valued animals in arid and semiarid regions (3), where they serve as a basic 
source of milk and meat (4). The trading of camels and camel meat is an important source 
of income (5). In addition to the use of camels for food production, camels are popular 
for sport competition and beauty championships, which has led to formation of special 
camel institutions in some Arabian countries, including camel supreme councils and camel 
hospitals.
With the MERS-CoV outbreak as an emerging threat, the public health response included 
the possible role of camels in collaborative work with veterinary authorities to control and 
prevent the disease. Uncertainties about MERS-CoV transmission modes, coupled with 
growing evidence of the potential role of camels in disease dissemination, made this first 
trial of a One Health response challenging. A proper One Health response to a zoonotic 
disease requires several elements, including political support, appreciable preparedness 
and response plans, a joint vision on epidemiologic surveillance for MERS-CoV and zoonotic 
diseases in general, joint use of laboratory diagnostic capabilities, funding, and means for 
crisis communication and health education.
In Qatar, led by the Supreme Council of Health, a multidisciplinary team was established 
in 2014 once the zoonotic origin of the disease became evident. To discuss the challenges 
encountered during the MERS-CoV outbreak, and as part of international efforts to advance 
the adoption of the One Health approach to address health risks at the animal–human–
environment interfaces (6), together with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), Qatar organized in April 2015 a regional workshop in collaboration 
with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO about the application of 
the One Health approach to MERS-CoV (7). Countries from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC; Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), Egypt, and 
Jordan were represented in this workshop, along with delegates from FAO, OIE, WHO, the 
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, GA, USA), Erasmus Medical 
Center (Rotterdam, the Netherlands), the University of Hong Kong, and several other 
international experts.
To gauge a preliminary understanding about the extent to which the involved countries 
were using a One Health approach and how it was translated in government policies and 
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practices, the One Health Working Group conducted a survey before the workshop. The 
findings were aggregated, presented, and discussed before the entire audience of the 
workshop.
METHODS
We designed the study based on guidance and references of the One Health approach 
established in documents issued by FAO, OIE, WHO (6), and CDC (8); meeting reports (9,10); 
and policy documentation (11). A questionnaire was drafted to answer queries about 
policies and structures governing control of zoonotic diseases in general and MERS-CoV 
in particular (Table 1). We shared the questionnaire with public health and veterinary 
authorities in charge of surveillance and control of MERS-CoV in all GCC countries, 
Egypt, and Jordan 1 week before the workshop. The questionnaire also included open-
ended questions permitting comments. Results were analyzed and interpreted using an 
Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft, https://www.microsoft.comExternal Link). The core of the 
questions and the relevant results scores are shown in Table 2. Results were presented 
and discussed before the survey participants and audience of the workshop and approved 
by the joint scientific committee of the workshop. Decision for dissemination followed 
consent of all of the survey participants.
RESULTS
We surveyed 16 authorized government institutions representing 8 countries. Two 
countries did not respond. Seven (43%) institutions from 6 (75%) countries responded to 
the questionnaire. Six (85%) of 7 responding institutions were veterinary authorities. Except 
for 1 country, no public health authorities responded to the questionnaire.
Table 1: Domains of the questionnaire of the survey on the implementation of One Health for MERS-
CoV preparedness and control in Gulf Cooperation Council and Middle East countries, 2015*
Principle Title
1 Leadership and Coordination
2 Policies and Drivers of MERS-CoV Management
3 Preparedness and Response Plans
4 Epidemiologic Surveillance System
5 Laboratory Diagnostic Capacities
6 Crisis Communication and Health Education
7 The One Health Approach Operationalization Challenges
*MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
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Leadership and Coordination
The 6 responding countries reported the existence of a joint veterinary and public health 
MERS-CoV committee (Table 2). Six institutions confirmed meeting on a regular basis. 
Five institutions from 4 countries reported having joint committees encompassing public 
health, veterinary services, municipalities, and research authorities. Two countries had an 
active emergency supreme committee at the national level addressing MERS-CoV crisis and 
threat.
Table 2: Outcomes of survey questionnaire on the implementation of One Health for MERS-CoV 
preparedness and control in Gulf Cooperation Council and Middle East countries, 2015*
Domain Subdomain
Response
Yes No
Leadership and 
coordination
A. Existence of a dedicated MERS-CoV committee in surveyed 
institutions†
7 0
B. The committee is meeting on regular basis† 6 1
C. Participation of stakeholders in a joint committee or advisory board 
dealing with MERS-CoV at the national level†
5 2
D. Activation of emergency supreme committee for MERS-CoV at the 
state level‡
2 4
Policies and 
drivers of 
MERS-CoV 
management
A. Existence of a document ascribing policy, roles, and responsibilities of 
committee’s stakeholders†
5 2
B.The document describes the chain of command‡ 4 2
C. Joint committee responsibility for preparedness and response to 
MERS-CoV†
5 2
Preparedness 
and response 
plans
A. National plans for preparedness and response to MERS-CoV† 6 1
B. Participation of stakeholders in preparation of national plans for 
preparedness and response to MERS-CoV‡
2 4
C. Adequate budget allocation† 2 3
Epidemiologic 
surveillance 
system of 
MERS-CoV
A. Program of epidemiologic surveillance in humans‡ 6 0
B. Program of epidemiologic surveillance in animals‡ 5 1
C. Participation of animal breeders in MERS-CoV epidemiologic 
surveillance‡
3 3
D. Joint or integrated surveillance program for MERS-CoV† 4 2
E. MERS joint field investigation team† 5 2
F. Field investigation joint team training‡ 2 2
G. Research program(s) for MERS-CoV† 2 4
Laboratory 
diagnostic 
capacities‡
A. Public Health Reference Laboratory 4 2
B. Veterinary Reference Laboratory
Crisis 
communication 
and Health 
education
A. Strategies and plans for information, crisis communication, and health 
education on MERS-CoV†
5 2
B. MERS-CoV communication cooperation and coordination‡ 5 1
C. Joint implementation of MERS-CoV awareness and health education 
activities‡
3 3
*MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
†Statistical analysis was performed by institution.
‡Statistical analysis was performed by country.
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Policies and Drivers of MERS-CoV Management
Five institutions from 4 countries reported the presence of national documents detailing 
entitled authorities, policies, roles, commands, and responsibilities for stakeholders 
involved in MERS-CoV management. The same 5 institutions reported having a joint public 
health–veterinary authority committee responsible for preparedness and response to 
MERS-CoV following the standardized procedures developed by FAO and WHO.
Preparedness and Response Plans
Six institutions from 5 countries had national early preparedness and response to MERS-
CoV plans. Four of these institutions had clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each 
of the involved authorities (public health authority, animal health authority, environment 
authority, and others) during MERS-CoV threat or outbreaks. Only 2 (33%) countries 
had involved the major stakeholders (public health and animal health authorities) in the 
process of preparing a national plan for preparedness and response to MERS-CoV. Of the 
7 institutions that answered the questionnaire, 2 reported adequate funding to address 
MERS-CoV, 3 denied adequacy, and the remaining 2 did not respond. Two institutions from 
1 country did not agree on funding questions.
Joint Epidemiologic Surveillance of Zoonotic Pathogens
All but 1 country reported having established a MERS-CoV epidemiologic surveillance 
program investigating vulnerable animals, camel owners, camel workers, breeders and 
keepers, slaughterhouse workers, and veterinary and medical personnel and sharing data 
with counterparts. Three countries reported participation of animal breeders; the other 3 
reported the contrary. Four institutions from 4 GCC countries reported the existence of a 
joint epidemiologic surveillance program enabling outbreak investigation and sharing of 
reports and results. Two institutions reported lacking the joint surveillance, and 1 did not 
respond.
In 4 countries, 5 of 7 institutions indicated the presence of a joint public health–
veterinary authority field investigation team and that MERS-CoV was jointly investigated. 
Two of the 4 countries organized an epidemiologic and disease control training course for 
the joint investigation team. Two countries initiated research programs in response to the 
outbreak.
Joint Laboratory Diagnostic Capabilities
In 4 countries, national reference laboratories were established and identified to provide 
diagnostic services for human and animal MERS-CoV infection. The 4 countries reported 
national collaboration encompassing laboratory services, joint MERS-CoV diagnosis 
training, specimen shipping, and competency testing. Regionally, 2 GCC countries reported 
joint laboratory processing for MERS-CoV in camel samples. Three GCC countries reported 
joint activities with the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Germany, CDC, and the UK reference 
laboratories to fulfill international diagnostic and research requirements.
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Crisis Communication and Health Education
Five of 7 responding institutions from 4 countries reported having MERS-CoV crisis 
communication and health education strategic plans stating that the key stakeholders 
were involved in plans development. The 2 remaining countries either did not include these 
strategies in their national plans or were not aware of inclusion of these strategies.
Six responding countries reported providing MERS-CoV communication coordination 
mechanisms between public health and veterinary authorities covering awareness 
and health education. One country reported some conflicting messages between the 2 
authorities. Three of the responding countries reported collaboration and implementation 
of awareness and health education issues during the MERS-CoV epidemic. In all but 1 
country, camel breeders did not participate in the campaign.
The One Health Approach Operationalization Challenges
Four of the 6 responding countries reported operational challenges encountered with 
adoption of the One Health approach. These challenges included lack of reliable and 
specialized diagnostic laboratories in the region, incapacity of the existing laboratories 
to yield MERS-CoV diagnostic services, and lack of skilled personnel tasked to investigate 
zoonotic cases. Other reported key challenges were misunderstanding of the One Health 
concept; conflicting priorities and plans; dearth of budgets allocated to meet MERS-CoV 
technical needs in terms of surveillance, diagnosis, control, and research; lack of skilled 
personnel on communication and health education; and the denial of camel breeders.
DISCUSSION
Because of the global increase in zoonotic threats, the importance of the One Health 
approach has also increased, along with the need to establish effective mechanisms for 
collaboration to address threats at the human–animal–environment interface (6,8,12,13). 
Affected by the United Nations agencies, several countries, particularly those challenged 
by zoonotic events, began initiating their One Health platforms and programs to enhance 
their capacities to manage zoonotic diseases (10,11,14–16). However, these efforts always 
faced many challenges.
To enable sufficient internal deliberations and ensure One Health quality and consensus-
based responses, we shared the survey questionnaire with the relevant authorized health 
and veterinary institutions. However, the first hindrance was the response by only 44% of 
surveyed institutions, a fact that limited a comprehensive analysis of the outcomes. This low 
response rate could be attributed to poor leadership and to limited conceptual awareness 
about the One Health approach (16,17). This finding is sustained by our observation that 
there was a discrepancy understanding the One Health approach. Although the term is 
familiar among veterinarians, it is not among their health counterparts, a considerable 
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drawback to implementing the approach. A high-capacity endeavor is needed advocating 
the health sector to deal with the One Health approach in the future.
Most of the GCC countries, including those with high MERS-CoV incidence, have 
adopted an epidemic control policy, indicating that the One Health approach was either 
partially embraced or totally overlooked. This finding was demonstrated by the fact that 
only 2 responding countries reported veterinary health authorities partnership formulating 
national preparedness and response plans. As a result, the quality of data collected in 
response to an outbreak remains questionable.
The lack of budget to support MERS-CoV control programs revealed by the survey 
questionnaire and the consequent workshop discussions emphasizes crucial points in the 
implementation of a successful One Health approach. One explanation may be that the cost 
for a proper One Health response had been underestimated. However, the disproportionate 
distribution of the available budget raised by the delegates might further explain the lack 
of integrated response. For instance, although most surveyed countries had established 
MERS-CoV epidemiologic investigation teams, only 50% of these teams react jointly. At the 
level of diagnostics, national laboratories in 66% of the countries managing and diagnosing 
MERS-CoV outbreaks had collaboration between medical and veterinary response, and 
several teamed up with international reference laboratories, which was considered a 
positive step toward diagnostic efficiency and cooperation. However, because MERS-CoV 
is a GCC home-country infection, the in-country diagnostic capacity was expected to be 
adequate.
When discussing crisis communication and health education, the core persistent 
barrier to embracing One Health seemed to be the prevalent denial of the camel owners 
that camels could be a potential source of MERS-CoV. Because of the highly influential 
role of camel owners among the communal sectors of most of the surveyed countries, 
involvement of these sectors to combat emerging zoonotic diseases is essential (18,19). 
However, because most local communities tend to react forcibly toward emerging infectious 
diseases (20), the investigators could neither judge this factor nor its effect in curbing the 
policy makers bolstering the One Health approach (21). Anticipating such socioeconomic 
risk factors, involvement of social scientists to resolve this barrier might help (22) facilitate 
community buy-in of One Health.
The survey results appear to show that respondents did not benefit much from the 
lessons learned during the last influenza A(H1N1) outbreak (23). The variation in the nature 
of MERS-CoV epidemiology among the countries—handled as a human-associated infection 
in some, a human–camel infection in others, and an unnoticed inapparent camel infection 
in others (2)—has imbalanced the magnitude of response among healthcare and veterinary 
sector authorities, a situation negatively affecting the application goals.
Given that the One Health approach is increasingly recognized internationally as an 
effective trend for managing emerging diseases at the human–animal–environment 
interface (10,11,18), the key barrier fostering the One Health approach at the national level 
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suggested by this study seems to be the relative lack of political will. Based on the experience 
gained in addressing MERS-CoV at the human–animal interface, this lack of will could further 
be responsible for the poor sectoral response to the surveillance questionnaire. Although 
in Qatar, MERS-CoV was addressed through a One Health approach from the start (24), 
much remains to be done nationally, particularly at policy-making level. The foundation of 
a permanent interministerial committee might be a key step to raise awareness of leaders 
and policy makers using the concept and to determine the importance of the One Health 
approach. Creation of a supreme coordinating crisis communication committee is an 
important element to build zoonosis control and prevention capacities. A unified funding 
policy is a good incentive encouraging alleviation of the financial obligations accompanying 
One Health, expected to ease launching of joint investigations, intensive health educational 
sessions, epidemiologic surveillance programs, and joint seminars and workshops. Sharing 
of laboratory diagnostic research facilities, diagnostic protocols, and application of 
proficiency testing would help build experience and improve quality results. Joint routine 
veterinary health services programs application and adoption of compensation policy with 
continuous health education and extension programs might turn animal owners and other 
social stakeholders onto One Health.
The ratification of establishing a regional GCC center for infection control (25) to 
help develop unified standard and integrative guidelines to control zoonoses might 
help sustain the One Health approach. However, whether the current political situation 
might compromise the hope created by the previously promised political commitment to 
collaborate and allocate funds after the recent emergence of avian influenza A(H5N1) (26) 
remains questionable.
Dr. Farag is the Acting Head of Communicable Diseases Control Programs, Public Health 
Program, Ministry of Public Health, Doha, Qatar, His primary research interest is emerging 
infectious diseases.
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ABSTRACT
Dromedary camels have been shown to be the main reservoir for human Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS) infections. This systematic review aims to compile and analyse 
all published data on MERS-coronavirus (CoV) in the global camel population to provide an 
overview of current knowledge on the distribution, spread and risk factors of infections in 
dromedary camels. We included original research articles containing laboratory evidence of 
MERS-CoV infections in dromedary camels in the field from 2013 to April 2018. In general, 
camels only show minor clinical signs of disease after being infected with MERS-CoV. 
Serological evidence of MERS-CoV in camels has been found in 20 countries, with molecular 
evidence for virus circulation in 13 countries. The seroprevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies 
increases with age in camels, while the prevalence of viral shedding as determined by 
MERS-CoV RNA detection in nasal swabs decreases. In several studies, camels that were 
sampled at animal markets or quarantine facilities were seropositive more often than 
camels at farms as well as imported camels vs. locally bred camels. Some studies show 
a relatively higher seroprevalence and viral detection during the cooler winter months. 
Knowledge of the animal reservoir of MERS-CoV is essential to develop intervention and 
control measures to prevent human infections.
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INTRODUCTION
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a highly fatal respiratory tract disease in 
humans that was first detected in 2012 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) [1]. After 
its first detection, MERS-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was being reported in human patients 
across the Arabian Peninsula, with occasional travel-related cases in other continents. 
As of the end of March 2018, a total of 2189 human laboratory-confirmed cases from 
27 countries have been reported to the World Health Organisation (WHO), including 782 
associated deaths [2]. Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedaries) have been shown to be 
the natural reservoir from where spill-over to humans can occur [3, 4]. Human-to-human 
infection is also reported frequently, especially in healthcare settings [5]. Sustained human-
to-human transmission outside of hospital settings has not been shown yet [6]. Direct or 
indirect human contact with camels has resulted in repeated introductions of MERS-CoV 
into the human population [7]. It has been suggested that camels may have acquired MERS-
CoV from a spill-over event from a bat reservoir, but evidence for that remains inconclusive 
[8]. Infections with MERS-CoV generally are thought to be mild or inapparent in camels 
[9], and are therefore of low economical or animal welfare significance. This systematic 
review was done to compile and analyse all published data on MERS-CoV in the global 
camel population to provide an overview of current knowledge on the distribution, spread 
and risk factors of MERS-CoV infections in dromedary camels as a basis for the design of 
intervention and control measures to prevent human infections.
This systematic review was done to compile and analyse all published data on MERS-
CoV in the global camel population to provide an overview of current knowledge on the 
distribution, spread and risk factors of MERS-CoV infections in dromedary camels as a basis 
for the design of intervention and control measures to prevent human infections.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
On 2 May 2018, a literature search on PubMed was performed, using the terms ‘middle east 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus’ and ‘MERS-CoV’. Using the term ‘MERS’ did not result 
in any additional articles that fit the scope of this review. Only articles published in English 
were included. Two reviewers individually selected all original research articles containing 
laboratory evidence of MERS-CoV infections in dromedary camels in the field. Articles 
that were mentioned in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) updates [10] or in the 
references of included publications, but did not appear in the PubMed search were added. 
Subsequently, abstracts, follow-up studies of MERS-CoV-positive camels and genome 
studies without prevalence data were excluded from the analysis. Data on variables such as 
year of sampling, country, region, age, sex and animal origin were extracted and analysed. 
For each variable, the number of positive camels, total number of camels tested and the 
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median percentage positivity was calculated. Data from experimental infection studies 
were not included in this analysis, but they were included in the review to provide additional 
information and context to the field studies. Additional information on the distribution and 
trade of dromedary camels was collected from references in the publications on MERS-
CoV in camels and extracted from official FAO and World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE) databases [11, 12]. The additional literature on camel trade was collected in a less 
systematic way from PubMed.
RESULTS
Literature search
The literature search resulted in a total of 53 papers (Fig. 1). Forty-three research papers 
described the results of crosssectional studies in dromedary camel populations, six papers 
described outbreak investigations, including an analysis of camel samples, and four papers 
described longitudinal studies. In total, 33 papers describe camel studies in the Middle 
East, 13 studies investigated camels from Africa and the remaining seven surveys were 
from Spain, Australia, Japan, Bangladesh and Pakistan (Table 1). 
Distribution and trade of camels
Most recent FAO statistics estimate the world population of camel to be around 29 million 
[11], of which approximately 95% are dromedary camels [13]. However, it is believed that 
the true population size is even larger due to inaccurate statistics and feral camels, such as 
Literature search on “Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus” 
OR“MERS-CoV”, 2 May 2018
1463
↓
Reporting of evidence of MERS-CoV in 
camels 56
↓
Articles retrieved in addition to original 
literature search 4 → 60
↓
Exclude abstracts, experimental studies, 
single genome announcements and 
follow-up studies of MERS-CoV positive 
camels
6 ← 54
↓
Research designs Outbreak 
investigation:
6
Cross-
sectional: 
4
Longitudinal: 
4
Figure 1: results literature search
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the feral dromedary camel population in Australia that is estimated to be around 1 million 
[14]. Over 80% of the camel population lives in Africa. The main camel countries are Chad 
(6 400 000), Ethiopia (1 200 000), Kenya (2 986 057), Mali (1 028 700), Mauritania (1 379 
417), Niger (1 698 110), Sudan (4 830 000), Somalia (7 100 000) and Pakistan (1 000 000) 
[12] (Table 2). A large number of camels are being transported from the Horn of Africa to 
the Middle East each year. These are mainly meat camels coming from the east of Africa 
going to Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states, and Sudanese camels that are being imported 
into the Middle East to participate in camel racing competitions [15]. For example, the FAO 
reported that Somalia exported 77 000 camels in 2014 [16]. The largest camel market in 
Africa is the Birqash market near Cairo (Egypt), where camels from Sudan and Ethiopia are 
most common, but trade routes include animals from Chad, Somalia, Eritrea and Kenya 
[17]. Imported camels are usually quarantined for 2–3 days at the border before they are 
allowed to enter Egypt [17]. Most Somali and Sudanese camels that are exported to the 
KSA are shipped from the ports of Berbera and Bosaso in North Somalia to the KSA ports 
of Jizan and Jeddah [15].
Clinical and pathological features of MERS-CoV infections in dromedary camels
In general, only minor clinical signs of disease have been observed in animals infected 
with MERS-CoV and most MERS-CoV infections do not appear to cause any symptoms [9]. 
Disease symptoms that have been described after experimental and field infections are 
coughing and sneezing, respiratory discharge, fever and loss of appetite [18–20]. Although 
MERS-CoV RNA can be detected in several organs after experimental infection, in studies 
of natural infectious virus it has only been detected in the tissues of the upper and lower 
respiratory tract and regional lymph nodes of the respiratory system in part of the infected 
camels. Histologically, a mild-to-moderate inflammation and necrosis could also be seen 
on the upper and lower respiratory tract. No viral antigen or lesions were detected in the 
alveoli. Histopathological examination showed that the nasal respiratory epithelium is the 
principal site of MERS-CoV replication in camels [18, 21]. 
Virus shedding and antibody response
In one study investigating experimental infection of camels, MERS-CoV shedding started 
1–2 days post-infection (dpi). In that study, infectious virus could be detected until 7 dpi, 
and viral RNA until 35 dpi in nasal swab samples and, in lower amounts, in oral swab 
samples [18]. No infectious virus or viral RNA was detected in faecal or urine samples [18]. 
Viral RNA detection in nasal, but also rectal swabs of camels after experimental infection 
until day 14, has been confirmed in a recent vaccine study [21]. In the field surveys included 
in this review,MERS-CoV RNA has been described in rectal swab samples, although other 
field studies report negative results [3, 22–24] and when viral RNA can be detected, the 
positivity rate of rectal swabs is lower compared with nasal swab samples [19, 25–27]. 
Oral swabs are usually negative or show a lower positivity rate even when nasal swabs test 
138
Chapter 8 | Global status of MERS- CoV in dromedary camels
positive for MERS-CoV RNA [3, 19, 26]. Some studies have reported MERS-CoV RNA in milk 
samples [27, 28]. Longitudinal studies of camel herds show that PCR results of nasal swabs 
can remain positive after 2 weeks [27, 29]. When an interval of sampling of 1 or 2 months 
was maintained, nasal swabs become negative for viral RNA in the next sampling round [24, 
30]. MERS-CoV infections have also been detected in camels with MERS-CoV antibodies, 
both in calves with maternal antibodies as well as older camels that had already acquired 
antibodies from a previous infection. However, virus replication and thus the virus load is 
generally lower in infected seropositive animals compared with seronegative camels [19, 
21, 23, 24, 30, 31]. Little is known about the longevity of antibody titres after infection 
from longitudinal studies. A study following camels on a closed farm found that neutralizing 
antibodies remained consistent during a year [30], while other studies found that antibody 
titres rapidly drop by 1–4-fold within a period often as short as 2 weeks [24, 27].
Worldwide distribution of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels
The first evidence of MERS-CoV in camels described so far is the detection of antibodies to 
MERS-CoV in camel sera from Somalia and Sudan from 1983 of which 81% tested positive 
[32]. Additional serological evidence of the widespread presence of MERS-CoV infection 
in camels, included in this review, has been found in 18 additional countries: Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, KSA, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Spain, Tunisia and the UAE (Fig. 2). In addition, Promed mail reported that 
virus-positive camels had been found in Kuwait and Iran, the latter reportedly in imported 
animals (Archive number 20140612.2534919 and 20141029.2912385). In 11 countries, 
serological findings were complemented with the finding of viral RNA in dromedary camels: 
Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, KSA, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar and the 
UAE. Investigations of MERS-CoV circulation amongst dromedary camels in Australia, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, USA and Canada did not find any proof of MERS-CoV circulation. All countries 
where MERS-CoV circulates in the camel population, with the exception of Spain (Canary 
Islands), Pakistan and Bangladesh, are located in the Middle East or Africa [4, 33]. One 
out of 17 camels that had MERS-CoV antibodies in Bangladesh was born in Bangladesh, 16 
others were imported from India [34]. However, there have not been any additional reports 
of MERS-CoV in camels in India. There is no record of foreign origin of the seropositive 
camels from Pakistan [35]. Moreover, in previous studies there had already been evidence 
of seropositive camels that originate from Pakistan [37, 58]. 
When combining serology data from all papers included in this review, the overall 
median seroprevalence of camels in Africa is 81% (6106/8526; range 28–98%), compared 
with a median seroprevalence of 93% (3230/3846; range 53–100%) in camels from the 
Middle East. Based on viral shedding studies from African countries, the median rate of 
viral shedding was 5% (1108/6318; range 1–15%), compared with 12% in camels from the 
Middle East (1191/14902; range 0–100%).
Risk factors of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels
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Age
The seroprevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies increases with age in camels, while the 
fraction of camels that test positive for MERS-CoV RNA in their nasal swabs decreases with 
age [17, 31, 36, 38, 39]. When all serological results of papers that included sufficient age 
information is combined, the median seroprevalence of camels aged under 2 years is 52% 
(992/1972; range 0–100%), while the age groups 2–5 years (702/924; range 30–100%) and 
over 5 years old (1226/1370; range 0–100%) had a combined median seroprevalence of 
97%. In the virological studies reporting age breakdown, the median rate of nasal shedding 
in 0–2 years old camels was 34% (718/2612; range 0–100%) of cases, compared with 2% 
(91/1142; range 0–100%) in camels older than 2 years.
Sex
Some individual studies show a significantly higher seroprevalence in female camels 
compared with males [27, 39], while others show the opposite [38] or do not find any 
significant difference [17, 35]. Similar disagreeing results are published for the presence 
of MERS-CoV RNA in male vs. female camels [17, 27, 38, 39]. In the studies in this review 
where sex of camels was recorded, a total of 4810 serum samples from female camels and 
3458 samples from male camels were collected and analysed for MERS-CoV antibodies, 
compared with 2007 vs. 2505 nasal swabs for viral RNA testing. Approximately three times 
more female camels were sampled at farms, while male camels were in the majority in 
studies that looked at MERS-CoV prevalence of camels at slaughterhouses, live animal 
markets and quarantine areas. The overall median Seroprevalence of male and female 
camels in our review is 50% and 67%, respectively (range 0–100%; excluding results from 
Israel and Kazakhstan). The median percentage of presence of viral RNA is 18% in nasal 
swabs of male camels (range 0–21%) compared with 9% in female camels (range 0–100%), 
in our review.
Sampling location and herd characteristics
In several studies, camels that were sampled at animal markets or quarantine facilities 
were seropositive more often than camels at farms [17, 22, 27, 34]. Combining serological 
laboratory results of camels in our review with sufficient background information with regard 
to the sampling location does not result in the same pattern, with a median seroprevalence 
of 84% (5632/8115; range 0–100%; excluding Australia and Spain) in camels from farms and 
80% (943/1005; range 28–98%) in the camel population sampled at markets and quarantine 
facilities. Studies in Egypt found a significantly higher PCR positivity rate in camels sampled 
in abattoirs or quarantine facilities, but these results could not be confirmed by other 
papers in this review [17, 27]. When comparing differences in seroprevalence or virus RNA 
positive rate in nomadic vs. sedentary camel herds, some authors did not find a statistical 
difference between the two herd management types [39, 40], while others found some 
evidence of higher seroprevalences in nomadic herds [27, 36]. One study in Kenya looked at 
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Table 2: Camel population (>10.000) and trade 
Country Camel population (OIE, 2016)
Camel density (OIE, 2016)
(Animals per square kilometer)
Africa
Algeria 354.565 (OIE, 2014) 0.15 (OIE, 2014)
Burkino Faso 19.097 0.07
Djibouti 50.000 2.17
Egypt 66.233 0.07
Eritrea 385.283 3.18
Ethiopia 1.200.000 1.06
Kenya 2.986.057 5.12
Libya 110.000 0.06
Mali 1.028.700 0.83
Mauritania 1.379.417 (OIE, 2013) 1.34 (OIE, 2013)
Morocco 197.550 (OIE, 2014) 0.44 (OIE, 2014)
Niger 1.698.110 (OIE, 2013) 1.34 (OIE, 2013)
Nigeria 279.397 0.3
Sudan 4.830.000 1.93
Somalia 7.100.000 11.13
Chad 6.400.000 4.98
Tunisia 56021 0.34
Middle East/Central Asiaa
Afghanistan 175.270 0.21
Indiab 400.000 (OIE, 2015) 0.12 (OIE, 2015)
Iranb 171.500 0.10
Iraq 81.205 0.19
Jordan 10.872 (OIE, 2014) 0.12 (OIE, 2014)
Kazakhstan b 170.513 0.06
Kuwait 80.790 4.53
Oman 257.713 1.21
Pakistanb 1.000.000 1.24
Qatar 77.417 (OIE, 2014) 6.77 (OIE, 2014)
Saudi Arabia 481.138 0.25
Syria 45.610 0.25
Turkmenistanb 122.900 0.25
UAE 392.667 4.74
Uzbekistanb 14.800 0.03
Yemen 459.366 0.87
Excluding China and Mongolia because the large majority of camel population are Bactrian camels 
Camel population exists of both dromedary and Bactrian camels (L. Ming, L. Yi, 1 R. Sa, 1 Z. X. Wang, Z.,  Genetic 
diversity and phylogeographic structure of Bactrian camels shown by mitochondrial sequence variations, Anim 
Genet. 2017 Apr; 48(2): 217–220)
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the differences between herds with different levels of isolation, and did not find significant 
differences in MERS-CoV antibody levels [40].
Animal origin
Most studies that compared local camels with imported camels suggested that imported 
camels are seropositive for MERS-CoV more often [9, 17, 27, 34, 41], although not all 
differences were significant. Two studies in Egypt found a significantly higher RNA positivity 
rate in imported camels from East Africa compared with domestically bred camels [17, 27], 
while another study executed in the KSA found a significantly higher number of MERS-CoV 
RNA-positive results amongst local camels vs. camels from Sudan and Somalia [22].
Seasonal variation in MERS-CoV circulation in the camel population
Although MERS-CoV was detected almost year-round in camels, some studies show a 
relatively higher seroprevalence and viral detection during the cooler winter months [17, 
20, 27, 38]. 
MERS-CoV in non-dromedary animals
MERS-CoV antibodies have been detected in llamas and alpacas in Israel and in alpacas in 
Qatar [42, 43]. To date, no MERS-CoV antibodies or viral RNA have been detected in Bactrian 
camels [4, 37, 44–47] (Table 1 and Table 3). Swine, goats and horses that were included in 
the field surveys in our review all tested negative for MERS-CoV RNA and antibodies [4, 17, 
Figure 2: Virological and serological evidence for MERS CoV in dromedary camels. 
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31, 48–52]. MERS-CoV antibodies were detected in two studies in sheep in Egypt and Qatar, 
although in very low numbers [17, 51]. However, most surveys that investigated sheep did 
not find evidence of MERS-CoV infection or exposure [4, 23, 29, 31, 34, 48–51, 53].
DISCUSSION
The publications in this review show that the MERS-CoV mainly circulates in dromedary 
camel populations in the Middle East and part of Africa, and has been infecting dromedary 
camels in Africa for more than three decades. Antibodies have also been found in Arabic 
camel sera from the early 90s [31, 32]. However, MERS-CoV was discovered until 2012, after 
the first human cases appeared [1], which is probably due to the minor clinical symptoms 
of MERS-CoV infections in camels [18]. Most camel surveys were conducted in the Middle 
Table 3: MERS-CoV in non-dromedary animals in the field 
Species Seroprevalence Viral RNAc
Bactrian camel 0% (0/505) 
(Oman, UAE, Mongolia, China, 
Kazakhstan)
0/390 
(China, Mongolia)
Alpaca 24% (30/126) 
(Israel(+), Oman)
100% (15/15), Qatarb
0% (0/102)
(Israel)
0% (0/15)(Qatar)b
Llama 23% (6/26)
(Israel (+), Oman)
0% (0/19)
(Israel)
Guanaco 0% (0/2) -
Cattle and 
Buffalos 
0% (0/258)
(KSA, Egypt, Oman, Jordan)
0% (0/35) 
(Egypt)
Swine 0% (0/260)
(Egypt)
-
Sheep 0.2% (1/482)a
(KSA, Egypt (+), Oman, Jordan, UAE, 
Bangladesh)
0% (0/307)
(Jordan, KSA, UAE, Egypt, Bangladesh)
Goats 0% (0/399)
(KSA, Egypt, Oman, Jordan)
0% (0/72)
(KSA, Egypt)
Horses, 
donkeys
0% (0/22)
(Egypt, UAE)
0% (0/192)(UAE)b
0% (0/19)
(Egypt)
Birds 0% (0/444)
(KSA, Hong Kong)
-
Bats 0% (0/91)
(Egypt)
a. 6 additional sera from sheep in Qatar tested positive by protein microarray (pMA), but could not be confirmed 
by NT
b. Articles that were not included in the original literature search, because no dromedary camels were 
investigated in these studies
c. MERS-CoV RNA in nasal swabs
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East and some northern and eastern African countries, but significant data gaps currently 
still exist in the north and west of Africa, in countries that have camel populations of 100 
000 to more than a million animals, such as Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Niger. Even less 
is known about the central Asian region. Some evidence of MERS-CoV circulation in camels 
of Pakistan and Bangladesh was recently published, but data is lacking from Afghanistan 
and India. Knowledge on the presence of MERS-CoV in the animal reservoir is a crucial first 
step to assess whether MERS-CoV could be a relevant public health threat in these regions.
MERS-CoV infections are mainly detected in calves and young camels [30, 31]. The 
research included in this review shows that the IgG positivity rate increases gradually in 
dromedary camels of increasing age while the MERS-CoV RNA detection rate decreases. 
Maternal IgG antibodies in camels are acquired through the intake of colostrum during the 
first 24 h post-parturition. After 24 h, antibody levels in the dam’s milk decrease rapidly 
[54]. One study showed that maternal antibodies in calves peak at 7 days post parturition 
and decline in the following 6 months. After 5–6 months, over half of the calves did not 
have maternal neutralizing antibodies in their serum any longer [30]. However, in other 
field studies, the titre of MERS-CoV-specific antibodies is still low at 1 month of age and 
increases with age in dromedary calves [27, 55]. A lower or undetectable antibody levels 
in young camels is likely to explain the higher MERS-CoV RNA detection rate. In adult 
camels, a much higher MERS-CoV seroprevalence can be found, which is probably due to 
a long-lasting immune response against a MERS-CoV infection or multiple re-infections 
with MERS-CoV. Immunity is not sterilizing, as MERS-CoV infection and shedding have also 
been shown in adult camels that have MERS-CoV antibodies [19, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31]. Several 
articles have analysed seroprevalence and virus shedding data in relation to factors, other 
than age, that may explain differences in seroprevalence and MERS-CoV RNA-positive 
rate in camels, such as sex, sampling location, herd characteristics and animal origin. Our 
review shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in results. In addition, comparison 
between studies is difficult given the lack of standardisation of study designs. A key factor 
to consider when comparing studies is the difference in distribution of male and female 
camels amongst different disciplines of camel husbandry. Females are mainly used for 
milking and reproduction. As a result, they often stay at farms. Male camels, especially of 
young age (<1 year old), are the predominant sex in slaughterhouses and amongst camels 
used for transport [39, 56]. This also influences the risk profile of acquiring a MERS-CoV 
infection. Female camels are in closer contact with calves, who are more susceptible to 
infection and shed virus in higher quantities compared with older camels [30]. On theother 
hand, meat and transport camels (predominantly male) travel more, leading to increased 
contact with other camels and camel herds, and therefore a higher chance of exposure 
to MERS-CoV. Some papers in this review suggest that there is a generally lower infection 
rate of domestically bred camels and camels on farms compared with imported camels 
and camels on animal markets or in quarantine facilities. This may be explained by the 
same increased contact rate and mixing of camel herds, leading to an increased chance 
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of MERS-CoV exposure and spread. The increase in MERS-CoV circulation in winter and 
spring can have multiple explanations. Firstly, the winter is the calving season [10], which 
leads to a larger proportion of young animals that usually have a higher number of MERS-
CoV infections and virus excretion. Moreover, in winter season, there is a major increase 
of camel and human movements due to camel racing competitions, camel breeding, 
trading and movements to grazing grounds, which increases the chance of virus spread. 
Additionally, cooler temperatures may facilitate coronavirus survival in the environment 
[57]. In experimental studies, llama’s and alpaca’s are shown to be susceptible to infection 
with MERS-CoV [58, 59], which was confirmed by two papers in our review, describing 
serologically positive llamas and alpacas in Israel and alpacas with MERS-CoV neutralizing 
antibodies in Qatar [42, 43]. In experimental settings, animal-to-animal transmission has 
been shown for alpacas, making them a possible risk population for human infections 
[58]. Two studies in our review also found anti-MERS-CoV antibodies in sheep [17, 51] 
but experimental inoculation of sheep did not result in MERS-CoV replication or antibody 
development [59, 60]. However, the DPP4 receptor, the entry receptor for MERS-CoV, is 
present in sheep tissues, making it possible for the virus to bind to the sheep respiratory 
tract which may explain the finding of MERS-CoV antibodies [61]. Pigs also express the DPP4 
receptor in their respiratory tract, and viral replication in experimental settings has been 
shown for pigs, but no antibodies or MERS-CoV RNA have been found in pigs during field 
surveys [48, 59]. This may be explained by the limited viral shedding in pigs and the absence 
of animal-to-animal transmission [62, 63]. We show that dromedary camels are present 
in large parts of the African and Asian continent, and that MERS infections in dromedary 
camels are widespread. However, human infections due to spill-over from the dromedary 
camel reservoir have not been reported in Africa [10]. Several explanations for the 
difference in human cases between the Arabian Peninsula and Africa have been suggested, 
such as differences in cultural habits, camel husbandry, prevalence of comorbidities, under 
detection or genetic factors in the local population [64]. Moreover, West African viruses 
were found to be phylogenetically and phenotypically distinct from the MERS-CoV viruses 
that caused human disease in the Middle East [65]. Increased knowledge on the animal 
reservoir of MERS-CoV needs to be combined with research on MERS prevalence and risk 
factors in humans to assess the true public health risk. Moreover, the absence of human 
disease, combined with the mild symptoms in camels, caused by MERS, will likely have a 
negative effect on the willingness to implement interventions and the cost-effectiveness of 
possible interventions in some areas.
CONCLUSION
Since the discovery of MERS-CoV in 2012, the dromedary camel has been identified as 
the animal reservoir of human infections with the MERS-CoV. However, the exact route 
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of human primary infections is still unknown. Moreover, the scale of the spread and 
prevalence of MERS-CoV in the camel reservoir is not fully known yet since there is still 
a lack of MERS-CoV prevalence data in some countries that harbour a very significant 
proportion of the world camel population. However, knowledge of the animal reservoir 
of MERS-CoV is essential to develop intervention and control measures to prevent human 
infections. Prospective studies that include representative sampling of camels of different 
age groups and sex, within the different husbandry practices, are needed to fully understand 
the patterns of MERS-CoV circulation. Such studies are important as they may give more 
information on critical control points for interventions to reduce the circulation of MERS-
CoV and/or exposure of humans.
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ABSTRACT
MERS-CoV (Middle East respiratory syndrome corona virus) antibodies were detected in 
camels since 1983, but the first human case was only detected in 2012. This study sought 
to identify and quantify possible drivers for the MERS-CoV emergence and spillover to 
humans. A list of potential human, animal and environmental drivers for disease emergence 
were identified from literature. Trends in possible drivers were analyzed from national and 
international databases, and through structured interviews with experts in Qatar. The 
discovery and exploitation of oil and gas led to a 5-fold increase in Qatar GDP coupled 
with a 7-fold population growth in the past 30 years. The lifestyle gradually transformed 
from Bedouin life to urban sedentary life, along with a sharp increase in obesity and 
other comorbidities. Owing to substantial governmental support, camel husbandry and 
competitions flourished, exacerbating the already rapidly occurring desertification that 
forced banning of free grazing in 2005. Consequently, camels were housed in compact barns 
alongside their workers. The transition in husbandry leading to high density camel farming 
along with increased exposure to humans, combined with the increase of camel movement 
for the racing and breeding industry, have led to a convergence of factors driving spillover 
of MERS-CoV from camels to humans.
Keywords: Drivers, MERS-CoV, Qatar
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INTRODUCTION
Emerging infectious diseases are a cause for increasing global concern, because of their 
impact on global health and economics [1]. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa during 2014-
2015 showed that pathogens which previously caused small and easy to control outbreaks 
had the potential to infect thousands of people under the right circumstances [2]. This is 
also a concern for the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), which 
until now has been the cause of sporadic cases and hospital outbreaks [3]. To date, there 
have been 2220 confirmed laboratory cases worldwide, with 790 deaths [4]. All MERS index 
cases are linked to the Arabian Peninsula. Dromedary camels have been identified as a 
reservoir of MERS-CoV with occasional zoonotic transmission to humans [5,6]. Human-to-
human transmission is also common, with around 30% of the MERS cases reported to WHO 
being health care associated [7,8]. However, the source of infection of many index cases 
remains unclear [9,10]. 
Studies have shown that MERS-CoV, or related viruses have been circulating among 
camels at least since 1983 [11]. Since that period, massive changes have occurred in 
people’s lives and in animal husbandry across the Arabian Peninsula. Understanding these 
changes may help to reconstruct the events that led to the emergence of MERS-CoV as 
a human disease. Past research identified several drivers of emerging zoonoses, such as 
urbanisation, population growth and demography, and environmental and agricultural 
changes [12,13,14]. The drivers which could have potentially influenced the MERS-CoV 
emergence in humans have only sporadically been investigated [15,16]. By reviewing 
changes involving humans and camels over the past 30 years in Qatar, this study sought to 
identify the key drivers of the emergence and spread of MERS-CoV. 
METHODS
Potential drivers for disease emergence were identified from literature and from discussions 
with national and international experts in MERS-CoV. The final list had the following 
categories: economic development; human demography and behavior; international travel, 
commerce, sports and leisure; political environment; agriculture and food industry change, 
including camel demography, husbandry and movement; changes in climate and land 
use. Data from 1980 onwards were collected from national and international databases. 
If multiple data sources were available, data from both sources were collected. All data 
were entered in an excel datasheet and reviewed and discussed with the project team 
(Supplementary 1). 
Qualitative information and remaining data gaps were addressed by interviews with 
a group of 15 experts and stakeholders from Qatar. Criteria to select experts included 
5 years or more experience in a camel-related business (farming, trading and racing) or 
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professional services related to camels and being familiar with cultural aspects of the Qatari 
community. Using a structured interview guide (Supplementary 2) and a moderator, a 
series of 4 interviews were conducted in Arabic, each lasting approximately for 3 hours. The 
main themes that were covered during the interviews included: (changes in) people’s living 
conditions; customs and purposes of camel ownership; cultural habits related to camels; 
educational level and personal behaviors of camel owners and workers; camel movement; 
demographic distribution of camels in Qatar; camel farming practices: feeding, grazing, and 
slaughter. A detailed transcript was shared with the experts for authentication. A literature 
search was done to complement findings from the quantitative and qualitative study, 
using PubMed, Google Scholar and the local sources of information including the Ministry 
of Public Health (MoPH), Ministry of Municipality and Environment (MME), Ministry of 
Development and Planning Statistics (MDPS), and Qatar Statistical Authority (QSA).
The funder had no role in study design, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the review.
RESULTS
Changes in the Economic Situation
Historically, Qatari inhabitants were mostly Bedouins along with a few settled people 
[17,18]. The Bedouins owned limited numbers of camels, sheep, and goats [19]. Camels 
were used as a source of food (milk and meat) and means for transportation. In 1939, oil 
and natural gas resources were discovered. However, large-scale exploitation started in the 
1950s [20]. From the 1950s onwards, Qatar’s economy has been steadily growing. However, 
the year 2000 marked a significant turning point as Qatar’s GDP almost increased by more 
than 5-fold during the period 2000–2006 (Figure 1A) [20,21]. Qatar is currently considered 
to be one of the wealthiest countries in the world [20].
Changes in Human Demography and Health
The thriving economy was paralleled by major demographic and life style changes. In the 
late 1950s, around 16,000 people lived in Qatar [22]. In response to demands for a larger 
workforce after the exploitation of oil and gas began, foreign laborers started to migrate 
to Qatar from countries in the region, like Palestine, Oman, Iran, and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (KSA). Later, immigrants from Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the 
Figure 1: Developments in economy, camel demography, production, and trade. (A). Development 
over time of the gross domestic product per capita; (B) Development over time of the camel 
population; (C) Development over time of camel import and export; (D) Development over time of 
camel importation per country of origin. *Other Arab countries: Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen. **Other GCC countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar.
165
9
Chapter 9 | Drivers of MERS-CoV emergence in Qatar
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Gross
domestic
product
per capita
(US$)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Th
o
us
an
d
s
Total number
of camels
Meat camels
Milk camels
2A. Gross domestic product per capita
2B. Camel population
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Gross
domestic
product
per capita
(US$)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Th
o
us
an
d
s
Total number
of camels
Meat camels
Milk camels
2A. Gross domestic product per capita
2B. Camel population
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Imported camels
Exported camels
Figure 2: Developments in economy, camel demography, production, and trade
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Australia
Pakistan
Other Arab
countries
countries
Other GCC
UAE
2C. Camel import & export
2D. Camel import : origins
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Imported camels
Exported camels
Figure 2: Developments in economy, camel demography, production, and trade
2
4
6
8
100
120
140
160
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Australia
Pakistan
Other Arab
countries
countries
Other GCC
UAE
2C. Camel import & export
2D. Camel import : origins
166
Chapter 9 | Drivers of MERS-CoV emergence in Qatar
Philippines, and Indonesia joined the older migrant populations, increasing the number 
of inhabitants to 369,079 by 1986 and recently to 2,617,634 (Figure 2A) [23]. In 2016, non-
Qatari males made up 78% of the residents of working age (15-64) and non-Qatari made 
up more than 90% of the total number of Qatar inhabitants older than 15 years of age 
(Figure 2B,C) [24]. Most recent estimations of the origins of the non-Qatari population are 
that 25% is Indian, 11% Bangladeshi, 14% Nepali, 10% Filipinos, 9% Egyptian, 5% Pakistani, 
and 2% Iranian [25]. The total number of males in Qatar increased from 67.2% of the total 
population in 1986 to 75.5% in 2016 (Figure 2B). In 2004, almost 50% of residents were 
between 15 and 39 years old, and this has risen to more than 60% in 2015 (Figure 2A). 
Detailed accounts on age distribution were not available before 2004 [26].
Most people in Qatar live in urban areas. The percentage of residents living in cities 
increased from 85.3% in 1960, to 90.4% in 1986, and 99.3% in 2016 [20]. Doha, the capital 
and the biggest city of Qatar, hosts the greatest number of people. However, there has also 
been a large increase in number of people living in the Al-Rayan area, where most of the 
camel farms are located. The number of tourists visiting Qatar also increased, especially 
since 2000. Most tourists came from other GCC countries, but the number of visitors from 
Europe and America were also increasing (Figure 2D) [20,27].
According to experts, the economic development and population increase coincided 
with major changes in life style. The Bedouin nomadic lifestyle gradually decreased as most 
of the Qatari tribes shifted to an urban, settled lifestyle; cars and planes rapidly replaced 
camels as transportation means. This transformation to a more sedentary lifestyle is 
reflected in the profile of comorbidities. More than 70% of adults are overweight and 
almost half of them obese [28]. Male obesity increased from 17% in 1986 to 34% in 2014, 
which is extremely high compared to the current 11% prevalence in men worldwide [29]. In 
1998, 7% of residents above 15 years were hypertensive, rising to 14% in 2006, and 33% in 
2012 [30,31]. Prevalence of high blood sugar among adults in 2015 was 14%, compared to 
a worldwide prevalence of 9% [28]. The Qatar Stepwise Report reported in 2012 that 15% 
of adults were daily smokers. Yet, Qatar has a low death rate: 1.49/1000, compared to the 
worldwide death rate of 7.72/1000, and its healthcare system has developed rapidly over 
the past twenty years [28,31,32].
Figure 2: Developments in human demography in Qatar; (A) Development over time of the age 
structure of the population; (B) Development over time of the human sex ratio; (C) Development over 
time of the ration Qatari vs. non Qatari; (D) Development over time of tourism per country of origin 
*Other Arab countries: Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. **GCC countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, KSA, and the United Arab Emirates
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Changes in Camel Husbandry and Practices
The increase in the number of dromedary camels reflects the increasing popularity of 
camels as sports animals (Figure 1B). With the changing life style and increasing wealth, the 
purchase and breeding of (expensive) racing camels came within reach of an increasingly 
large segment of the Qatari national population. According to experts, although camel 
racing has traditionally been part of the Bedouin culture, the organized racing business 
went through major changes over the past decades. This was partly due to financial and 
regulatory support from the Qatari government. This support increased the social and 
economic value of camels in Qatar, further stimulating their popularity. The Al Sheehaniya 
camel-racing track, one of the biggest tracks in the Gulf, was opened in 1990 [33]. The 
camel farms that are located near the Al Sheehaniya  camel racing area are mostly used 
for racing camels. There are about 1500 racing camel holdings at the Al Sheehaniya  camel 
racing area. Some of the camels in Qatar are used to compete in camel beauty contests 
that are organized around the Arabian Peninsula. According to the FAO, in 1960 there were 
about 6,000 camels in Qatar. This rose to over 43,000 in 1992, 50,000 in 2000, and more 
than 90,000 in 2016 (Figure 1B). More than 83% of the animals are currently kept for racing 
[34]. Across the Gulf region, Qatar has the highest camel density, with 6.77 units/km2, 
compared to 4.74 units/km2 in United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 0.11 units/km2 in the KSA 
[35]. In 2005, the total number of camel farms was 1300 and by 2014 it had increased to 
9594 [34].
As a result of the loss of traditional methods of rangeland management, the vegetation 
coverage decreased from 10% to only 1% of total land cover. Overgrazing of the green 
areas due to the increased population of camels and other livestock accelerated the 
desertification of Qatar [36]. Therefore, the government decided to assign natural protected 
areas in 2004 [37,38], and started to sanction the free grazing of livestock since 2005 [39]. 
By 2011, open grazing was completely banned [40]. According to the experts’ opinions, this 
led to changes in farming practices, as herds were then moved outside of Qatar to areas 
where free grazing remained possible. Moreover, in Qatar, camels are now raised in closed 
systems and within 1 of 9 designated farming areas (camel complexes) in the residential 
districts. Camel workers also live on the premises of the camel complexes. Typically, a 
camel complex has a reception room (Majlis) for social activities of the camel owners. 
The Al-Rayyan municipality, where the Al Sheehaniya  camel racing area is also located, 
currently holds about 83% of the total camel population and 61% of camel holdingss (Figure 
3) [34,35]. According to the experts, this newly adopted closed farming system led to the 
increase of disease incidence, especially of parasitic diseases. However, we did not find any 
disease statistics to substantiate these findings.
Changes in Race Camel Farming and Practices
The increasing focus on camel race competitions caused big changes in camel farming 
practices. Previously, the calves were weaned when the next calf was born. Currently, 
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weaning occurs at around 7 months of age. After being weaned, young camels are directly 
taken for acclimatization (during the period mid-July through mid-August) from the general 
livestock farms (located across the region) to the racing farms, mostly located within the 
Al Sheehaniya  area. This involves drastic changes in feeding systems, intense training for 
races, and mock races alongside camels from other farms and older training camels. The 
off-season for camel racing is during summer (mid-April to August) (Figure 4). During this 
time, most of the owners travel abroad, the frequency of visits to the farms substantially 
decreases, and workers are permitted to take annual vacations. From September onward, 
training intensifies, in preparation of the racing season, which lasts from mid-September 
through mid-April. During that time, 14,000 registered camels from different origins, ages, 
gender, nationalities, and breeds compete together at the Al Sheehaniya  camel-racing 
track. During the racing season, up to 24 rounds take place, approximately five days per 
week.
Figure 3: Human and camel density map of Qatar (adapted from Ministry of Development Planning 
and Statistics, Population Concentration map, 2015). The density map shows the density of camels 
(source: Ministry of Municipality and Environment) and humans in Qatar. Most people live in and 
around Doha, where the Doha animal market and slaughterhouse are also located. The highest 
camel density can be found in the Al-Rayyan area, where the Al Sheehaniya  racing tracks are also 
located. A small, but growing, part of the Qatar population also lives in the Al-Rayyan area.
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Figure 3: Human and camel density map of Qatar (adapted from Ministry of Development 
Planning and Statistics, Population Concentration map, 2015). The density map shows the 
density of camels (source: Minis ry of Mu icipality and Environment) and humans in Qatar. 
Most people live in and around Doha, where the Doha animal market and slaughterhouse 
are also located. The highest camel density can be found in the Al-Rayyan area, where the 
Al Sheehaniya  racing tracks are also located. A small, but growing, part of the Qatar 
population also lives in the Al-Rayyan area. 
Changes in Race Camel Farming and Practices 
The increasing focus on camel race competitions caused big changes in camel farming 
practices. Previously, the calves were weaned when the next calf was born. Currently, 
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Changes in International Camel Movements and Travel
An unprecedented, increasingly intensified mobility of camels inside and outside Qatar 
has been seen over the recent decades. The domestic and cross border mobility does not 
only involve camels, but also people who look after the camels to provide care along the 
journey. Import and export of camels have especially increased since the year 2000 (Figure 
1C). The imported camels mainly come from the UAE and KSA (Figure 1D).
The dynamics and travel patterns of Qatari camels are complex (Figure 4). Camels are 
transported to and from different locations, for a variety of purposes, and with a noticeable 
seasonal pattern. Mobility gets more intensive during the racing and trading season 
(September to April). Experts believe that the ban of open grazing in Qatar played a key 
role in the intensity and frequency of camel movements. They mention that there has been 
a remarkable increase after 2011 in numbers of camel workers and owners who cross the 
borders to and from KSA along with their animals, although this recently stopped with the 
KSA-Qatar political situation. The ban of open grazing stimulated camel owners to establish 
farms in KSA and UAE where open grazing is still permitted. Therefore, camels are moved 
through Gulf Countries, particularly during the winter season.
Camel races and beauty contests that are routinely organized in nearly all Gulf countries 
are another factor that boost the national and international movement of camels. Compared 
to other types of camels, racing camels dominate in terms of numbers and frequency of 
mobility both across borders and domestically, particularly between September and April. 
As per the records of the Camel Racing Committee, in the 2016 racing competitions, 14,000 
camels from Qatar and camels from the other GCC countries contested [35]. However, 
owing to the lack of standardized identification system, it was difficult to determine the 
exact figures and the extent of these movements.
Camels are also being mobilized for reproduction purposes (Figure 4). Mating season 
(also known as camels’ honeymoon) starts in the middle of August and continues through 
February of the next year, with the high season in the September-October period. Female 
camels are usually taken from their own location to other farms where selected males 
are kept particularly for reproduction purposes. About 14,000 female camels are annually 
being moved for mating. They spend around 1 week at a breeding farm with male camels 
before they are taken back to their original farms. Programmed mating is exclusively 
being practiced for race and show camels. The mating season is another seasonal activity 
that entails intensive movements of camels, camel owners, workers, car drivers and 
veterinarians.
Figure 4: Seasonality and movements of camels and camel activities. (A) Dark green locations and 
periods of time indicate a high concentration of camels. The arrows show the direction of camel 
movements. It is shown that many camels gather and mix at the animal market, racing track, and 
breeding farms in Qatar in August, September and October. Moreover, there is constant movement 
to and from grazing grounds and racing tracks outside of Qatar. In March and April, most camels 
travel back to their barns. (B) shows the seasonality of camel related activities. Most activities take 
place in the “cold season” from September to April.
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Changes in Camel Trade
The Doha wholesale market constitutes the primary hub for camel trading. In parallel with 
the increased number of camel races, Al Sheehaniya  City also grew as a market and has 
become a hub for trade of racing and beauty show camels in Qatar. The wholesale market 
in Doha hosts camels and other types of livestock from countries all over the Gulf region. 
The camels typically stay at the market until they are sold. Camel workers live at the market 
premises. Camels that are being sold (calves in particular) serve a variety of purposes. They 
are sold to be slaughtered at the Doha wholesale market abattoir, for breeding purposes, to 
be trained as racing camel, or to be prepared for camel show competitions. 
In recent years, the Doha wholesale market has been surrounded by rapidly growing 
residential areas. Animals in the market are now in close proximity to the residents. As 
of 2005, slaughter practices were banned inside residential premises, and can only be 
performed in official slaughterhouses and exclusively by licensed persons.
Changes in Use of Camel Meat, Milk, and Urine
Camel meat and milk are no longer part of the daily diet of most Qatar inhabitants. 
Nonetheless, camel meat is a fundamental ingredient of Qatari social events and family 
celebrations. Production of camel meat and milk has remained stable in the past 30 years. 
Camel milk is generally kept for personal use, particularly for the perceived therapeutic 
merits of raw camel milk, as well as camel urine. Experts state that there is an unshakable 
belief that the regular consumption of camel milk helps to prevent and control diabetes. 
It is also widely believed in the Qatari community that camel urine and milk can heal skin 
lesions and other diseases. Camel urine is also regularly used to whiten the skin and face 
and lighten the hair. The majority of camel owners offer camel milk and urine for free, as a 
practice of generosity.
DISCUSSION
The role of camels in the transmission of MERS-CoV is well documented [5]. Despite the 
fact that MERS antibodies have already been detected in camels since 1983 [11] and human 
contact with animals is not new, human MERS cases were only detected in 2012 [41]. Based 
on institutional and literature data and in-depth interviews with key professionals, this 
study sought to examine the changes involving the human, animal, and environmental 
drivers that may have contributed to the spread and virus spillover to humans.
Our reconstruction of events over the past decades, based on available literature, 
statistics, and expert opinions, lead to the conclusion that the discovery of oil and natural gas 
resources has been the starting point of a chain of events that ultimately led to conditions 
favoring the emergence of MERS-CoV (Figure 5). This discovery led to massive economic 
growth. Owning a camel represents the wealth and status of its owner in Arabic culture. 
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Governmental sponsorship of camel ownership and camel racing further stimulated the 
camel industry, especially the camel-racing sector. This in turn lead to an accelerating 
increase of the camel population, a change in camel farming, and a concomitant increase 
in the number of camel workers [34]. The human population of Qatar has increased by 
7-fold over the last decades [23]. This is unlike other high-income countries, that have a 
yearly overall population growth of only 0.6% [20]. Population growth and high population 
density have been shown previously to be important risk factors for disease emergence 
Figure 5: Visual summary/timeline of relevant events.
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[42]. Moreover, consistent with the disease profile of wealthy countries where sedentary 
lifestyle prevails, the prevalence of chronic diseases increased in Qatar in accordance with 
the increasing GPD, ultimately rendering the Qatar population not only vulnerable to virus 
transmission, but also to its deadly complications [43].
The intimate nature and number of interactions between camels and humans has also 
increased significantly in the past 30 years, increasing the risk of any zoonotic spillover. 
At camel complexes, workers intimately reside, sleep, and eat with their camels. Camel 
owners, on the other hand, pay regular visits to their barns and stay there for considerable 
hours every day (even longer during weekends, holidays, and winter season) in the majlis 
built at the corner of their barns. Owners, who are often of advanced age with multiple 
comorbidities, enjoy drinking fresh camel milk and entertaining guests. Those who suffer 
certain diseases tend to visit the camel barns to use camel urine or drink fresh camel milk 
for its perceived curative properties.
Among the variety of changes that involved camel husbandry in Qatar, the shift 
from open grazing to close housing systems seems to be most significant. Opportunities 
for camel-to-camel and camel-to-human spread have greatly increased since then. It is 
possible that housing camels in barns, with poor biosecurity and hygienic standards, turned 
these barns into ‘melting pots’ for the virus that ultimately acquired the ability to cross 
the human-animal barrier. The increase of cross-border movement of camels increased 
chances and frequency of (international) virus spread. Camels are transported freely across 
borders for a variety of purposes through multiple routes and means of transportation. 
When camels and the humans that accompany them, arrive at the site of a race or beauty 
event in Qatar, they are housed with the local camels. Owners are welcomed in the majlis at 
the camel complexes. The mixing of camel and human of different origins further increase 
chances of virus transmission.
Although much effort was made to study MERS-CoV viral sequences and MERS-CoV 
transmission between dromedary camels and humans, it is still unknown which genetic 
mechanisms have caused the viral spillover of dromedary camels to humans. However, 
the most important determinant of host specificity seems to be the Spike S1 protein, that 
recognizes and binds to host-cell receptor DPP4 [44]. Recently it has been shown that the 
MERS-CoV spike can rapidly adapt to species variation in DPP4 [45]. As such, the increasing 
human-animal interface that is described in this paper may have facilitated the adaptation 
of the spike protein to human DDP4. However, much remains unknown, also in view of the 
findings that MERS-CoV from East Africa were not phenotypically different from the viruses 
from the Middle East, while human MERS patients have not been reported from the African 
continent [46]. 
Finally, the changes in animal husbandry practices, earlier weaning, frequent grouping 
and transportation of animals, and the introduction of an entirely new feeding system, 
may induce stress in the camels. These changes and movements often involve young 
weaned animals, at the same time as maternal antibodies are waning, which are linked 
to the shedding of the virus [42,47]. Most of the limitations of this study were related to 
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the availability of data. Firstly, statistics on animals, import and export, animal workers, 
and land use were only found since 2000 onwards, limiting the chance to study the trends 
and changes prior to that year. Secondly, even the available national data on the animals, 
humans, and environment were found to be sometimes inconsistent, limiting the possibility 
to provide “hard evidence” of causality. Nevertheless, this is the first comprehensive 
quantitative overview of possible drivers of MERS-CoV in Qatar.
CONCLUSIONS
Several key changes were shown to involve camels, humans, the economy, and the 
environment in Qatar during the last 30 years. Our study indicates that the rapid increase in 
camel ownership, leading to the presence of camels from different origins in a high-density 
environment mixed together with human and other animal species may have offered the 
right circumstances for the virus to spread from camels to humans. The other key changes 
that were described collectively contributed to this situation. Further understanding 
of the drivers that led to the emergence of MERS-CoV can serve as input for MERS-CoV 
surveillance and control measures to prevent further spread of MERS-CoV and reduce 
transmission from camels to humans.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Annex 1: Categories, subcategories, and data sources used for information 
gathering in this review.
Methodology: This review aims to summarize quantitative dataset containing human, animal, 
and environmental factors to investigate the possible drivers that contributed to the MERS-CoV 
emergence in Qatar. The review mainly refers to changes in the last 30 years.
Categories Sub-categories Description of sub-categories Reference 
Human 
demography 
and behavior 
Population Total population 1, 2
Gender wise population 1
Age wise population 1, 3
Municipality wise population distribution 32
Population by nationality and origin 4, 5, 6
Economically active peoples 4, 32
Comorbidities 
and death
Smoking 7, 35
Obesity 8
Cardiovascular  7, 9, 30
Diabetes 7, 9, 10
Asthma 11
Chronic Lung Disease 9
High Blood Pressure 7, 9, 36
Kidney Failure 9
Chronic Liver Disease 9
Chronic Anemia 9
Cancer 9
Immune Deficiency 12
Total death and death rate 9
Sanitation Number of buildings connected to public sewage 26
Number of buildings connected to water 27
Access to drinking water 37
Population with access to improved water source 13
Population using improved sanitation facilities 13
Cultural practices 
around camels
People living in rural and urban area 18
Employment in agriculture 18
Knowledge level Educational status of population 14
Health education 30
Economic 
development
Oil and GDP  16, 17, 18
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Categories Sub-categories Description of sub-categories Reference 
International 
travel, 
commerce, 
sports and 
leisure
Tourists Total arrival and number of tourists 15, 18
Doha airport arriving passengers 16
Origin of visitors 15
Camel related 
travel
Cross border movement and travel of workers and 
owners
4
Camel import and export 19, 23, 24
Camel type (Race, show, and others) and origin in 
import
19
Show camel events (number of shows per year) 39
Agricultural 
and food 
industry 
change
Camel 
demography
Total number and density per area 19, 29, 21
Farming  
demography
Total number of farms and density per farms 19
Camel types Race, show, and others 22, 38
Camel products Production: milk and meat 22, 40
Camels 
slaughtering
Total slaughterhouse and number of slaughtered 
animals
19, 22
Feed import Camel and other livestock 24
Other livestock Sheep, goat, cattle, and horse 40
Climate and 
weather
Temperature, humidity and rainfall 25, 26
Land use change surface protected area and cultivable land 27, 28, 40
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Annex 2: Questionnaires used for qualitative information gathering in this review
Methodology: Interviews with a group of 15 experts and stakeholders from Qatar aimed 
to summarize quantitative information and remaining data gaps in the quantitative dataset 
containing human, animal and environmental factors to investigate the possible drivers that 
contributed to the MERS-CoV emergence in Qatar. The question mainly refer to changes in 
the last 30 years. 
List of the questions:
1. What are the changes with regard to camel ownership?
2. What are the changes over time with regards to behavior and living conditions of 
people around camels? Examples are: frequency/intensity of –camel contact, visiting 
camel’s barns, proportion of people living with camels permanently. 
3. What are the changes with regard to  cultural habits involving camels, such as  kissing 
camels and uses of camel products (meat, milk, and urine)?
4. What are the changes of the level of educational status of the camel’ workers and 
owners?
5. What are the changes in the health education activities targeting camel workers and 
camel owners?
6. What has changed in the cross border movements of camels and people around 
camels?
7. What are the changes in movements within Qatar of camels and people around 
camels?
8. What has changed with regard to the demography of camels and camel farms?
9. What are the changes in camel farming practices?
10. What are the changes in the feeding of camels? 
11. What are the changes in camel slaughtering practices?
12. What are the environmental changes that took place in Qatar, for example with 
regard to protected areas (nature conservation) and their effects on camel farming?
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In this study, we sought to review human and animal dynamics to identify factors that 
might have influenced the emergence, transmission and spread of MERS-CoV in Qatar. In 
addition, we explored the strengths and challenges faced by the health system in preparing 
for and responding to the MERS-CoV epidemic. Through this study, a (One Health and 
Biosecurity) framework is introduced to tackle some of the challenges to control MERS-
CoV and other zoonoses at the human-animal interface.  
Operationalization of One-Health
Among the viral zoonotic pathogens that threaten humans, MERS-CoV is perceived as a 
global health security problem in view of continued spill overs and the potential for human 
to human spread [1,2]. In fact, Leibler et al. [3] argued that most of the zoonotic pathogens 
threatening human health either arise, or are transferred to, humans from livestock. 
Therefore, when MERS-CoV appeared, officials from the public health and veterinary side 
identified a number of questions during the early phase of the epidemic. These questions 
included: (i) what are the potential reservoirs of the virus? (ii) from where and how do 
camels contract the infection in the first place? (iii) do camels demonstrate symptoms? 
(iv) for how long would they shed the virus? (v) what are the circumstances and practices 
that might increase the risk of the virus transmission to humans? (vi) Who are those at 
risk more than the others? and (vii) whether such transmission follow particular seasonal 
trend? These questions, in addition to several others, directed the research work part of 
which is introduced within this thesis. 
Once the early evidence suggested the zoonotic nature of MERS-CoV, the Qatar 
government embraced the One-Health, multidisciplinary approach with the goal to ensure 
efficient and coordinated national response to MERS-CoV cases (Introduction, chapter 2 
and 6, [4]). Three main strategic actions were taken to establish a One-Health response to 
outbreaks including MERS-CoV: (1) the development of an integrated National Emergency 
Preparedness and Response (EPR) Plan. This plan provided an overall guidance to all 
responders at the national and sub-national levels. Under the umbrella of ‘One-Health’, 
the plan was developed with the help from the WHO, OIE and FAO (FAO, 2015); (2) the 
formulation of a National Outbreak Control Task force (NOCT); and (3) the implementation 
of joint MERS-CoV investigations.
Outcome of the One-Health Approach
The findings of our studies at the human animal interface in Qatar made an important 
contribution to the understanding of the potential relationship between humans, animals 
and MERS-CoV infection. In addition, we have provided evidence for the zoonotic potential 
of MERS-CoV from camels and the possible risk factors (Chapter 3, 4, 5; [5]). Hitherto, the 
implemented One Health surveillance helped us to detect twenty-four MERS-CoV cases in 
Qatar and establish the link with dromedary camels (summarized in Chapter 10). Of these, 
forteen cases had direct camel contacts (six camel owners and eight camel workers), and 
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camels associated with cases tested positive for MERS-CoV RNA and in two cases, virus was 
identical. These findings have strengthened our knowledge on modes of transmission and 
the source of infection. 
Detection of virus in camels
First definitive proof of camels as potential source for MERS-CoV infection came when the 
virus was detected and characterized genetically from a nasal swab of camels in Qatar 
as part of our joint investigations [6]. In the study, the nucleotide sequence of isolated 
virus from camels swab were matched with MERS-CoV from two persons work in the same 
farm in Hafr-Al-Batin [7], suggests a recent outbreak incident that involved humans as well 
as camels. We further confirmed that dromedary camels are a reservoir for MERS-CoV 
(Chapter 5.2; [5]) and highest rates of virus shedding occurring in young camels (Chapter 
5.1; [8]). In addition, as co-circulation of several variants at any given time was detected 
by strain typing of samples from animals at the central market in Doha, this demonstrated 
that the high prevalence was probably caused by multiple introductions. This could likely be 
attributed to the way camels from different origins are grouped together then co-herded 
for weeks prior to slaughter, providing many opportunities for the virus circulation [9].
Risk factors and at-risk groups
We reported that 80% of the workers from camel slaughter house were positive for IgG 
antibodies by serological microarray followed by virus neutralization assays, augmenting 
the perceived evidence of the dromedary camels’ role as a source threatened to infect 
humans. These results also suggest that people with frequent exposure to camel settings 
could be at higher risk of the infection than healthy adults and/or those with no close 
contact with camels. This group is not only capable of transmitting MERS-CoV, but also 
any other similar emerging or re-emerging zoonotic disease. Qatar animal workers are at 
particular risk in view of the rapid changes in the animal sector over the past decades, 
described in chapter 4, 9 [9]. Thus, promotion of biosecurity measures and occupational 
regulations for animal caretakers under the One-Health umbrella is paramount.
These studies contributed to the knowledge needed by the WHO, OIE, and FAO to 
conclude coherent recommendations to the professionals and the public worldwide [2,10]. 
All of them were used to update their MERS risk assessment guidelines. Nonetheless, 
MERS-CoV transmission dynamics within the herd and between dromedaries and humans 
remained incompletely resolved, providing insufficient evidence to curb the virus spread. 
Similarly, the events that typically involve intensive human exposure to dromedary camels, 
like camel racing, have not yet been thoroughly investigated to understand where and how 
infection occurs at the human animal interface [11].
Amid the lack of conclusive evidence on what caused the virus spillover from camels 
to humans, public health scholars resort to the belief that the spread of MERS-CoV has 
likely resulted from the effect of combined factors: the exponential increase in the camel 
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population roaming the region amid absence of biosecurity precautions coupled with the 
poor perception of the disease risk among both camel owners and workers (Chapter 4, 9; 
[12]). 
Interventions, policy changes and societal impact 
Understandably, separation of naive animals from previously exposed camels and 
encouraging workers to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) might help decrease 
the risk of MERS-CoV exposure to humans (Chapter 3, 4, 9; [4]). A national One Health 
program needs to foster collaboration on training of interdisciplinary teams, risk 
assessments, surveillance and control measures for MERS-CoV as well as other zoonoses. 
Regular meetings that joined the two sectors enhanced coordination and the timely sharing 
of information. Through these meetings decisions makers were advised by pubic health 
specialists to allocate the resources needed by the veterinary sector to undertake its role 
in investigation and response. Formalised and continued cross sectoral collaboration is 
critical because there is a range of serious zoonotic diseases threats. Sharing the same 
socioeconomic and climatic conditions, Gulf countries likely are threatened with a number 
of zoonotic illnesses, further necessitating the promotion of regional collaboration where 
the one-health can rather become an institutional practice, not a temporary style to 
respond to an epidemic. 
An important benefit of the One-Health collaboration is the change in attitude of 
the camel owners, who used to deny the joint investigation teams to access their camel 
barns, but now allow investigation and research teams to examine infection transmission 
hypothesis along with the risk factors [14]. This in turn most likely led to a reduction in the 
experiences of both self-stigma and social-stigma associated with MERS-CoV (Chapter 6). In 
Qatar, the human and animal sector decided to have unified and joint media activities and 
messages and, as result of that, the local media became more engaged with the authorities 
and reported more on the effort by the teams to prevent the spread of MERS-CoV. Qatar 
TV made a documentary reconstructing the outbreak and activities which was broadcasted 
nationally in 2015/2016. Also, possibly as a result of the raised awareness in the risk group 
and the general population, patients and families became more co-operative during case 
investigation, contact tracing, history taking, sample collection and allowed access to their 
barns and camels. A marked improvement in the adherence to infection control measures 
among camel owners with co-morbidities was observed and there were less rumors or 
negative messages circulating in the community about MERS-CoV (Chapter 2, 3, 6). 
Challenges faced when implementing the One Health approach
The One-Health approach exposed serious technical challenges involving both the public 
health as well as the veterinary sector. Different factors can explain these challenges, but 
having different priorities for the two sectors could be signalled as a prime factor. While 
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the priorities of the public health sector largely focused on protecting humans from the 
impact of the epidemics caused by emerging zoonotic agents, the animal and agricultural 
sector, on the other hand, seems to prioritize health problems that can have direct impact 
on animal or farm.
Under the pressure to carry out coherent control measures, public health sector had to 
assume direct responsibility for taking the lead. However, the veterinary sector, as voiced 
in several ‘off-the-record’ meetings, seemed to perceive this approach as ‘superiority’, 
attenuating the momentum of the joint work. The readiness to perform consistent, 
coordinated investigation of human as well as animal-suspected cases is one of the key 
challenges to the joint work including the promptness to initiate field investigation with a 
designated rapid response team. 
Being short of technical staff to undertake the routine as well as the urgent field 
investigation missions, the veterinary sector had difficulties to keep abreast with the burning 
needs of outbreak investigations. Moreover, the national capacity to perform advanced 
diagnostic tests was also lacking. Sequencing of both human and animal specimens is 
unattainable domestically, limiting the ability to determine whether the source of infection 
is zoonotic. Similarly, the time needed to obtain governmental consent and arrange the 
shipping of the specimens abroad to the international reference laboratories has negatively 
hampered the timeliness of investigation and response. Remarkably, there were no 
guidelines for the veterinarians on how to investigate camels suspected with such a novel 
virus and what are the appropriate samples to be collected, how to collect them and when. 
 Also, since there was no biosecurity system in camel farms, the lack of a camel 
identification and registration system has negatively affected the joint case investigation; 
traceability (important given the high mobility of the camels across the international 
borders and domestically), the likely whereabouts of exposure, and the potential sources 
of exposure thus were difficult to reconstruct. 
Finally, as MERS is not typically considered as serious disease in camels (infected camels 
typically neither show apparent symptoms nor die because of it), the urge to respond 
to the reported cases was uneven between the public health and the veterinary sector. 
The same observation can explain why most of persons at risk continued the practices 
(like consumption of the unpasteurized milk and the use of camel urine) that can result in 
them acquiring such a serious infection. Hence, we can understand why the enthusiasm to 
comply with the biosecurity precautions is almost absent. 
Key lessons Learned
One-Health is important to understand a zoonotic disease. The One Health approach has 
been central to our current understanding of MERS-CoV. Thus, the same approach will have 
to be maintained to assess the effectiveness of the control measures. As emerging viruses 
remain to be a constant challenge, One-Health must be fostered at all levels.
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Community engagement is paramount: Community engagement substantially helped in 
undertaking our investigations. A dramatic behavior change was observed among people 
at-risk who initially denied that camels could be a source for such a disease. During the 
initial phases of the epidemic, owners of the camel farms denied the joint investigation 
teams from accessing their farms. These are not true anymore. 
Transparency: The constant policy of transparent Emergency Risk Communication allowed 
the community to be up to date with the situation. It also helped maintain the public trust 
in the national competent authorities.
Recommendation for scaling up
To upgrade the One-Health approach, a comprehensive system of One-Health surveillance 
needs to be established to ensure the early reporting and joint investigation of suspected 
human and animal cases along with contact tracing. The elements of this system should 
include the flowing components: Severe Acute Respiratory Infections (SARI) surveillance; 
active surveillance of people-at-risk for MERS-CoV infection (such as persons around 
camels); and testing of camels at slaughterhouses, camel race and at the ports of entry 
of Qatar.  Additionally, effective joint training programs are needed for veterinarians and 
physicians to ensure the early detection of suspected human and animal cases. Moreover, 
to increase knowledge on the prevalence and epidemiology of MERS-CoV, a large-scale 
case-control study along with a sero-epidemiological survey targeting the most-at-risk 
groups needs to be designed.
Camel farm biosecurity
As a system for management, the surveillance should be complemented by a farm 
biosecurity system, which is supposed to limit the virus transmission in camel populations 
(through development of vaccines and effective management of infected animals/herds) 
and thereby reduce the opportunity for further human exposure. It is well established 
that infectious diseases that spread from animals to humans, such as salmonellosis, 
cryptosporidiosis, rabies and many others have been reported in veterinary personnel [16-
23]. It is argued that such vulnerability could be substantially lowered by applying evidence-
based precautions like biosecurity protocols and infection prevention and control measures 
at the animal care settings and biosafety measures at the healthcare facilities respectively. 
There is no doubt that ignoring such preventive actions increases the chance for serious 
outbreaks to spread. 
We have previously shown that the risk to acquire MERS is proportionate to the 
exposure to camel farms where biosecurity measures and hygienic practices are largely 
ignored (Chapter 2, 3, 9; [8,9]). One of the serious observations reflected in the drivers for 
MERS was the intensive, poorly traceable movement of camels along with their caregivers 
across the borders and domestically between wide range of entertainment, trading 
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markets, abattoir house, and husbandry farm settings. Another observation was the 
frequent mixing of camels from various origins and the level of direct contact with humans, 
some of whom suffer chronic illnesses, rendering them susceptible to MERS. When reading 
this with the prevailing low risk perception among both the camel owners and workers, 
as described in anthropological studies [14], the vulnerability to the risk of the disease 
multiplies. Nonetheless, such vulnerability could significantly be abated if the biosecurity 
simple measures were applied. 
As a result of the drastic sociopolitical and economic change experienced in Qatar in 
recent years (Chapter 9), novel routes from importation of food were established along with 
powerful encouragement to produce food, including from animal resources, domestically. 
These developments are likely to exacerbate the already existing risks of zoonotic diseases 
precipitated by the lack of biosecurity, poor hygiene, the low risk perception, and the 
constant vulnerability to occupational hazards. As the number of farms endorsed for 
agriculture and animal production is rapidly mounting, it is thus preferable to promptly 
embrace biosecurity measures along with the other preventive strategies rather than 
regretting an avoidable waste of precious lives and livestock. 
Biosecurity is defined as “the suite of good management practices that are implemented 
on farms to reduce the entering, spreading, or establishment of disease agents, which 
further reduces risks to the environment, community, and the economy” [27]. In fact, 
biosecurity is deemed the best-known effective way to prevent the introduction of MERS-
CoV and other zoonotic diseases into camel farms. Recently, it has been argued that 
biosecurity is the most economical and effective method of zoonotic diseases’ prevention 
and control, particularly when coupled with educating and training the staff in the farms 
[24,25]. 
The objectives of such as system should be to (1) ensure early detection of MERS-CoV in 
the camel production, (2) to implement proportional and sustainable measures to limit 
the spread of the virus in the camel population, and (3) to limit occupational exposure of 
personnel to the virus.
Development and implementation of the camel farm biosecurity plan
Undoubtedly, the effective implementation of biosecurity largely depends on good planning 
and resources. Biosecurity calls for sophisticated culture of safety and hygiene to be 
performed by caretakers of all types of farms/barns. Several steps need to be taken under 
the technical guidance of experts in the field to develop and implement the biosecurity plan 
on a farm. Defining the program objectives, developing tools for risk assessment, assessing 
occupational health vulnerability, along with the practices that influence environmental 
hygiene. Further, the plan must give detailed guidance in terms of standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), staff training, and monitoring the effectiveness of the biosecurity plan. 
Through these steps, risks and hazards can be classified and prioritized. However, to ensure 
the appropriateness and feasibility of the plan, it is fundamental to involve the relevant 
stakeholders and define how they perceive the risks to which they might be exposed. 
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The role of these stakeholders would not be confined to identifying the social and 
cultural acceptability of the proposed measures, but also, they can noticeably facilitate 
the foundation step of assessing the risks. Such step can draw from the technical risk 
assessments which explains the capability of an infectious agent to spread across different 
farms in a vast geographic location. Moreover, the stakeholders can help and provide 
reasonable understanding of the community motivations, calculate the estimated cost for 
the required items and whether it would be affordable for the community to bear it. 
However, a more potent way of showing the seriousness of the biological hazards is to 
use the same mechanism to engage the target stakeholders in reflecting the socioeconomic 
effects of a natural-occurring outbreaks among animals. Events as such create an ideal 
chance to explain threats, how they cause harm, and the ways to prevent them along 
with their avoidable consequences. Therefore, vigilant animal surveillance to detect 
epidemics, combined with professional investigations that include potential zoonotic 
threats can persuade the target community members with the credibility of the authority’s 
recommendations. Ensuring the preparedness to manage such events will contribute to 
public trust on the value of the biosecurity measures.  
Biosecurity in its essence calls for a drastic behavioral change in the current organization 
of camel farming, investing in a package of incentives, penalties, and regulations. Adoption 
of a biosecurity system will not only require a burden of practices that are unfamiliar to 
many of those involved in farming business, but also will add a substantial cost on them. 
Therefore, it might need to be marketed as an essential value to preserve the wellbeing and 
prosperity for the individuals, their families, and the entire community. A blended approach 
of carefully designed risk communication, behavioral change, and health promotion 
strategies can help achieve the desired effect. Surely, these strategies are not cheap and on 
top of that, it will take some time to exhibit tangible results. 
Approaches to implement biosecurity might differ according to the farm type and 
size. For instance, regulatory authorities can use their power in controlling the access 
of farm products to the markets as an incentive to promote the abidance to biosecurity 
measures across large–scale farms with commercial production. Whereas in small-scale 
farms, biosecurity can rely on establishing physical barriers to control access. However, 
such barriers, along with the other in-kind materials and consumables, should be part of 
the project budget.  
A risk-based pilot study can help identify the critical control points, prioritize the 
biosecurity interventional measures, and assess the support from the farm owners and 
workers, putting into account motives with which they shall abide to. 
Where to install the biosecurity measures?
The risk assessment during the preparatory and pilot phases of the program is anticipated 
to yield a prioritized list of high-risk settings. For MERS, camel farms particularly in the 
main hubs for race competitions in Shahanyia and the trade in the wholesale market will 
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be considered. Additionally, as noted in studies conducted on MERS-CoV in Egypt [26], 
quarantine areas are likely to be one of the critical points where the virus transmission 
can occur when imported camels mix with each other for several days before they are 
redeployed inside the country. In addition, although it might rather fall under the jurisdiction 
of occupational health, abattoir and veterinary clinics shall firmly be included. 
Components for the camel farming biosecurity system
The basic principle elements of farm biosecurity are segregation, cleaning and disinfection. 
Infected animal shall be denied access to mix with uninfected animals. Likewise, vehicles, 
equipment, and materials should all be cleaned before they are allowed into the farm [27]. 
The components of the system include: (i) the farm location, design, and management. It 
also includes a system that operates according to national and international guidelines for 
farm biosecurity. It guides how farms shall be categorized, licensed, along with the routine 
farm inspection and notification of events; (ii) control of animal movement to and from the 
farm as animals frequently taken out for variety of entertainment and business purposes; 
(iii) the protocol to manage importation of new animals, screening process, and isolation of 
both sick and new animal [28]. Additionally, the husbandry, which is rather an occupational 
field, will also deal with the animal welfare. Some of the activities include: health and safety 
training, registration of workers, annual health check-up, timely vaccination of caretakers, 
the process of camels’ raising, breeding, and feeding [28]. 
Health management of animals
As shown in this thesis active circulation of MERS-CoV was found in animals when transported 
and grouped in high risk areas such as camel racing and show competition, slaughter house, 
camel market (Chapter 3, 4.1, 8, 9). Therefore, a framework was proposed. This framework 
includes: active surveillance covering farms, quarantine stations and other similar settings. 
Whenever an animal tests positive by PCR at one of the designated screening visits, the 
following response actions should be taken regardless of epidemiological link to human 
case: i) immediate notification to animal health authorities and the public health sector; ii) 
both sectors should carry out rapid joint animal-human investigation with retrospective or 
prospective tracing for the animal movement using standardized investigation forms. The 
entire herd should be screened besides reviewing the history of contacts of the persons 
linked to the infected animal; iii) if the investigation detected confirmed human cases 
suspected of being community-acquired, veterinary authorities must be informed; iv) the 
interpretation of epidemiological and laboratory data should be done along with sequencing 
of viruses from both animals and human cases; v) the outcome of such investigation should 
be communicated with the OIE as well as the public in accordance with the emergency 
risk communication guidelines; vi) the veterinary team must undertake control measures 
as part of the field investigation. As a precaution measure, isolation of infected camels 
shall continue until PCR testing turns negative. Milking and slaughter of positive camels 
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supplying the food chain must be banned throughout the period of quarantine. All persons 
in contact with infected animal must put on the appropriate protective equipment. 
Preventive interventions for visitors and other at-risk groups
When affected with MERS-CoV, dromedaries do not display any signs of infection [29-35] 
Therefore, it is unlikely to identify all animals on a farm, marketplace, racetrack or abattoir 
that are shedding the MERS-CoV, potentially exposing humans to the infection. However, 
infected camels may shed the virus through nasal and eye discharge, faeces, and possibly 
in their milk and urine [36-39]. The virus may also be found in the organs and meat of an 
infected camels [12,40]. Several conducted studies suggested that visitors to the camel 
barns contracted MERS infection [41,42]. 
Based on the literature who approach camels’ and their setting apart from the 
veterinarians, we found that camel farm owners and workers in addition to the visitors 
were exposed at varying degrees to the camels over a course of different seasons. Animal 
workers, who are often young and healthy, experience a highly intensive, frequent, and 
intimate exposure to camels, but only few of them contracted the disease, and displayed 
clinical outcome (Chapter 2, 3, 4.1 and 9). However, it is unclear if that implies that they are 
less likely to be transmitting virus when infected. Camel owners, who were predominantly 
middle-aged with chronic illnesses and reported a less frequent exposure to camels are 
more vulnerable for developing severe disease [31,41,43-47]. As farms also serve a social 
function, visitors to the camel farms also can arguably have a similar degree of vulnerability 
to the owners. Therefore, they can both be put in the same category for the guidelines of 
biosecurity measures [48,49].
Anthropological studies [14] revealed several social norms imply exposure to MERS 
infection. Camel owners spend their weekends in their ‘Majlis’ where they receive visitors 
and guests. A constant practice of entertaining guests is offering the fresh camel milk with 
dates and coffee to display the Arabic generosity. It is worth noting here that MERS-CoV 
was detected in raw milk of infected dromedaries (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9; [6,8,40]). Until 
more is understood about MERS, males above 60 years of age with comorbidities such 
as diabetes, renal failure, hypertension, chronic lung disease, obesity, and low immunity 
should avoid direct contact with dromedaries with unknown infection status, and abstain 
from drinking or eating raw animal products in the first place.
Furthermore, drinking raw milk or consuming undercooked camel products, including 
meat, blood and urine, implies a high risk of infection from a variety of other organisms 
that might cause disease in humans. Among others, relevant for Qatar are Brucella abortus 
and Brucella melitensis. When animal products are appropriately processed, they will likely 
become safe for human consumption. Yet, other hygiene practices should persistently be 
observed to prevent cross-contamination [50,51].
 As a general safeguard, anybody visiting farms, animal marketplaces, barns or other 
places where dromedaries are present must practice the universal hygiene measures; 
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consistent hand washing after touching animals, avoiding touching eyes, nose or mouth 
with hands, and avoiding contact with sick dromedaries. It is no less important to wear 
protective gowns and gloves while professionally handling animals. Such recommendations 
should also be disseminated to travellers, tourists and pilgrims coming to the region from 
around the world [10].
Workers in dromedary farm, abattoir, animal market, veterinary personnel and those 
handling camels at racing farms should all be instructed to comply with hygiene and 
biosecurity standards, including frequent hand washing after touching animals and using 
PPEs. Workers should also avoid exposing household members to dirty work clothing, 
shoes, or other contaminated items that may have come into contact with camel excretions 
and fomites. It is therefore highly recommended that these clothes and items remain at the 
workplace to be washed daily, and that workers to have access to wash facilities at their 
workstations before leaving the farm. The biosecurity guidelines shall give more details on 
how to change cloths and skills of hygienic practices [50].
Wisely, infected animals should never be slaughtered for feeding purposes; deceased 
animals should be safely buried or burned. If not protected, people should abandon contact 
with animals tested positive for MERS-CoV until consequent tests reveal that the camel is 
free from the virus or of other public health threats [51].
Vaccines
Vaccination is one of the most practical proactive measures, which significantly prevents 
infection, replication and shedding of the pathogen while ensuring sustained animal 
production. Vaccines are increasingly used in animals for variety of purposes. Primarily, 
vaccines are used to improve animal health and consequently animal production, by 
managing infections and infestations among animals. In addition, vaccines can be used 
to indirectly protect the public health by administering vaccines that can prevent or curb 
infections and shedding of pathogens from animals, particularly emerging or re-emerging 
zoonotic ones [52]. Therefore, inoculation of camels can be considered a risk mitigation 
option as well as a biosecurity intervention directed to target the human-animal interface 
to substantially reduce MERS-CoV spillover to human population [53-56].
Equivac®, a Hendra virus vaccine can be taken as a good example for such a good 
intervention. Equivac was developed solely for horses as a precedent for mitigating the 
risk of zoonotic disease among humans with a vaccine administered to animals. However, 
the difference for MERS CoV is that a camel vaccination in this context would be deployed 
solely to protect humans, as the virus causes only mild upper respiratory illness in camels, 
unlike Hendra virus which causes severe disease in horses as well. It is for scholars in public 
health, veterinary sector and pharmaceutical manufacturers to tell whether this method 
can be replicated to managing the risk of MERS-CoV. A similar proposed preventive strategy 
that needs to be assessed is the production of human vaccine against MERS-CoV to offer 
long term protection for those with high vulnerability risk factors. Such human vaccine 
might also prove valuable during prospect MERS outbreaks [55,57-61].
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Currently, there are no MERS-CoV-licensed human vaccines as the process leading 
to its production is not yet at industrial scale. However, a number of human vaccine 
candidates for coronaviruses, including MERS-CoV, are at various phases of development. 
Reports tell that five overall vaccine technology platforms targeting the MERS-CoV spike 
protein have been proccessed to develop the inoculation [55]. Fortunately, a number of 
countries and public health agencies called upon pharmaceutical companies to urge these 
companies accelerate the development of a dromedary camel vaccine in order to evaluate 
the potential to limit the chances for the virus transmission to humans [55,62].
Operationalizing the vaccination
Ahead of the mass production and deployment of a dromedary camel vaccine, several 
critical aspects essential to be evaluated; the vaccine acceptability, cost-effectiveness, 
and feasibility of its administration in comparison with the other typical interventions. 
A technical advice is desperately needed to tell which is better: to go for the production 
of dromedary camel vaccine, a combined camel vaccine that includes protection from 
diseases that are relevant for the camel production sector, or a human one, provided 
the formerly mentioned points. Prior to administering the camel vaccine, camel owners 
and the competent governmental agencies have to be consulted. Additionally, feasibility 
studies is an essential preparatory part, as it cab help explore opportunities for commercial 
manufacturing and characterize incentives for camel vaccination. Further, the careful 
assessment of the potential implications on trade is no less important. 
Conclusion and main recommendations 
The studies described in this thesis helped improve our understanding of MERS-CoV, our 
ability to identify, early detect, and respond to infection in camels as well as humans, the 
way we communicate our results and how we use evidence to inform policy decisions 
to protect camels and prevent new human infections. The results provided compelling 
evidence that: i) the novel corona virus is circulating in camel herds; ii) camel workers, and 
camel owners, are at high risk of exposure to MERS-CoV; and iii) abattoirs, camel market, 
and camel racing areas are high risk settings for MERS-CoV exposure. Despite the progress 
in our understanding of MERS-CoV, however, many questions remain unanswered. The 
definitive origin, particular mechanism of transmission, and the factors explaining the 
seasonal variability of the infections at the human-animal interface are some of the 
areas that need further research efforts. Determining the principal route(s) of the virus 
transmission between camels and humans is fundamental to preventing the spread of 
MERS-CoV into human populations. 
MERS-CoV persists to be a significant concern to public health, including potential for 
adaptation resulting in more efficient human to human transmission. The high case fatality 
rate underscores the need to expedite well-designed clinical trials for direct, effective 
therapies and vaccines to reduce the forthcoming economic and public health impacts of 
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MERS-CoV.  Given the documented camel role in MERS-CoV transmission, the common 
practices in the affected region, like consuming unpasteurized camels’ milk and lack of 
hygiene practice at farms, should be discouraged. 
There are systematic challenges impeding the effective embracement of the One-
Health in terms of preparedness, investigation and response to MERS-CoV. As new infectious 
agents will continue to emerge at the human-animal interface, operationalization of the 
One-Health is the only strategic solution, and prevention and preparedness programs, 
including farm biosecurity and the One-Health surveillance, investigation, and response, 
are paramount. Additionally, guidance for surveillance in animal population, quarantine 
procedures, management of dromedary camels actively shedding the MERS-CoV, food and 
environmental safety practices at farms, and biosecurity measures at the camel markets, 
racing yards need to be developed or updated. 
While many research efforts were conducted on MERS-CoV over the past seven years, 
the  future focus should aim to generate evidence for public health policies, strategies 
and interventions. This research agenda should address  the following technical priority 
areas: epidemiology and transmission among both human and animal populations; virus 
origin and its genetic characteristisation; clinical management of cases besides infection 
prevention and control at the healthcare facilities; treatment and vaccine development 
and implementation; and impact of prevention interventions and the operational research. 
The experience gained out of these studies also provides an opportunity to extend 
the work on MERS to other zoonoses, including viral, bacterial and parasitic pathogens, 
of public health significance, as several of the observed findings also may apply to other 
pathogens.  A national zoonotic diseases control program needs to be proposed, including 
the development of a zoonotic diseases control operational framework, involving different 
organizations with various scientific and professional backgrounds. They should actively 
cooperate and collaborate on training of interdisciplinary teams, risk assessments, 
surveillance and control measures of MERS-CoV, other zoonoses and implementation of 
joint field investigations
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Summary of the thesis
The reporting of human cases of MERS-CoV in Qatar during 2012 has sparked intensive 
investigative efforts to identify factors that might have influenced the emergence, 
transmission and spread of MERS-CoV. A “One Health” approach was found to be the most 
feasible and practical way to study the human and animal dynamics in relation to MERS-
CoV. Recognizing interconnection of human and veterinary health, “One Health” uses a 
multidisciplinary and cross-sectorial approach to address (re)emerging risks that originate 
at the animal-human-ecosystems interface. We explored the strengths and challenges 
faced by health system partners in preparing for and responding to the MERS-CoV epidemic. 
The objective of this thesis was to gain knowledge on the ecology and epidemiology of 
MERS-CoV in Qatar and to enable evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies 
to reduce the risk of infections at human-animal interface. Additionally, it reviews the 
current epidemiology and clinical presentation of MERS-CoV infection while describing the 
preparedness plans to combat the disease. 
A comprehensive literature review was conducted in order to determine the gaps in 
knowledge about MERS-CoV infection at human-animal interface and to lay the foundation 
for the overall research studies conducted in this thesis (Chapter 1). To better understand 
the emergence and modes of transmission of MERS-CoV infection in Qatar, a descriptive 
epidemiological investigation of MERS human cases in Qatar was conducted (Chapter 2). 
Camel workers were found seropositive for viral antibody in West Qatar (Chapter 3). 
The case-control study showed that participants who were found seropositive were more 
involved in camel training and herding, cleaning farm equipment, or milking camels. In 
addition, seropositive workers were less likely to wash their hands before and after animal 
contact and were more likely to handle camels that travelled abroad. Contact with camel 
excretions and subsequent touching of mucous membranes was likely an important source 
of infection. The identified risk factors can be used to establish infection prevention and 
control measures for MERS-CoV by introducing farm biosecurity system. (Chapter 3).
With the objective to design prevention measures as well as explaining the reportedly 
high MERS-COV mortality rate, a population-based serosurvey was conducted among 
camel-contact versus non-camel contact personnel (Chapter 4). Serum-neutralizing 
antibodies were only detected among camel-contact persons of the 498 randomly sampled 
sera, suggesting exposure to dromedary as a major risk factor for the infection. Further, 
upon studying exposure risk factors for MERS-CoV, a high risk was shown by not using 
personal protection equipment for workers at Doha slaughterhouse (Chapter 4). When 
investigating MERS-CoV shedding patterns, a high proportion of camels presented for 
slaughter in Qatar showed significant evidence for nasal MERS-CoV shedding compared 
to both fecal and oral shedding. This led to the conclusion that nasal swabs constitute 
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the samples of choice for diagnosis and surveillance of MERS-CoV in camels (Chapter 5.2). 
Sequence analysis showed that at least five different virus strains were found to be circulating 
in Qatar, suggesting the slaughterhouse in Doha as a driver of MERS-CoV perpetuation as 
well as a high-risk area for human exposure. As no correlation was observed between RNA 
loads and the levels of neutralizing antibodies among examined camels, it was inferred 
that the immune protection is limited and the potential for reinfection is likely regardless 
previous exposure (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.1). After MERS-CoV was first isolated from 
camels, the phylogenetic analysis of the complete genome clearly showed that MERS-CoV 
camel/Qatar_2_2014 was very similar to human MERS-CoV. It was also the closest relative 
to MERS-CoV England/Qatar1 2012 (Chapter 5.2). These data supported the hypothesis that 
dromedary camels are a reservoir for MERS-CoV and can transmit the infection to humans. 
The evidence for a possible role of food-borne of MERS-CoV infection was investigated. 
Camel milk and urine were collected form the high risk areas. We found MERS-CoV specific 
antibodies in urine samples while all camels showed such evidence for a (previous) MERS-
CoV infection in serum (Chapter 5.3). Raw milk samples were tested for anti-MERS-CoV 
antibodies using both protein microarray assay and virus neutralization with parallel testing 
of serum, nasal and rectal swabs for multiple genomic targets. All sera and milk samples 
were positive for MERS-CoV antibodies. Moreover, the presence of MERS-CoV RNA in milk 
of camels which actively shed the virus warrants measures to prevent putative food borne 
transmission of MERS-CoV (Chapter 5.4).
A case study describes how One Health approach was initiated and used to develop and 
establish surveillance and response to MERS-CoV in Qatar during 2012 (Chapter 6). Initial 
emergency response actions were identified through the Qatar national outbreak control 
task force including a joint national human-animal health investigation team. Requesting 
inputs from several international organizations, a comprehensive roadmap for MERS-
CoV surveillance and response on the human-animal interface for Qatar was generated. 
Research findings were used to provide national and international guidance for studies 
and prevention measures. A survey was conducted among the governmental health and 
veterinary authorities to monitor preparedness and response to MERS-CoV epidemic 
through ‘One-Health’ approach (Chapter 7). Nominating lack of political will as one of the 
key gaps to adopt ‘One-Health’, that was also mentioned in ‘Doha Declaration’ to take the 
epidemic as a chance to promote the inter-sectorial collaboration to contain MERS-CoV 
epidemic and to enhance preparedness to combat other possible future emerging zoonotic 
diseases.
To provide an overview of current knowledge on the distribution, spread and risk factors 
of infections in dromedary camels, a systematic review was carried out where published 
data MERS-CoV was compiled and analysed. (Chapter 8). Camels only show minor clinical 
signs of disease after being infected with MERS-CoV. Serological evidence of MERS-CoV 
in camels has been found in 20 countries, with molecular evidence for virus circulation in 
13 countries. The seroprevalence of MERS-CoV antibodies increases with age in camels, 
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while the prevalence of viral shedding MERS-CoV RNA detection in nasal swabs decreases 
as determined by. In several studies, camels that were sampled at animal markets or 
quarantine facilities were seropositive compared to those at farms as well as imported 
camels vs. locally bred camels. Some studies show a relatively higher seroprevalence and 
viral detection during the cooler winter months. Knowledge of the animal reservoir of 
MERS-CoV is essential to develop intervention and control measures to prevent human 
infections (Chapter 8).
To identify and quantify key possible drivers that might have contributed to the MERS-
CoV emergence and spread in Qatar (Chapter 9), a list of potential human, animal and 
environmental drivers for disease emergence were identified utilizing literature review, 
database analysis, and expert opinions. Observing that the discovery and subsequent 
exploitation of oil and gas has led to a fivefold increase of Qatar GDP and a seven-fold 
increase in the population in the past 30 years, the resulting increase in income has gradually 
transformed lifestyle from Bedouin life to urban sedentary life. The subsequent flourishing 
of the governmental-supported culturally embedded camel sector has led as early as 1990 
to duplication of the camel numbers. Experiencing overgrazing and desertification, open 
grazing was banned in 2005. Replacing this with compact barn housing, camels, camel 
attendants and other animal species were forced to live in contact and significantly cross 
borders to seek new grazing areas. Such major habitual changes might have offered the 
virus the right circumstance to spill over from camels to humans and spread throughout 
Northern Africa and the Middle East (Chapter 9).
An integrated framework for One Health and camel farm Biosecurity was proposed as 
a practical strategy to prevent and control MERS-CoV and other zoonoses at the human-
animal interface (Chapter 10).
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اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﯾن اﻟذﯾن ﻛﺎﻧت ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﻓﺣوﺻﺎﺗﮭم اﻟﻣﺻﻠﯾﺔ إﯾﺟﺎﺑﯾﺔ ﻟﻸﺟﺳﺎم اﻟﻣﺿﺎدة ﻛﺎﻧوا أﻛﺛر اﻧﺧراطﺎ ًﻓﻲ 
أﻧﺷطﺔ ﺗدرﯾب اﻹﺑل ورﻋﺎﯾﺗﮭﺎ وﺣﻠﺑﮭﺎ أو ﯾﻘوﻣون ﺑﺗﻧظﯾف اﻟﻣزرﻋﺔ واﻟﻣﻌدات اﻟﻣوﺟودة ﺑﮭﺎ.  ﻛﻣﺎ ُوﺟد 
أن اﻷﺷﺧﺎص اﻹﯾﺟﺎﺑﯾﯾن ﻟﻸﺟﺳﺎم اﻟﻣﺿﺎدة ﻟﻔﯾروس اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ أﻗل اﻋﺗﻧﺎًء ﺑﻐﺳل اﻷﯾدي ﺳواًء ﻗﺑل أو 
ﺑﻌد اﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻹﺑل، أو ﻛﺎﻧت ﻓرﺻﺔ ﻣﻼﻣﺳﺗﮭم ﻟﻺﺑل اﻟﻣرﺗﺣﻠﺔ ﻋﺑر اﻟﺣدود أﻛﺑر. 
 ﻛﻣﺎ ﻟوﺣظ أن ﻣﻼﻣﺳﺔ إﻓرازات اﻹﺑل وأﻏﺷﯾﺗﮭﺎ اﻟﻣﺧﺎطﯾﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻣن أﺑرز اﻟﻣﺻﺎدر اﻟﻣﺣﻣﻠﺔ ﻻﻛﺗﺳﺎب 
اﻟﻌدوى. وﯾﻣﻛن اﻻﺳﺗﻔﺎدة ﻣن ﻋواﻣل اﻟﺧطورة اﻟﺗﻲ ﺟرى ﺗﺣدﯾدھﺎ ﻟﺗﺄﺳﯾس ﺗداﺑﯾر اﻟوﻗﺎﯾﺔ وﻣﻛﺎﻓﺣﺔ 
اﻟﻌدوى ﺑﻔﯾروس اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺷروع ﻓﻲ ﺗﻔﻌﯾل ﻧظﺎم اﻷﻣﺎن اﻟﺣﯾوي ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣزارع )اﻟﻔﺻل اﻟﺛﺎﻟث(.  
وﻓﻲ إطﺎر ﺗطوﯾر اﻟﺗداﺑﯾر اﻟوﻗﺎﺋﯾﺔ وﺗﻔﺳﯾر ﻣﻌدﻻت اﻟوﻓﯾﺎت اﻟﻣرﺗﻔﻌﺔ ﻟﺣﺎﻻت ﻓﯾروس اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ، أﺟرﯾت 
ﻣﺳوﺣﺎت ﻣﺻﻠﯾﺔ ﺑﯾن اﻟﺳﻛﺎن ﻟﺗﻘدم ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﺑﯾن أوﻟﺋك اﻟذﯾن ھم ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻣﺎس ﻣﺑﺎﺷر ﻣﻊ اﻹﺑل ﻓﻲ ﻣﻘﺎﺑل 
ﻏﯾرھم )اﻟﻔﺻل اﻟراﺑﻊ(. وﻗد رﺻدت اﻷﺟﺳﺎم اﻟﻣﺿﺎدة اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ ﻟﻔﯾروس اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ ﻓﻘط ﻣن اﻷﻣﺻﺎل 
اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﻠﺻﺔ ﻣﻣن ھم ﻋﻠﻰ اﺗﺻﺎل ﺑﺎﻹﺑل ﺿﻣن ﻋﯾﻧﺔ ﻋﺷواﺋﯾﺔ ﺿﻣت 498 ﻋﯾﻧﺔ ﺷﺧﺻﺎ ًﻣﺎ ﯾﺷﯾر إﻟﻰ 
أن اﻟﺗﻌرض ﻟﻺﺑل أﺣد ﻋواﻣل اﻟﺧطورة ﻟﻺﺻﺎﺑﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌدوى. وﻋﻧد اﻟﺗﺣﻘﯾق ﻓﻲ ﻣﺧﺎطر اﻟﺗﻌرض ﻟﻔﯾروس 
اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ، وﺟد ﺧطر اﻹﺻﺎﺑﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺎ ًﻟدى ﻏﯾر اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧدﻣﯾن وﺳﺎﺋل اﻟﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﺷﺧﺻﯾﺔ ﻣن ﻗﺑل 
اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﺑﻣﺳﻠﺦ اﻟدوﺣﺔ اﻟﻣرﻛزي )اﻟﻔﺻل اﻟراﺑﻊ(.  
وﻋﻧد اﻟﺗﺣﻘﯾق ﻓﻲ أﻧﻣﺎط إﻓراز ﻓﯾروس اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ، وﺟد أن ﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻣن اﻹﺑل اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻘدم ﻟﻠذﺑﺢ أظﮭرت 
أدﻟﺔ ﻣﻌﺗﺑرة ﻋﻠﻰ ذرف اﻹﺑل ﻟﻠﻔﯾروس ﻣن اﻷﻧف أﻛﺛر ﻣﻣﺎ ﺗذرﻓﮫ ﻋﺑر اﻟﺑراز أو اﻟﻔم. أدى ذﻟك إﻟﻰ 
اﺳﺗﻧﺗﺎج أن ﻣﺳﺣﺎت اﻷﻧف ھﻲ اﻟﻌﯾﻧﺎت اﻟﻣﻔﺿﻠﺔ ﻷﻏراض ﺗﺷﺧﯾص وﺗرﺻد ﻓﯾروس اﻟﻛوروﻧﺎ ﻓﻲ 
اﻹﺑل )اﻟﻔﺻل اﻟﺧﺎﻣس 5.2(  
وﺑﺟﺎﻧب ذﻟك أظﮭر اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾل أن ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﯾﻘل ﻋن ﺧﻣس ﺳﻼﻻت ﻓﯾروﺳﯾﺔ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ ﺗﺳري ﻓﻲ ھذه اﻷﻣﺎﻛن، 
ﻣﻣﺎ ﯾﺷﯾر إﻟﻰ أن اﻟﻣﺳﻠﺦ اﻟﻣرﻛزي ﻓﻲ اﻟدوﺣﺔ ﯾﻣﺛل أﺣد ﻣﺣرﻛﺎت اﺳﺗﻣرار اﻟﻌدوى ﺑﺎﻟﻔﯾروس وأﻧﮫ 
ﻣﻧطﻘﺔ ﯾزداد ﻓﯾﮭﺎ ﺧطر ﺗﻌرض اﻟﺑﺷر ﻟﻺﺻﺎﺑﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌدوى.  
وﺗﺷﯾر ﻣﻼﺣظﺔ ﻋدم وﺟود ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﯾن ﻛﻣﯾﺎت اﻟﺣﻣض اﻟﻧووي اﻟرﯾﺑﻲ RNA وﻣﺳﺗوﯾﺎت اﻷﺟﺳﺎم 
اﻟﻣﺿﺎدة اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺣﺗﻣﺎل أن اﻟﻣﻧﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻛﺗﺳب ﻣن اﻟﺗﻌرض اﻟﺳﺎﺑق ﻟﻠﻔﯾروس ﺗﺑﻘﻰ ﻣﺣدودة ﻣﺎ 
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 قرﺷﻟا ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣﻟ بﺑﺳﻣﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟا نأ ﻻإ 2102 مﺎﻋ تﻧﺎﻛ رﺷﺑﻟا نﯾﺑ ضرﻣﻠﻟ لﺟﺳﺗ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ لوأ
 تأرط .ﻲﺿﺎﻣﻟا نرﻘﻟا تﺎﯾﻧﯾﻧﺎﻣﺛ ذﻧﻣ لﺎﻣﺟﻟا نﻣ تذﺧأ تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ﻲﻓ دﺻر (ﺎﻧوروﻛ) ﺔﯾﺳﻔﻧﺗﻟا طﺳوﻷا
 رﺷﺑﻠﻟ تﺎﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا نﻣ سورﯾﻔﻟا لﻘﺗﻧﯾﻟ فورظﻟا دﮭﻣ ﺎﮭﺿﻌﺑ ،ثﻼﺛﻟا دوﻘﻌﻟا هذھ لﻼﺧ ﺔﻠﺋﺎھ تارﯾﻐﺗ
 مﺎﻋ لﻼﺧ ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﺑ رﺷﺑﻟا نﯾﺑ تﺎﺑﺎﺻإ لﯾﺟﺳﺗ لﻌﺷأ دﻗو .ﻲﺑرﻌﻟا ﺞﯾﻠﺧﻟا لود ﺔﯾﻘﺑو رطﻗ ﻲﻓ
 روﮭظ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎھرﯾﺛﺄﺗ لﻣﺗﺣﯾ ﻲﺗﻟا لﻣاوﻌﻟا دﯾدﺣﺗﻟ ﻲﻣرﺗ رطﻗ ﻲﻓ ٍﺔﻔﺛﻛﻣ ٍﺔﯾﺋﺎﺻﻘﺗﺳا ٍدوﮭﺟ ﺔﻗﻼطﻧا 2102
 enO" ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا" ﺞﮭﻧ زرﺑ دﻗو .ﮫﻧﺎﯾرﺳو ﮫﻟﺎﻘﺗﻧاو ﺔﯾﺳﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣ سورﯾﻓ
 ىدﻣو ناوﯾﺣﻟاو نﺎﺳﻧﻹا ﺔﻛرﺣ ﺔﺳاردﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﻣﻌﻟا ﺎھاودﺟ لﺿﻔﺑ ﺎﮭﯾﻧﺑﺗ نﻛﻣﯾ ﺔﺑرﺎﻘﻣ لﺿﻓﺄﻛ "htlaeH
 رﺷﺑﻟا ﺔﺣﺻ نﯾﺑ قﯾﺛوﻟا طﺎﺑﺗرﻻﺎﺑ رارﻗﻹا قﺎﯾﺳ ﻲﻓو .دﯾدﺟﻟا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣﺑ ﺎﮭطﺎﺑﺗرا
 فدﮭﺑ تﺎﻋﺎطﻘﻟا نﻣ دﯾدﻌﻟا رﺑﻋ تﺎﺻﺻﺧﺗﻟا فﻠﺗﺧﻣ ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا ﺞﮭﻧ ﻊﻣﺟ ،ﺔﯾرطﯾﺑﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟاو
 ﺔﯾﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا ﺔﯾﺟوﻟوﻛﯾﻹا مظﻧﻟا نﯾﺑ لﺧادﺗﻟا نﻋ ردﺻﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﺋﺷﺎﻧﻟا وأ ةدﺟﺗﺳﻣﻟا ءاوﺳ رطﺎﺧﻣﻟا ﺔﺟﻟﺎﻌﻣ
 ﻲﻓ ﻲﺣﺻﻟا مﺎظﻧﻟا ءﺎﻛرﺷ ﮫﺟاوﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا تﺎﯾدﺣﺗﻟاو ةوﻘﻟا نطاوﻣ فﺎﺷﻛﺗﺳا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﻧﻠﻣﻋ دﻗو .ﺔﯾرﺷﺑﻟا –
 .دﯾدﺟﻟا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣ ءﺎﺑوﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو بھﺄﺗﻟا لﯾﺑﺳ
 بﺑﺳﻣﻟا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﺔﯾﺟوﻟوﻛﯾﻹاو ﺔﯾﺋﺎﺑوﻟا صﺋﺎﺻﺧﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ فرﻌﺗﻠﻟ ﺔﺳاردﻟا هذھ تﻓدھ دﻗو 
 ﺔﻟدﻷا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﯾﻧﺑﻣﻟا تﺎﯾﺟﯾﺗارﺗﺳﻻاو ﺔﯾﺋﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗﻟا ذﺎﺧﺗﻻرطﻗ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﺳﻔﻧﺗﻟا طﺳوﻷا قرﺷﻟا ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣﻟ
 ضرﻌﺗﺳﺗ ﺎﻣﻛ .ناوﯾﺣﻟاو نﺎﺳﻧﻹا نﯾﺑ لﺧادﺗﻟا ضرﻌﻣ ﻲﻓ ىودﻌﻟا نﺎﯾرﺳ رطﺎﺧﻣ نﻣ دﺣﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻣﻠﻌﻟا
 فﺻو ﻊﻣ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ىودﻌﻟ ﺔﯾﻟﺎﺣﻟا ﺔﯾرﯾرﺳﻟا ضارﻋﻷاو ﺔﯾﺋﺎﺑوﻟا رھﺎظﻣﻟا ﺔﺣورطﻷا هذھ
 .ضرﻣﻟا ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣﻟ بھﺄﺗﻟا ططﺧ
 ﻲﻓ سورﯾﻔﻟﺎﺑ ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﻓرﻌﻣﻟا ﻲﻓ تاوﺟﻔﻟا دﯾدﺣﺗ ضرﻐﺑ رﺷﻧ ﺎﻣﻟ لﻣﺎﺷ ضارﻌﺗﺳا يرﺟأ دﻗو
 هذھ نﻣﺿ ﺔﯾﺛﺣﺑﻟا تﺎﺳاردﻠﻟ دﮭﻣﺗ ﺔﯾﺿرأ ﻊﺿوﻟ كﻟذﻛو ناوﯾﺣﻟاو نﺎﺳﻧﻹا نﯾﺑ لﺧادﺗﻟا ضرﻌﻣ
 ،رطﻗ ﻲﻓ ﮫﻧﺎﯾرﺳ طﺎﻣﻧأو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ ءوﺷﻧ ﺔﻌﯾﺑط مﮭﻓ لﺟأ نﻣ .(لوﻷا لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺔﺣورطﻷا
 .(ﻲﻧﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺎﮭﺗﺑﺎﺻإ تدﺻر ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﯾرﺷﺑﻟا تﻻﺎﺣﻟا ﻊﯾﻣﺟ لﻣﺷ ﻲﻔﺻو ﻲﺋﺎﺑو ءﺎﺻﻘﺗﺳا يرﺟأ
 ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣ ًﺎﻣﺎﺳﺟأ مﮭﻟﺎﺻﻣأ يوﺗﺣﺗ رطﻗ برﻏ ﻲﻓ لﺑﻹا ﺔﯾﺑرﺗ لﺎﻣﻋ نأ دﺟُو دﻗو
 نأ (seiduts lortnoc-esac) دھاوﺷﻟاو تﻻﺎﺣﻟا تﻠﻣﺷ ﺔﺳارد ترﮭظأ ﺎﻣﻛ .(ثﻟﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا)
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 ﻲﻓ ًﺎطارﺧﻧا رﺛﻛأ اوﻧﺎﻛ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻸﻟ ﺔﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾإ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣﻟا مﮭﺗﺎﺻوﺣﻓ ﺞﺋﺎﺗﻧ تﻧﺎﻛ نﯾذﻟا نﯾﻛرﺎﺷﻣﻟا
 دﺟُو ﺎﻣﻛ  .ﺎﮭﺑ ةدوﺟوﻣﻟا تادﻌﻣﻟاو ﺔﻋرزﻣﻟا فﯾظﻧﺗﺑ نوﻣوﻘﯾ وأ ﺎﮭﺑﻠﺣو ﺎﮭﺗﯾﺎﻋرو لﺑﻹا بﯾردﺗ ﺔطﺷﻧأ
 وأ لﺑﻗ ًءاوﺳ يدﯾﻷا لﺳﻐﺑ ًءﺎﻧﺗﻋا لﻗأ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻸﻟ نﯾﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾﻹا صﺎﺧﺷﻷا نأ
 .رﺑﻛأ دودﺣﻟا رﺑﻋ ﺔﻠﺣﺗرﻣﻟا لﺑﻺﻟ مﮭﺗﺳﻣﻼﻣ ﺔﺻرﻓ تﻧﺎﻛ وأ ،لﺑﻹا ﻊﻣ لﻣﺎﻌﺗﻟا دﻌﺑ
 بﺎﺳﺗﻛﻻ ﺔﻠﻣﺣﻣﻟا ردﺎﺻﻣﻟا زرﺑأ نﻣ نﺎﻛ ﺔﯾطﺎﺧﻣﻟا ﺎﮭﺗﯾﺷﻏأو لﺑﻹا تازارﻓإ ﺔﺳﻣﻼﻣ نأ ظﺣوﻟ ﺎﻣﻛ 
 ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣو ﺔﯾﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗ سﯾﺳﺄﺗﻟ ﺎھدﯾدﺣﺗ ىرﺟ ﻲﺗﻟا ةروطﺧﻟا لﻣاوﻋ نﻣ ةدﺎﻔﺗﺳﻻا نﻛﻣﯾو .ىودﻌﻟا
  .(ثﻟﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) عرازﻣﻟا ﻲﻓ يوﯾﺣﻟا نﺎﻣﻷا مﺎظﻧ لﯾﻌﻔﺗ ﻲﻓ عورﺷﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﺑ ىودﻌﻟا
 تﯾرﺟأ ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ تﻻﺎﺣﻟ ﺔﻌﻔﺗرﻣﻟا تﺎﯾﻓوﻟا تﻻدﻌﻣ رﯾﺳﻔﺗو ﺔﯾﺋﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗﻟا رﯾوطﺗ رﺎطإ ﻲﻓو
 لﺑﺎﻘﻣ ﻲﻓ لﺑﻹا ﻊﻣ رﺷﺎﺑﻣ سﺎﻣﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ مھ نﯾذﻟا كﺋﻟوأ نﯾﺑ ﺔﻧرﺎﻘﻣ مدﻘﺗﻟ نﺎﻛﺳﻟا نﯾﺑ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣ تﺎﺣوﺳﻣ
 لﺎﺻﻣﻷا نﻣ طﻘﻓ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﺔﻟدﺎﻌﻣﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا تدﺻر دﻗو .(ﻊﺑارﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) مھرﯾﻏ
 ﻰﻟإ رﯾﺷﯾ ﺎﻣ ًﺎﺻﺧﺷ ﺔﻧﯾﻋ 894 تﻣﺿ ﺔﯾﺋاوﺷﻋ ﺔﻧﯾﻋ نﻣﺿ لﺑﻹﺎﺑ لﺎﺻﺗا ﻰﻠﻋ مھ نﻣﻣ ﺔﺻﻠﺧﺗﺳﻣﻟا
 سورﯾﻔﻟ ضرﻌﺗﻟا رطﺎﺧﻣ ﻲﻓ قﯾﻘﺣﺗﻟا دﻧﻋو .ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻺﻟ ةروطﺧﻟا لﻣاوﻋ دﺣأ لﺑﻺﻟ ضرﻌﺗﻟا نأ
 لﺑﻗ نﻣ ﺔﯾﺻﺧﺷﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟا لﺋﺎﺳو نﯾﻣدﺧﺗﺳﻣﻟا رﯾﻏ ىدﻟ ًﺎﯾﻟﺎﻋ نﺎﻛ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا رطﺧ دﺟو ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا
  .(ﻊﺑارﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) يزﻛرﻣﻟا ﺔﺣودﻟا ﺦﻠﺳﻣﺑ نﯾﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا
 ترﮭظأ ﺢﺑذﻠﻟ مدﻘﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا لﺑﻹا نﻣ ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻋ ﺔﺑﺳﻧ نأ دﺟو ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ زارﻓإ طﺎﻣﻧأ ﻲﻓ قﯾﻘﺣﺗﻟا دﻧﻋو
 ﻰﻟإ كﻟذ ىدأ .مﻔﻟا وأ زارﺑﻟا رﺑﻋ ﮫﻓرذﺗ ﺎﻣﻣ رﺛﻛأ فﻧﻷا نﻣ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ لﺑﻹا فرذ ﻰﻠﻋ ةرﺑﺗﻌﻣ ﺔﻟدأ
 ﻲﻓ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ دﺻرﺗو صﯾﺧﺷﺗ ضارﻏﻷ ﺔﻠﺿﻔﻣﻟا تﺎﻧﯾﻌﻟا ﻲھ فﻧﻷا تﺎﺣﺳﻣ نأ جﺎﺗﻧﺗﺳا
  (2.5 سﻣﺎﺧﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) لﺑﻹا
 ،نﻛﺎﻣﻷا هذھ ﻲﻓ يرﺳﺗ ﺔﻔﻠﺗﺧﻣ ﺔﯾﺳورﯾﻓ تﻻﻼﺳ سﻣﺧ نﻋ لﻘﯾ ﻻ ﺎﻣ نأ لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا رﮭظأ كﻟذ بﻧﺎﺟﺑو
 ﮫﻧأو سورﯾﻔﻟﺎﺑ ىودﻌﻟا رارﻣﺗﺳا تﺎﻛرﺣﻣ دﺣأ لﺛﻣﯾ ﺔﺣودﻟا ﻲﻓ يزﻛرﻣﻟا ﺦﻠﺳﻣﻟا نأ ﻰﻟإ رﯾﺷﯾ ﺎﻣﻣ
  .ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻺﻟ رﺷﺑﻟا ضرﻌﺗ رطﺧ ﺎﮭﯾﻓ دادزﯾ ﺔﻘطﻧﻣ
 مﺎﺳﺟﻷا تﺎﯾوﺗﺳﻣو ANR ﻲﺑﯾرﻟا يووﻧﻟا ضﻣﺣﻟا تﺎﯾﻣﻛ نﯾﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ دوﺟو مدﻋ ﺔظﺣﻼﻣ رﯾﺷﺗو
 ﺎﻣ ةدودﺣﻣ ﻰﻘﺑﺗ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ قﺑﺎﺳﻟا ضرﻌﺗﻟا نﻣ بﺳﺗﻛﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﻋﺎﻧﻣﻟا نأ لﺎﻣﺗﺣا ﻰﻟإ ﺔﻟدﺎﻌﻣﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا
802
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 ﻲﻓ ًﺎطارﺧﻧا رﺛﻛأ اوﻧﺎﻛ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻸﻟ ﺔﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾإ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣﻟا مﮭﺗﺎﺻوﺣﻓ ﺞﺋﺎﺗﻧ تﻧﺎﻛ نﯾذﻟا نﯾﻛرﺎﺷﻣﻟا
 دﺟُو ﺎﻣﻛ  .ﺎﮭﺑ ةدوﺟوﻣﻟا تادﻌﻣﻟاو ﺔﻋرزﻣﻟا فﯾظﻧﺗﺑ نوﻣوﻘﯾ وأ ﺎﮭﺑﻠﺣو ﺎﮭﺗﯾﺎﻋرو لﺑﻹا بﯾردﺗ ﺔطﺷﻧأ
 وأ لﺑﻗ ًءاوﺳ يدﯾﻷا لﺳﻐﺑ ًءﺎﻧﺗﻋا لﻗأ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻸﻟ نﯾﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾﻹا صﺎﺧﺷﻷا نأ
 .رﺑﻛأ دودﺣﻟا رﺑﻋ ﺔﻠﺣﺗرﻣﻟا لﺑﻺﻟ مﮭﺗﺳﻣﻼﻣ ﺔﺻرﻓ تﻧﺎﻛ وأ ،لﺑﻹا ﻊﻣ لﻣﺎﻌﺗﻟا دﻌﺑ
 بﺎﺳﺗﻛﻻ ﺔﻠﻣﺣﻣﻟا ردﺎﺻﻣﻟا زرﺑأ نﻣ نﺎﻛ ﺔﯾطﺎﺧﻣﻟا ﺎﮭﺗﯾﺷﻏأو لﺑﻹا تازارﻓإ ﺔﺳﻣﻼﻣ نأ ظﺣوﻟ ﺎﻣﻛ 
 ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣو ﺔﯾﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗ سﯾﺳﺄﺗﻟ ﺎھدﯾدﺣﺗ ىرﺟ ﻲﺗﻟا ةروطﺧﻟا لﻣاوﻋ نﻣ ةدﺎﻔﺗﺳﻻا نﻛﻣﯾو .ىودﻌﻟا
  .(ثﻟﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) عرازﻣﻟا ﻲﻓ يوﯾﺣﻟا نﺎﻣﻷا مﺎظﻧ لﯾﻌﻔﺗ ﻲﻓ عورﺷﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﺑ ىودﻌﻟا
 تﯾرﺟأ ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ تﻻﺎﺣﻟ ﺔﻌﻔﺗرﻣﻟا تﺎﯾﻓوﻟا تﻻدﻌﻣ رﯾﺳﻔﺗو ﺔﯾﺋﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗﻟا رﯾوطﺗ رﺎطإ ﻲﻓو
 لﺑﺎﻘﻣ ﻲﻓ لﺑﻹا ﻊﻣ رﺷﺎﺑﻣ سﺎﻣﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ مھ نﯾذﻟا كﺋﻟوأ نﯾﺑ ﺔﻧرﺎﻘﻣ مدﻘﺗﻟ نﺎﻛﺳﻟا نﯾﺑ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣ تﺎﺣوﺳﻣ
 لﺎﺻﻣﻷا نﻣ طﻘﻓ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﺔﻟدﺎﻌﻣﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا تدﺻر دﻗو .(ﻊﺑارﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) مھرﯾﻏ
 ﻰﻟإ رﯾﺷﯾ ﺎﻣ ًﺎﺻﺧﺷ ﺔﻧﯾﻋ 894 تﻣﺿ ﺔﯾﺋاوﺷﻋ ﺔﻧﯾﻋ نﻣﺿ لﺑﻹﺎﺑ لﺎﺻﺗا ﻰﻠﻋ مھ نﻣﻣ ﺔﺻﻠﺧﺗﺳﻣﻟا
 سورﯾﻔﻟ ضرﻌﺗﻟا رطﺎﺧﻣ ﻲﻓ قﯾﻘﺣﺗﻟا دﻧﻋو .ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻺﻟ ةروطﺧﻟا لﻣاوﻋ دﺣأ لﺑﻺﻟ ضرﻌﺗﻟا نأ
 لﺑﻗ نﻣ ﺔﯾﺻﺧﺷﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﻣﺣﻟا لﺋﺎﺳو نﯾﻣدﺧﺗﺳﻣﻟا رﯾﻏ ىدﻟ ًﺎﯾﻟﺎﻋ نﺎﻛ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا رطﺧ دﺟو ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا
  .(ﻊﺑارﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) يزﻛرﻣﻟا ﺔﺣودﻟا ﺦﻠﺳﻣﺑ نﯾﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا
 ترﮭظأ ﺢﺑذﻠﻟ مدﻘﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا لﺑﻹا نﻣ ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻋ ﺔﺑﺳﻧ نأ دﺟو ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ زارﻓإ طﺎﻣﻧأ ﻲﻓ قﯾﻘﺣﺗﻟا دﻧﻋو
 ﻰﻟإ كﻟذ ىدأ .مﻔﻟا وأ زارﺑﻟا رﺑﻋ ﮫﻓرذﺗ ﺎﻣﻣ رﺛﻛأ فﻧﻷا نﻣ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ لﺑﻹا فرذ ﻰﻠﻋ ةرﺑﺗﻌﻣ ﺔﻟدأ
 ﻲﻓ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ دﺻرﺗو صﯾﺧﺷﺗ ضارﻏﻷ ﺔﻠﺿﻔﻣﻟا تﺎﻧﯾﻌﻟا ﻲھ فﻧﻷا تﺎﺣﺳﻣ نأ جﺎﺗﻧﺗﺳا
  (2.5 سﻣﺎﺧﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) لﺑﻹا
 ،نﻛﺎﻣﻷا هذھ ﻲﻓ يرﺳﺗ ﺔﻔﻠﺗﺧﻣ ﺔﯾﺳورﯾﻓ تﻻﻼﺳ سﻣﺧ نﻋ لﻘﯾ ﻻ ﺎﻣ نأ لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا رﮭظأ كﻟذ بﻧﺎﺟﺑو
 ﮫﻧأو سورﯾﻔﻟﺎﺑ ىودﻌﻟا رارﻣﺗﺳا تﺎﻛرﺣﻣ دﺣأ لﺛﻣﯾ ﺔﺣودﻟا ﻲﻓ يزﻛرﻣﻟا ﺦﻠﺳﻣﻟا نأ ﻰﻟإ رﯾﺷﯾ ﺎﻣﻣ
  .ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻺﻟ رﺷﺑﻟا ضرﻌﺗ رطﺧ ﺎﮭﯾﻓ دادزﯾ ﺔﻘطﻧﻣ
 مﺎﺳﺟﻷا تﺎﯾوﺗﺳﻣو ANR ﻲﺑﯾرﻟا يووﻧﻟا ضﻣﺣﻟا تﺎﯾﻣﻛ نﯾﺑ ﺔﻗﻼﻋ دوﺟو مدﻋ ﺔظﺣﻼﻣ رﯾﺷﺗو
 ﺎﻣ ةدودﺣﻣ ﻰﻘﺑﺗ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ قﺑﺎﺳﻟا ضرﻌﺗﻟا نﻣ بﺳﺗﻛﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﻋﺎﻧﻣﻟا نأ لﺎﻣﺗﺣا ﻰﻟإ ﺔﻟدﺎﻌﻣﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا
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 لﺻﻔﻟا) قﺑﺎﺳﻟا ضرﻌﺗﻟا نﻋ رظﻧﻟا فرﺻﺑ ًاددﺟﻣ ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا لﺎﻣﺗﺣﻻ ًﺎﺣوﺗﻔﻣ لﺎﺟﻣﻟا كرﺗﯾ
  (1.5 سﻣﺎﺧﻟاو ﻊﺑارﻟا
 نأ سورﯾﻔﻟا موﻧﯾﺟﻟ لﻣﺎﻛﻟا لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا رﮭظأ لﺑﻹا نﻣ ةرﻣ لوﻷ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ لزﻋ نﻋ فﺷﻛﻟا دﻌﺑ
 4102_2_rataQ/lemac VoC-SREM رطﻗ ﻲﻓ لﺑﻹا نﻣ ﮫﻟزﻋ ىرﺟ يذﻟا سرﯾﻔﻟا ﺔﻟﻼﺳ
 ﮫﻟزﻋ ىرﺟ يذﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟا ﺔﻟﻼﺳﻟ ﺔﺑﺳﻧﻟﺎﺑ برﻗﻹا نﺎﻛ ﺎﻣﻛ رﺷﺑﻟا بﯾﺻﯾ يذﻟا هرﯾظﻧﺑ ﮫﺑﺷﻟا دﯾدﺷ نﺎﻛ
 ﺔﯾﺿرﻓ مﻋدﺗ تﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑﻟا هذھ نإ .2102_1_rataQ/dnalgnE ﺎﯾﻧﺎطﯾرﺑ ﻲﻓ يرطﻘﻟا ضﯾرﻣﻟا نﻣ
  .رﺷﺑﻠﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا لﻘﻧ ﺎﮭﻧﺎﻛﻣﺈﺑ لﺑﻹا نأو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ عدوﺗﺳﻣ ﻲھ لﺑﻹا نأ
 تﺎﻧﯾﻋ تﻌﻣُﺟ ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﺑ ىودﻌﻟا لﻘﻧ ﻲﻓ ءاذﻐﻠﻟ لﻣﺗﺣﻣ رود دوﺟو ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟدﻷا نﻣ قﻘﺣﺗﻠﻟو
 سورﯾﻔﺑ ﺔﺻﺎﺧﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا ﺎﻧدﺟو دﻗو .رﺎطﺗﺧﻻا ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻋ قطﺎﻧﻣﻟا نﻣ ﺎﮭﻟاوﺑأو لﺑﻹا بﯾﻠﺣ نﻣ
 ﺎﻣﻛ .ﺔﻘﺑﺎﺳ ﺔﺑﺎﺻإ لوﺻﺣ لﺑﻹا ﻊﯾﻣﺟﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣﻟا تﺎﻧﯾﻌﻟا ترﮭظأ ثﯾﺣ ،لوﺑﻟا تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا
 نﯾﺗورﺑ ﺔﺳﯾﺎﻘﻣ ﺔﯾﻧﻘﺗ مادﺧﺗﺳﺎﺑ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣ مﺎﺳﺟﻷ مﺎﺧﻟا لﺑﻹا بﯾﻠﺣ نﻣ تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ءاوﺗﺣا رُﺑﺗﺧا
 زاوﻣ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣ ﺔﺳﯾﺎﻘﻣ رﺎﯾﺗﺧا ﻊﻣ سورﯾﻔﻟا دﯾﯾﺣﺗو (yassa yarraorcim nietorP) ياررآ ورﻛﯾﻣ
 ًﺔﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾإ بﯾﻠﺣﻟاو لﺎﺻﻣﻷا تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ﻊﯾﻣﺟ تءﺎﺟ دﻗو .(سﻣﺎﺧﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) مﯾﻘﺗﺳﻣﻟاو فﻧﻷا تﺎﺣﺳﻣﻟ
 تﺎﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا زارﺑ وأ / و فﻧأ نﻣ زارﻓإ دوﺟو فﺎﺷﺗﻛا نإ .ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻸﻟ ﺔﺑﺳﻧﻟﺎﺑ
 ةوﻼﻋ .ﺔﯾﺋﺎﻗو رﯾﻏ ﺔﻋﺎﻧﻣ دوﺟو ﻰﻟإ رﯾﺷﯾ ةدﯾﺎﺣﻣﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا نﻣ ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻋ تﺎﯾوﺗﺳﻣ ﺎﮭﯾدﻟ ﻲﺗﻟا
 بﯾﻠﺣ ﻲﻓ ANR VoC-SREM ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﻲﺑﯾرﻟا يووﻧﻟا ضﻣﺣﻟا دوﺟو نﺈﻓ ،كﻟذ ﻰﻠﻋ
 موﻋزﻣﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟا لﺎﻘﺗﻧا ﻊﻧﻣﻟ رﯾﺑادﺗ ذﺎﺧﺗا ﻲﻋدﺗﺳﯾ لﺎﻌﻓ لﻛﺷﺑ سورﯾﻔﻟا فرذﺗ وأ زرﻔﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا لﺑﻹا
  .(4.5 سﻣﺎﺧﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺔﯾذﻏﻷا قﯾرط نﻋ
 سورﯾﻓ دﺻرﺗﻟ ﺔطﺷﻧأ سﯾﺳﺄﺗو ﻊﺿوﻟ ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا ﺞﮭﻧ لﺎﻣﻋإ ﺔﯾﻔﯾﻛ فﺻﺗﻟ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﺔﺳارد تﯾرﺟأ
 تاءارﺟﻹا دﯾدﺣﺗ مﺗ .(سدﺎﺳﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) 2102 مﺎﻋ لﻼﺧ ﺎﮭﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو ﺔﯾﺳﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣ
 يذﻟاو رطﻗ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺋﺑوﻷا ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣﻟ ﻲﻧطوﻟا لﻣﻌﻟا قﯾرﻓ لﻼﺧ نﻣ ئراوطﻟا تﻻﺎﺣﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻼﻟ ﺔﯾﻟوﻷا
 نﻣ دﯾدﻌﻟا نﻣ بﻠُط تﻼﺧدﻣ ﻰﻟإ ًادﺎﻧﺗﺳاو .نﺎﺳﻧﻹاو ناوﯾﺣﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟ ًﺎﻛرﺗﺷﻣ ءﺎﺻﻘﺗﺳا قﯾرﻓ مﺿ
 ﮫﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ دﺻرﺗﻟ ﺔﻠﻣﺎﺷ قﯾرط ﺔطرﺎﺧ تﻌﺿُو ،ﺎﮭﻣدﻘﺗ نأ ﺔﯾﻟودﻟا تﺎﻣظﻧﻣﻟا
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 لﺻﻔﻟا) قﺑﺎﺳﻟا ضرﻌﺗﻟا نﻋ رظﻧﻟا فرﺻﺑ ًاددﺟﻣ ىودﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا لﺎﻣﺗﺣﻻ ًﺎﺣوﺗﻔﻣ لﺎﺟﻣﻟا كرﺗﯾ
  (1.5 سﻣﺎﺧﻟاو ﻊﺑارﻟا
 نأ سورﯾﻔﻟا موﻧﯾﺟﻟ لﻣﺎﻛﻟا لﯾﻠﺣﺗﻟا رﮭظأ لﺑﻹا نﻣ ةرﻣ لوﻷ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ لزﻋ نﻋ فﺷﻛﻟا دﻌﺑ
 4102_2_rataQ/lemac VoC-SREM رطﻗ ﻲﻓ لﺑﻹا نﻣ ﮫﻟزﻋ ىرﺟ يذﻟا سرﯾﻔﻟا ﺔﻟﻼﺳ
 ﮫﻟزﻋ ىرﺟ يذﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟا ﺔﻟﻼﺳﻟ ﺔﺑﺳﻧﻟﺎﺑ برﻗﻹا نﺎﻛ ﺎﻣﻛ رﺷﺑﻟا بﯾﺻﯾ يذﻟا هرﯾظﻧﺑ ﮫﺑﺷﻟا دﯾدﺷ نﺎﻛ
 ﺔﯾﺿرﻓ مﻋدﺗ تﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑﻟا هذھ نإ .2102_1_rataQ/dnalgnE ﺎﯾﻧﺎطﯾرﺑ ﻲﻓ يرطﻘﻟا ضﯾرﻣﻟا نﻣ
  .رﺷﺑﻠﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا لﻘﻧ ﺎﮭﻧﺎﻛﻣﺈﺑ لﺑﻹا نأو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ عدوﺗﺳﻣ ﻲھ لﺑﻹا نأ
 تﺎﻧﯾﻋ تﻌﻣُﺟ ،ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﺑ ىودﻌﻟا لﻘﻧ ﻲﻓ ءاذﻐﻠﻟ لﻣﺗﺣﻣ رود دوﺟو ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟدﻷا نﻣ قﻘﺣﺗﻠﻟو
 سورﯾﻔﺑ ﺔﺻﺎﺧﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا ﺎﻧدﺟو دﻗو .رﺎطﺗﺧﻻا ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻋ قطﺎﻧﻣﻟا نﻣ ﺎﮭﻟاوﺑأو لﺑﻹا بﯾﻠﺣ نﻣ
 ﺎﻣﻛ .ﺔﻘﺑﺎﺳ ﺔﺑﺎﺻإ لوﺻﺣ لﺑﻹا ﻊﯾﻣﺟﻟ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣﻟا تﺎﻧﯾﻌﻟا ترﮭظأ ثﯾﺣ ،لوﺑﻟا تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا
 نﯾﺗورﺑ ﺔﺳﯾﺎﻘﻣ ﺔﯾﻧﻘﺗ مادﺧﺗﺳﺎﺑ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣ مﺎﺳﺟﻷ مﺎﺧﻟا لﺑﻹا بﯾﻠﺣ نﻣ تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ءاوﺗﺣا رُﺑﺗﺧا
 زاوﻣ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣ ﺔﺳﯾﺎﻘﻣ رﺎﯾﺗﺧا ﻊﻣ سورﯾﻔﻟا دﯾﯾﺣﺗو (yassa yarraorcim nietorP) ياررآ ورﻛﯾﻣ
 ًﺔﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾإ بﯾﻠﺣﻟاو لﺎﺻﻣﻷا تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ﻊﯾﻣﺟ تءﺎﺟ دﻗو .(سﻣﺎﺧﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) مﯾﻘﺗﺳﻣﻟاو فﻧﻷا تﺎﺣﺳﻣﻟ
 تﺎﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا زارﺑ وأ / و فﻧأ نﻣ زارﻓإ دوﺟو فﺎﺷﺗﻛا نإ .ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻸﻟ ﺔﺑﺳﻧﻟﺎﺑ
 ةوﻼﻋ .ﺔﯾﺋﺎﻗو رﯾﻏ ﺔﻋﺎﻧﻣ دوﺟو ﻰﻟإ رﯾﺷﯾ ةدﯾﺎﺣﻣﻟا ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا نﻣ ﺔﯾﻟﺎﻋ تﺎﯾوﺗﺳﻣ ﺎﮭﯾدﻟ ﻲﺗﻟا
 بﯾﻠﺣ ﻲﻓ ANR VoC-SREM ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﻲﺑﯾرﻟا يووﻧﻟا ضﻣﺣﻟا دوﺟو نﺈﻓ ،كﻟذ ﻰﻠﻋ
 موﻋزﻣﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟا لﺎﻘﺗﻧا ﻊﻧﻣﻟ رﯾﺑادﺗ ذﺎﺧﺗا ﻲﻋدﺗﺳﯾ لﺎﻌﻓ لﻛﺷﺑ سورﯾﻔﻟا فرذﺗ وأ زرﻔﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا لﺑﻹا
  .(4.5 سﻣﺎﺧﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺔﯾذﻏﻷا قﯾرط نﻋ
 سورﯾﻓ دﺻرﺗﻟ ﺔطﺷﻧأ سﯾﺳﺄﺗو ﻊﺿوﻟ ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا ﺞﮭﻧ لﺎﻣﻋإ ﺔﯾﻔﯾﻛ فﺻﺗﻟ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﺔﺳارد تﯾرﺟأ
 تاءارﺟﻹا دﯾدﺣﺗ مﺗ .(سدﺎﺳﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) 2102 مﺎﻋ لﻼﺧ ﺎﮭﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو ﺔﯾﺳﻔﻧﺗﻟا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣ
 يذﻟاو رطﻗ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺋﺑوﻷا ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣﻟ ﻲﻧطوﻟا لﻣﻌﻟا قﯾرﻓ لﻼﺧ نﻣ ئراوطﻟا تﻻﺎﺣﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻼﻟ ﺔﯾﻟوﻷا
 نﻣ دﯾدﻌﻟا نﻣ بﻠُط تﻼﺧدﻣ ﻰﻟإ ًادﺎﻧﺗﺳاو .نﺎﺳﻧﻹاو ناوﯾﺣﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟ ًﺎﻛرﺗﺷﻣ ءﺎﺻﻘﺗﺳا قﯾرﻓ مﺿ
 ﮫﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ دﺻرﺗﻟ ﺔﻠﻣﺎﺷ قﯾرط ﺔطرﺎﺧ تﻌﺿُو ،ﺎﮭﻣدﻘﺗ نأ ﺔﯾﻟودﻟا تﺎﻣظﻧﻣﻟا
 
 832
 
 
 
 كﻟذﻛو ﺔﯾﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗ ﮫﯾﺟوﺗﻟ ثوﺣﺑﻟا ﺞﺋﺎﺗﻧ تﻣدﺧﺗﺳا دﻗو .ناوﯾﺣﻟاو نﺎﺳﻧﻹا نﯾﺑ ﺔﮭﺟاوﻟا ضرﻌﻣ ﻲﻓ
  .ﻲﻟودﻟاو ﻲﻧطوﻟا ىوﺗﺳﻣﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻠﺻﻟا تاذ ﺔﯾﻣﻠﻌﻟا تﺎﺳاردﻟا
 ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣ ءﺎﺑوﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو بھﺄﺗﻟا مﯾﯾﻘﺗﻟ ﺔﯾﻣوﻛﺣﻟا ﺔﯾرطﯾﺑﻟاو ﺔﯾﺣﺻﻟا تﺎطﻠﺳﻟا فدﮭﺗﺳا ﺢﺳﻣ يرﺟأ
 (ﻊﺑﺎﺳﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا ﺞﮭﻧ ﻰﻟإ ًادﺎﻧﺗﺳا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا
 ﺞﮭﻧ ﻲﻧﺑﺗ نود لوﺣﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا تارﻐﺛﻟا زرﺑأ دﺣأ لﺛﻣ ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ةدارﻹا فﻌﺿ نأ رﺎﺑﺗﻋا ﻰﻠﻋو
 زﯾزﻌﺗﻟ ﺔﺻرﻔﻛ ءﺎﺑوﻟا ذﺎﺧﺗا ضرﻐﺑ ﺔﯾﺿﻘﻟا هذھ ﻰﻠﻋ "ﺔﺣودﻟا نﻼﻋإ" زﻛر ،"ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا"
 ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣﻟ بھﺄﺗﻟا ﺔﯾوﻘﺗ تﻗوﻟا سﻔﻧ ﻲﻓو ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻓ ءﺎﺑو ءاوﺗﺣﻻ ًﻻوﺻو تﺎﻋﺎطﻘﻟا نﯾﺑ نوﺎﻌﺗﻟا
  .ًﻼﺑﻘﺗﺳﻣ ﺎھروﮭظ لﻣﺗﺣﯾ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﺋﺷﺎﻧﻟا ﺔﻛرﺗﺷﻣﻟا ضارﻣﻷا
 مﺗ ،لﺑﻹا ﻲﻓ ىودﻌﻠﻟ رطﺧﻟا لﻣاوﻋو رﺎﺷﺗﻧاو ﻊﯾزوﺗﺑ ﻲﻟﺎﺣﻟا مﺎﻣﻟﻹا ىدﻣ لوﺣ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ةرظﻧ مﯾدﻘﺗﻟ
 لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺎﮭﻠﯾﻠﺣﺗو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ لوﺣ ةروﺷﻧﻣﻟا تﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑﻟا ﻊﯾﻣﺟﺗ ﺎﮭﻟﻼﺧ نﻣ مﺗ ﺔﯾﺟﮭﻧﻣ ﺔﻌﺟارﻣ ءارﺟإ
 مﺗ ﺎﻣﻛ .ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﺑ ﺎﮭﺗﺑﺎﺻإ دﻌﺑ ضرﻣﻠﻟ ﺔطﯾﺳﺑ ﺔﯾرﯾرﺳ تﺎﻣﻼﻋ طﻘﻓ لﺑﻹا رﮭُظﺗ  .(نﻣﺎﺛﻟا
 لﺎﻘﺗﻧا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﯾﺋﯾزﺟ ﺔﻟدأ ﻊﻣ ،ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﺑ لﺑﻹا ﺔﺑﺎﺻإ تﺑﺛﺗ ﺔﻟود 02 ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣ ﺔﻟدأ ﻰﻠﻋ روﺛﻌﻟا
 ،لﺎﻣﺟﻟا ﻲﻓ رﻣﻌﻟا مدﻘﺗ ﻊﻣ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا دوﺟو دﯾزﯾ .ﺔﻟود 31 ﻲﻓ سورﯾﻔﻟا
 .ﻲﺑﯾرﻟا يووﻧﻟا ضﻣﺣﻟا هددﺣﯾ ﺎﻣﻟ ًادﺎﻧﺗﺳا فﻧﻷا تﺎﺣﺳﻣ ﻲﻓ سورﯾﻔﻟا فرذ لدﻌﻣ صﻗﺎﻧﺗﯾ ﺎﻣﻧﯾﺑ
 رﺟﺣﻟا قﻓارﻣ وأ تﺎﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا قاوﺳأ ﻲﻓ ﺎﮭﻧﻣ تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ذﺧأ مﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا لﺑﻹا تﻧﺎﻛ ،تﺎﺳاردﻟا نﻣ دﯾدﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ
 ﻲﺗﻟا لﺎﻣﺟﻟا لﺑﺎﻘﻣ ةدروﺗﺳﻣﻟا لﺑﻹا كﻟذﻛو عرازﻣﻟا ﻲﻓ ةدوﺟوﻣﻟا كﻠﺗﺑ ﺔﻧرﺎﻘﻣ لﺻﻣﻟا ﺔﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾإ ﻲﺣﺻﻟا
 ﻰﻠﻋأ رﺑﺗﻌﺗ ًﺎﯾﻠﺻﻣ هدﺻرو سورﯾﻔﻟا فﺎﺷﺗﻛا لدﻌﻣ نأ ﻰﻟإ تﺎﺳاردﻟا ضﻌﺑ رﯾﺷﺗو .ﺎًﯾﻠﺣﻣ ﺎﮭﺗﯾﺑرﺗ مﺗﺗ
 رﻣأ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﻲﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا عدوﺗﺳﻣﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ فرﻌﺗﻟا نإ .ةدرﺎﺑﻟا ءﺎﺗﺷﻟا رﮭﺷأ لﻼﺧ ﻲﺑﺳﻧ لﻛﺷﺑ
 .(نﻣﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺔﯾرﺷﺑ تﺎﺑﺎﺻإ ثودﺣ نﻣ ﺔﯾﺎﻗوﻟاو ةرطﯾﺳﻟاو لﺧدﺗﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗ رﯾوطﺗﻟ يرورﺿ
 ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ ءوﺷﻧﻟ ﺔﻛرﺣﻣﻟا نوﻛﺗ نأ لﻣﺗﺣﯾ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا بﺎﺑﺳﻷا تارﯾﺛﺄﺗو ﺔﯾھﺎﻣ دﯾدﺣﺗﻟو
 نﺎﺳﻧﻹا نﻣ لﻛﺑ ﺔﻘﻠﻌﺗﻣﻟا ﺔﻠﻣﺗﺣﻣﻟا تﺎﻛرﺣﻣﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﻣﺋﺎﻗ تﺻﻠﺧﺗﺳا ،(ﻲﻧﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) رطﻗ ﻲﻓ ﮫﻧﺎﯾرﺳو
 بﻧﺎﺟﺑ ﺔﻠﺻﻟا تاذ تﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑﻟا دﻋاوﻗ لﯾﻠﺣﺗو ﺔﯾﻣﻠﻌﻟا تاروﺷﻧﻣﻟا ﺔﻌﺟارﻣ لﻼﺧ نﻣ ﺔﺋﯾﺑﻟاو ناوﯾﺣﻟاو
  .ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟا يوذ ءارﺑﺧﻟا ءارآ عﻼطﺗﺳا
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 كﻟذﻛو ﺔﯾﺎﻗوﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗ ﮫﯾﺟوﺗﻟ ثوﺣﺑﻟا ﺞﺋﺎﺗﻧ تﻣدﺧﺗﺳا دﻗو .ناوﯾﺣﻟاو نﺎﺳﻧﻹا نﯾﺑ ﺔﮭﺟاوﻟا ضرﻌﻣ ﻲﻓ
  .ﻲﻟودﻟاو ﻲﻧطوﻟا ىوﺗﺳﻣﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻠﺻﻟا تاذ ﺔﯾﻣﻠﻌﻟا تﺎﺳاردﻟا
 ﺔﻣزﻼﺗﻣ ءﺎﺑوﻟ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﺗﺳﻻاو بھﺄﺗﻟا مﯾﯾﻘﺗﻟ ﺔﯾﻣوﻛﺣﻟا ﺔﯾرطﯾﺑﻟاو ﺔﯾﺣﺻﻟا تﺎطﻠﺳﻟا فدﮭﺗﺳا ﺢﺳﻣ يرﺟأ
 (ﻊﺑﺎﺳﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا ﺞﮭﻧ ﻰﻟإ ًادﺎﻧﺗﺳا ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا
 ﺞﮭﻧ ﻲﻧﺑﺗ نود لوﺣﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا تارﻐﺛﻟا زرﺑأ دﺣأ لﺛﻣ ﺔﯾﺳﺎﯾﺳﻟا ةدارﻹا فﻌﺿ نأ رﺎﺑﺗﻋا ﻰﻠﻋو
 زﯾزﻌﺗﻟ ﺔﺻرﻔﻛ ءﺎﺑوﻟا ذﺎﺧﺗا ضرﻐﺑ ﺔﯾﺿﻘﻟا هذھ ﻰﻠﻋ "ﺔﺣودﻟا نﻼﻋإ" زﻛر ،"ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا"
 ﺔﺣﻓﺎﻛﻣﻟ بھﺄﺗﻟا ﺔﯾوﻘﺗ تﻗوﻟا سﻔﻧ ﻲﻓو ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻓ ءﺎﺑو ءاوﺗﺣﻻ ًﻻوﺻو تﺎﻋﺎطﻘﻟا نﯾﺑ نوﺎﻌﺗﻟا
  .ًﻼﺑﻘﺗﺳﻣ ﺎھروﮭظ لﻣﺗﺣﯾ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﺋﺷﺎﻧﻟا ﺔﻛرﺗﺷﻣﻟا ضارﻣﻷا
 مﺗ ،لﺑﻹا ﻲﻓ ىودﻌﻠﻟ رطﺧﻟا لﻣاوﻋو رﺎﺷﺗﻧاو ﻊﯾزوﺗﺑ ﻲﻟﺎﺣﻟا مﺎﻣﻟﻹا ىدﻣ لوﺣ ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ةرظﻧ مﯾدﻘﺗﻟ
 لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺎﮭﻠﯾﻠﺣﺗو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ لوﺣ ةروﺷﻧﻣﻟا تﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑﻟا ﻊﯾﻣﺟﺗ ﺎﮭﻟﻼﺧ نﻣ مﺗ ﺔﯾﺟﮭﻧﻣ ﺔﻌﺟارﻣ ءارﺟإ
 مﺗ ﺎﻣﻛ .ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﺑ ﺎﮭﺗﺑﺎﺻإ دﻌﺑ ضرﻣﻠﻟ ﺔطﯾﺳﺑ ﺔﯾرﯾرﺳ تﺎﻣﻼﻋ طﻘﻓ لﺑﻹا رﮭُظﺗ  .(نﻣﺎﺛﻟا
 لﺎﻘﺗﻧا ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﯾﺋﯾزﺟ ﺔﻟدأ ﻊﻣ ،ﺎﻧوروﻛ سورﯾﻔﺑ لﺑﻹا ﺔﺑﺎﺻإ تﺑﺛﺗ ﺔﻟود 02 ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﻠﺻﻣ ﺔﻟدأ ﻰﻠﻋ روﺛﻌﻟا
 ،لﺎﻣﺟﻟا ﻲﻓ رﻣﻌﻟا مدﻘﺗ ﻊﻣ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ةدﺎﺿﻣﻟا مﺎﺳﺟﻷا دوﺟو دﯾزﯾ .ﺔﻟود 31 ﻲﻓ سورﯾﻔﻟا
 .ﻲﺑﯾرﻟا يووﻧﻟا ضﻣﺣﻟا هددﺣﯾ ﺎﻣﻟ ًادﺎﻧﺗﺳا فﻧﻷا تﺎﺣﺳﻣ ﻲﻓ سورﯾﻔﻟا فرذ لدﻌﻣ صﻗﺎﻧﺗﯾ ﺎﻣﻧﯾﺑ
 رﺟﺣﻟا قﻓارﻣ وأ تﺎﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا قاوﺳأ ﻲﻓ ﺎﮭﻧﻣ تﺎﻧﯾﻋ ذﺧأ مﺗ ﻲﺗﻟا لﺑﻹا تﻧﺎﻛ ،تﺎﺳاردﻟا نﻣ دﯾدﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ
 ﻲﺗﻟا لﺎﻣﺟﻟا لﺑﺎﻘﻣ ةدروﺗﺳﻣﻟا لﺑﻹا كﻟذﻛو عرازﻣﻟا ﻲﻓ ةدوﺟوﻣﻟا كﻠﺗﺑ ﺔﻧرﺎﻘﻣ لﺻﻣﻟا ﺔﯾﺑﺎﺟﯾإ ﻲﺣﺻﻟا
 ﻰﻠﻋأ رﺑﺗﻌﺗ ًﺎﯾﻠﺻﻣ هدﺻرو سورﯾﻔﻟا فﺎﺷﺗﻛا لدﻌﻣ نأ ﻰﻟإ تﺎﺳاردﻟا ضﻌﺑ رﯾﺷﺗو .ﺎًﯾﻠﺣﻣ ﺎﮭﺗﯾﺑرﺗ مﺗﺗ
 رﻣأ ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﻟ ﻲﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا عدوﺗﺳﻣﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ فرﻌﺗﻟا نإ .ةدرﺎﺑﻟا ءﺎﺗﺷﻟا رﮭﺷأ لﻼﺧ ﻲﺑﺳﻧ لﻛﺷﺑ
 .(نﻣﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) ﺔﯾرﺷﺑ تﺎﺑﺎﺻإ ثودﺣ نﻣ ﺔﯾﺎﻗوﻟاو ةرطﯾﺳﻟاو لﺧدﺗﻟا رﯾﺑادﺗ رﯾوطﺗﻟ يرورﺿ
 ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻓ ءوﺷﻧﻟ ﺔﻛرﺣﻣﻟا نوﻛﺗ نأ لﻣﺗﺣﯾ ﻲﺗﻟا ﺔﯾﺳﯾﺋرﻟا بﺎﺑﺳﻷا تارﯾﺛﺄﺗو ﺔﯾھﺎﻣ دﯾدﺣﺗﻟو
 نﺎﺳﻧﻹا نﻣ لﻛﺑ ﺔﻘﻠﻌﺗﻣﻟا ﺔﻠﻣﺗﺣﻣﻟا تﺎﻛرﺣﻣﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﻣﺋﺎﻗ تﺻﻠﺧﺗﺳا ،(ﻲﻧﺎﺛﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) رطﻗ ﻲﻓ ﮫﻧﺎﯾرﺳو
 بﻧﺎﺟﺑ ﺔﻠﺻﻟا تاذ تﺎﻧﺎﯾﺑﻟا دﻋاوﻗ لﯾﻠﺣﺗو ﺔﯾﻣﻠﻌﻟا تاروﺷﻧﻣﻟا ﺔﻌﺟارﻣ لﻼﺧ نﻣ ﺔﺋﯾﺑﻟاو ناوﯾﺣﻟاو
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 نﻣ رﺛﻛﻷ ﺔﻟودﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻲﻠﺣﻣﻟا ﺞﺗﺎﻧﻟا ﺔﻔﻋﺎﺿﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ هرﺎﻣﺛﺗﺳاو زﺎﻐﻟاو طﻔﻧﻟا جارﺧﺗﺳا رﯾﺛﺄﺗ ﻰﻟإ رظﻧﻟﺎﺑو
 نﯾﺛﻼﺛ لﻼﺧ ﻲﺟﯾردﺗ لﻛﺷﺑ ةﺎﯾﺣﻟا طﻣﻧ لوﺣﺗﻟ سﺳأ كﻟذﻟ ًﺎﻌﺑﺗ أرط يذﻟا نﺳﺣﺗﻟا نﺈﻓ ،فﺎﻌﺿأ سﻣﺧ
 ﺔطﺑﺗرﻣﻟا ﮫﯾﻓرﺗﻟا ﺔطﺷﻧأ رﺎھدزا نأ ﺎﻣﻛ .لوﻣﺧﻟا ﺎﮭﯾﻠﻋ بﻠﻐﯾ ﺔﯾرﺿﺣ ةﺎﯾﺣ ﻰﻟإ ةوادﺑﻟا ةﺎﯾﺣ نﻣ ًﺎﻣﺎﻋ
 فﻋﺎﺿﺗ ﻰﻟإ ﻰﺿﻓأ ﺔﻟودﻟا نﻣ ﺔﻣوﻋدﻣﻟاو ﻊﻣﺗﺟﻣﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرذﺟﺗﻣﻟا ﺔﯾﻓﺎﻘﺛﻟا تﺎﺛوروﻣﻟا نﻣ ةدﺣاوﻛ لﺑﻹﺎﺑ
 0991 مﺎﻋ ذﻧﻣ لﺑﻹا دادﻋأ
 حوﺗﻔﻣﻟا ﻲﻋرﻟا ﻊﻧﻣ ﮫﺑﺟوﻣﺑ ىرﺟ رارﻗ ردﺻ عرﺎﺳﺗﻣ لﻛﺷﺑ رﺣﺻﺗﻟا دﺎﯾدزاو رﺋﺎﺟﻟا ﻲﻋرﻟا مﻗﺎﻔﺗ ﻊﻣو
 عاوﻧﻷا نﻣ دﯾدﻌﻟا راوﺟ ﻰﻟإ ،ﺔﻘﯾﺿ رﺋﺎظﺣ ﻲﻓ لﺑﻹا ﻊﺿوﺑ ﮫﻧﻋ ضﯾﻌﺗﺳاو 5002 مﺎﻋ ذﻧﻣ ًﺎﻣﺎﺗ ًﺎﻌﻧﻣ
 ﻰﻟإ فﺎﺿﯾو دﺣاو نﺎﻛﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺎﮭﻧوﻣدﺧﯾ نﯾذﻟا لﺎﻣﻌﻟا ﻊﻣ ﺎﮭﻌﯾﻣﺟ شﯾﻌﺗﻟ ﺔﻔﯾﻟﻷا تﺎﻧاوﯾﺣﻟا نﻣ ىرﺧﻷا
 تادﺎﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ةرﯾﺑﻛﻟا تﻻوﺣﺗﻟا هذھ نوﻛﺗ نأ دﻘﺗﻌﯾﻓ .ةدﯾدﺟ ٍعارﻣ نﻋ ًﺎﺛﺣﺑ دودﺣﻟا رﺑﻋ لﻘﻧﺗﻟا كﻟذ
 لﺎﻣﺷ ﻲﻓ رﺷﺗﻧﯾو رﺷﺑﻠﻟ لﺎﻣﺟﻟا نﻣ لﻘﺗﻧﯾﻟ سورﯾﻔﻠﻟ ﺔﺑﺳﺎﻧﻣﻟا فورظﻟا تﺄﯾھ دﻗ لﺑﻹا ﺔﯾﺑرﺗﺑ ﺔﻠﺻﺗﻣﻟا
 .(ﻊﺳﺎﺗﻟا لﺻﻔﻟا) طﺳوﻷا قرﺷﻟاو ﺎﯾﻘﯾرﻓإ
 لﺑﻹا عرازﻣ ﻲﻓ يوﯾﺣﻟا نﺎﻣﻷا رﯾﯾﺎﻌﻣو ةدﺣاوﻟا ﺔﺣﺻﻟا ﺞﮭﻧ نﯾﺑ ﻊﻣﺟﯾ لﻣﺎﻛﺗﻣ لﻣﻋ رﺎطإ حارﺗﻗا مﺗ
 ضارﻣﻷا نﻣ هرﯾﻏ ءﺎﻘﺗاو ﮫﯾﻠﻋ ةرطﯾﺳﻟاو ﺎﻧوروﻛﻟا سورﯾﻔﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺻﻹا ءﺎﻘﺗﻻ ﺔﯾﻠﻣﻋ ﺔﯾﺟﯾﺗارﺗﺳﺈﻛ
 .(01 لﺻﻔﻟا) ناوﯾﺣﻟاو نﺎﺳﻧﻹا ﺔﮭﺟاو ﻲﻓ ﺔﻛرﺗﺷﻣﻟا
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Name: Elmoubashar Farag,
Research Group: Department of Viroscience, Erasmus University Medical Center.
PhD Period: 2016- 2019
Promoter: M.P.G. Koopmans
Education Background:  
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of Gezira, Sudan
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2019, Master of Clinical Research (MPCR), Dresden International University-DIU, Germany
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9. 2015, The Regional Conference of Camel Management and Production under Open 
range System (RCCMPR), Khartoum, Sudan (invited as presenter)
10. 2015, The International Symposium on MERS from in Seoul, Republic of Korea (invited 
as presenter)
11. 2015, The International Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases 2015 (ICEID 
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16. 2016, First International Conference in Emergency Medicine and Public Health–Qatar 
( ICEP-Q 2016), Doha, Qatar (Member of the organizing committee and presenter)
17. 2017, WHO Meeting on the Environmental Contamination Studies of MERS-CoV in 
Health Care Settings co-hosted by WHO and The University of Hong Kong (Invited as 
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on MERS-CoV Training Curriculum Co-hosted by WHO and The University of Hong 
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19. 2017, FAO-OIE-WHO Global Technical Meeting on MERS-CoV, WHO Headquarters 
Geneva, Switzerland (Invited as advisor and presenter)
20. 2017, The 4th International Congress on Pathogens at the Human-Animal Interface 
(ICOPHAI), Environmental Challenges and Impact on Global Health, Doha, Qatar. 
(Organizing committee member and presenter)
21. 2018, WHO-IVI Joint Symposium for MERS-CoV Vaccine Development, Seoul, South 
Korea (Invited as advisor).
22. 2017, WHO Intercountry consultation on Mass Gathering Preparedness and 
Management, Jakarta, Indonesia (Invited as advisor)
23. 2017, WHO and Global Center for Mass Gathering Medicine (GCMGM) WHO  Technical 
Consultation on Health Risk Assessment Tools for Mass Gatherings Events, Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia (Invited as advisor)
24. 2018, International Meeting on Emerging Diseases and Surveillance IMED. Vienna, 
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presenter)
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Mediterranean Public Health Network (EMPHNET)-EMPHNET, Amman, Jordan 
(Invited as advisor and presenter)
29. 2018, Data sharing practices in public health emergencies - learning lessons from 
past outbreaks workshop, Wellcome Trust, London, UK (invited participant)
30. 2018, WHO Experts meeting on “one-health framework for action” for emerging 
zoonotic infections, Amman, Jordan (Invited as as advisor and presenter)
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Curriculum vitae
My name is Elmoubasher Farag. Born in Sudan, in 1975. I started my professional journey 
since I was yet a medical student in Al Gazeera University. I designed the first structured 
community outreach program in 1997, an initiative that got the attention of the faculty 
who picked me afterwards to join an unprecedented committee tasked with reviewing the 
curriculum a year later. Fully inspired by the impact of such valued contributions to the 
public health I dared to design two successive community-based surveys. While the first 
screened the farmers for Bilharzia, the other studied Vitamin A deficiency among school 
children. I am much proud that the results of these surveys were used by Ministry of Health 
to implement comprehensive treatment and prevention projects. The success I found 
in these surveys encouraged me to lead two more surveys for oral health and maternal 
health in rural community.  Just before my graduation from the school of medicine in 
2002, I crowned my undergraduate heritage with establishing a network of community 
health committees across the rural areas of Al Gezira State. I ended my time in the school 
of medicine, with a firm belief that the community medicine will be the only discipline to 
accommodate my aspirations and personal dreams.
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While fulfilling my internship as a houseman officer, I did not abandon my inclination 
towards public health and research. I was keen to observe how the lack of effective 
preventive strategies would unpleasantly display in medical problems the way we ultimately 
see in the referral hospitals. I was preoccupied by variety of thoughts as to what role I can 
assume to make a substantial difference. I thought I would help my medical colleagues 
get more involved in the research where they can recognize the disease determinants, I 
founded “the Nile Center for Medical Ethics” in Sudan in 2003-2005 to serve as a center for 
research and capacity building in the field.  I even created “Sahatak”, a medical magazine 
addressing the local health problems of Sudanese people, to help highlighting the health 
problems from preventive perspective to both the medical community and the public. My 
magazine has just completed its 14th birthday, with a decent readership. I am most content 
with such an achievement that would only need me to initiate, then survive regardless my 
involvement. Another dream that comes true.
I carried my public health passion over when I joined Sudan National AIDS Control 
Program (SNAP) at the Federal Ministry of Health and played a leading role in reviewing 
of the HIV/AIDS control guidelines in emergencies like Darfur, where the funds I raised 
managed to get two grants from the Global Fund with total of seven million US$. I further 
designed and led the first national integrated bio-behavioral survey for HIV/AIDS Most-at-
risk Population in Sudan in 2010 to inform the control and prevention policy and strategies 
targeting the most at risk groups. 
In 2010, I had two cardinal achievements that I hoped would serve generations to 
come. Still inspired by my previous work in designing a community-oriented curriculum, 
I developed the ‘Community Health Institute’ for the Faculty of medicine, Omdurman 
Islamic University in addition to developing the HIV AIDS professional higher Diploma, for 
the University of Medical Science and Technology -Sudan. 
A remarkable leap on my career occurred when I joined the Ministry of Public Health 
in Qatar. I learnt that I would be supervising the disease control division, where I would be 
required to draft Qatar National Health Strategy for communicable diseases 2011-2016 and 
also to prepare the first framework for prevention and control of communicable diseases. I 
discerned that as workers make more than 70% of the population in Qatar, addressing this 
group with a tangible strategic initiative would make a significant difference to the profile 
of communicable diseases in the country. I innovated ‘Wiqaya’, an initiative to promote 
hygienic and health-seeking practices among the male workers in Qatar. Wiqaya success 
was not only evident in the remarkable interaction it generated among the target workers, 
but also in the engagement of the local partners (like the Qatari Red Crescent) who found 
it appealing to make it rather a sustained program. 
As the lead in investigating the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus-MERS-
COV suspected cases, I helped confirm the camels’ role in the transmission of the infection, 
marking one of the major breakthroughs of the disease. Later, I planned and conducted a 
national MERS CoV sero survey among the group-at-risk.
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Maybe it has been obvious that I am biased to bringing research and capacity building 
to the work in which I get involved. While I admit such kind of inclination, I strongly believe 
that the back bone to the public health, as well as to the other healthcare lines of specialty, 
is the competent human resources who are guided by science. This might explain my 
keenness to develop reliable healthcare professionals to support quality service delivery. I 
managed somehow to translate my aspirations into actions. 
I succeeded in convincing the MoPH decision makers to adopt a wide range of capacity 
building short courses in collaboration with Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, the WHO, 
The CDC Atlanta, Erasmus Mc Institute, Pasteur Institute, Harvard School of Public Health, 
and the USA National Institute of Health. Since 2011 up to date, I have been affiliated as 
instructor for several public health and medicine training programs. I also have teaching 
contribution to Qatar University, Weil Cornel School of Medicine-Qatar, and College of 
North Atlantic. I was nominated to be ‘Qatar site monitor’ for Harvard Training Program in 
clinical research as well as being the site director of the online training program in clinical 
research of the NIH.  
I am proud that I succeeded since 2011 up to date to get 4 research grants with total 
of three Million US$ from Qatar Foundation to address public health priorities in Qatar. 
Similarly, I lead 10 research projects all were funded by the Ministry of Public Health 
in Qatar between 2011 till 2019. The outcome of such research projects are around 40 
published paper and 25 conference participation. 
Despite the burden of professional responsibilities, I managed to pursuit three Masters 
Degrees, and four diplomas in addition to membership in Travel Medicine, Royal College of 
Surgeon and Phrygians of Glasgow, besides fellowship of the Faculty of Public Health, Royal 
College of Surgeon and Physicians of UK. 
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Corporation Laboratories. At first, Dr. Saeed Al Dhahiri was hesitant to store animal and 
environmental specimens into his lab. Thanks to his investigative mind, he finally approved 
to keep them until they are shipped to an external reference lab. Days later, the WHO and 
FAO conducted their joint visit. Where Dr. Peter Benembark from FAO made the first contact 
with Professor Marion Koopmans, the head of the viruscience department, Erasmus MC in 
the Netherlands. 
Thereafter, Bart Haagmans, supported by his team from Erasmus MC, has thankfully 
helped detect MERS-CoV, providing the very first proof that camels are to be linked to 
MERS-CoV infection. Later, Stalin managed to isolate MERS-CoV from samples taken from 
Qatar camels. Then, Chantal. Reusken provide the world with more evidences about mers.
cov at Human animal Interface.
It was all about patience and determination to bring answers. Big thanks for the joint 
rapid response team, without their efforts and patience nobody knows how many persons 
could have been affected before we determine MERS-CoV source. It all depended on the 
one-health (the key that enabled the epidemiological breakthrough where principles of 
epidemiology were applied).
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These breakthroughs and discoveries paved the way to seriously pursuing a high 
degree while finding answers to MERS-CoV epidemic. Risk assessment and samples 
collection continued until I was destined to take part in the consultative meeting about 
MERS-CoV meeting, KSA 2014.  It was the first time to meet up face to face with Professor 
Marion Koopmans. She provided the world with further evidence about MERS-CoV from 
samples collected from camels and vulnerable groups in Qatar. I felt more confident and 
enthusiastic to go for it. Unknowing how would Prof Marion Koopmans would respond to 
the idea, I voiced my proposal to compile my scientific perspectives and papers as a PhD. 
Her welcoming of the notion was incomparable. She then was my mentor who supervised 
me over the course of 4 years.   
As the PhD is a remarkable life achievement for the sake of which so many sacrifices 
has been made, I believe it avails a unique chance to reflect on one’s experiences and the 
people happened to provide help. I really like this chapter where it permits to derail the 
paradox of firm scientific language to emotional terms in the hope to express my gratitude 
to those without whom this work could have never see the light. 
Couple of characteristics made Professor Koopmans supervision to my research an 
exceptional experience; her intensive knowledge about the research subject besides her 
deep familiarity with the emerging infectious diseases and MERS-CoV and Qatar cultural 
context. It is difficult to imagine anybody, but her, to competently guide me through the 
puzzling turns of my project. A million of thanks goes to her a (Veterinary Doctor working 
at a human hospital).
Another unique person that I was lucky to work with is Chantal. I learnt that she loves 
the sea but the desert always captures her. Whenever I meet with her, I admire that she 
seems never content from exploration. No wonder why I benefitted from her critical 
contemplation of the epidemiological theories and the virus behavior. Chantal was the 
one sent to meet us in Qatar, critical thinking and interrogative mentality. Her leadership, 
dedication, and commitment made her an extraordinary qualified co-investigator in the 
Qatar-Netherlands MERS-CoV project. 
Reina Sikkema, who is smart, well organized and an active member of the MERS-CoV 
study group, was so kind in offering her advice that helped achieve well in my research. I 
believe she will be an ‘emerging’ leader in the field of emerging infectious diseases and the 
one-health. 
I have to acknowledge Ms. ‘Loubna Bouzyd’, secretary of the viroscience department 
at EMC for her continuous support and guidance. I am also grateful to Simone Slabbekoorn 
and Maria Silva for their kind care and supportive treatment. In fact I need to thank the 
entire viroscience department for considering me as one of their family. 
There are so many persons to thank in Qatar. My former manager, Dr. Mohammed Al 
Hajri, the National lead for Mers.cov preparedness and response in Qatar, deserve a special 
thanks for his unparalleled welcoming to ideas no matter how bold or extraordinary. With 
his famous life slogan “sky is the limit,” he steadily kept devoting the credit of several 
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breakthroughs that were achieved under his leadership to me. Dr. Hamad Al Romaihi, my 
current manager at the HP & CDC department, was rather a friend than a boss. I am very 
grateful to his support without which neither resources nor staff could have been made 
available. 
I am personally indebted to both Dr. Salih Al Marri, the Undersecretary of Health and 
ShK. Dr. Mohamed Al Thani, the Director General of the Public Health Department, Ministry 
of Public Health. As their leadership and guidance in fact laid the foundation to literally all 
the achievement I am proud of in Qatar. Such achievement could have never happen unless 
they adopted a proactive policy of data-driven, none of the papers that made up my PhD 
thesis could have seen the light. 
Words will fall short from thanking my colleagues staff of the HP &CDC department. 
In particular I would like to mention Dr. Ahmed El Sayed, Mr. Fareed Shehata, Mr. Khalid 
Yousif, and Mr. Thomas Kutty in addition to the ARDS and the active surveillance team who 
all burdened the strenuous field work in so harsh conditions to interviewing suspected 
cases, collecting samples and being courageous to continue exposing themselves to the risk 
of the virus even when uncertainty about his transmission was prevailing. 
I am using this occasion to express my appreciation to my colleagues who supported 
me during the course of this PhD project. I am grateful for their ambitious guidance, 
invaluably constructive criticism and friendly assistance during the project work. I express 
my wholehearted thanks for my colleagues Dr. Mohamed Nour, Dr. Mazharul Islam, Dr. Dev 
Bansal and Prof Mohammed ismail for their support. I am sincerely thankful to them for 
sharing their enlightening visions on an amount of issues related to this research project.
I acknowledge the supportive efforts done by my colleagues from Animal Health 
Department, Dr. Hazim Ghobashi, Eng. Abdulaziz Al Zeyara, Mr. Khalid Mahran, and their 
leader Eng. Farhoud Al Hajri. It is their facilitation which smoothed the way for our joint 
efforts to approach their ‘animal related territories’ in Al Shehaneya and the other camel 
holdings and trading hubs. They introduced me and my team to the camel owners and 
workers and to the Camel Racing Organizing Committee which also thankfully made 
undeniable efforts to facilitate and support our professional and scientific endeavors.   
For a good reason I believe my devotion stemmed from my parents. (Dad Osman Abdu 
and Mum Amna Hassan) both discerned my passion to explore and learn. No words can 
describe my gratitude to their sacrifices to pave the roads ahead of my future. I am nothing 
without them. With their unconditional persistent support and motivation, my sisters; 
Maha, Manal and Zahra, pushed me to succeed. The appreciation of my only brother, Muaz, 
was in itself a kind of untold motive to continue my journey. 
Similarly, my uncles ‘Yousif’ and ‘Omer’, who, in an uncountable times, helped me 
take informed decisions pertaining my schooling and study disciplines. Looking at how 
far I managed to reach now, I can tell their advices proved right, every time. The circle 
of influence was arguably, however, bigger than just my close family. My neighbors and 
acquaintances in ‘New Halfa’ in Eastern Sudan, the small town where I grew up. We were a 
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group of distinguished students who usually score high grades. I cannot forget the peer-to-
peer competition that featured our relationship as young pupils. ‘Mohammed Asaad’ and 
‘Aymen Hilal’ still leading successful life since that beautiful time. 
Like our fathers, our teachers at the primary, intermediate, then secondary school Mr. 
Abdelhameed, Mr. Mohamed, Mr. Ali, Mr. Sulieman, Mr Abdel Mageed were able to see 
through our insides to help us get over our internal struggles. They have had a lasting effect 
to my soul and morals. The taste of success was in itself rewarding, but the encouragement 
of ‘New Halfa’ community was undeniable. 
Another unique teacher, yet a friend, was Sheikh ‘Mohamed Sayed Haj. A man that you 
can be sure was ‘one of a kind.’ With his robust knowledge in Quraan and Sunna sciences, 
Sheikh Mohamed was the light who opened my eyes to take medicine as a career. He 
strongly believed that I will excel in this field. He advised that I work hard to help those in 
pain to please the Almighty God. I was inspired by his visions and words. Similarly, Sheikh 
‘Yagoub’ and Sheikh ‘Al Tahir’ who equipped me with golden advices about having a good 
faith in ‘Allah’ and his blessings as they recognized my eagerness to excel for the sake of 
the public. 
Al Gazeera University was another story in my life. I am privileged with professors who 
welcomed my eagerness to sometimes work with them in ‘extracurricular projects and 
programs.’ The system in Al Gazeera medical school from where I was graduated allowed 
for, rather encouraged, such kind of activities that can discover and polish the students’ 
capabilities. All of my professors deserve my thanks but I would like to mention Prof 
‘Sameera Hamid’, Prof ‘Omer Aziz’. Yet, my senior colleagues, namely ‘Mutaz Urabi’ and 
‘Azza Zulfo’, had a significant role in offering their advices which helped me achieve a steady 
performance in my medical school through graduation. Not to forget my colleagues in batch 
18. This batch was characterized for it high, yet noble, competition. Such competition has 
positively influenced my career.
Life has driven me from experience to another. But joining the Patients’ Helping Fund-
None Governmental Organization was a distinctive one. The spirit of ‘giving’ could easily 
be appreciated from the humanitarian projects supervised by Dr. Mohamed Al Hassan 
Abdelrahman, the PHF Director. Famous with his second name, Dr. Hassan, was one of few 
who believed in my innovation competences as I was engaged in planning for humanitarian 
projects. He even extended his support beyond the organization projects to support my 
participation in the international scientific conferences.  I need also to underscore the 
sessions of free brain storming with Dr. Kamal Yagroub, the Deputy Director for PHF. 
Through his support to ‘thinking outside the box,’ Dr. Kamal, along with my friends Mr. 
Mohamed Omer Husein, Mr. Mutasim Alameen, and my colleagues, motivated me with a 
good cause to audaciously pioneer in inventing unparalleled programs. They have thankfully 
offered their offices, internet, and even lab tops, when these resources were so precious. 
‘El Nile Center for Medical Ethics’ and ‘Sahatak Health Magazine’ were examples of several 
projects generated out of such firm support and encouragement. 
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A distinguished expert in public health that would never have an equivalent to is 
Dr. ‘Elwathiq Al Hamadabi.’ When I was not sure about the medical career, his insightful 
consultation has remarkably helped me take one of the most critical decisions in my life 
and career. I am so appreciative to him and to Dr. Ginawi, who both persuaded me to invest 
my efforts in the public health field which is rich with so many virgin areas to welcome my 
enthusiasm to excel and innovate. Likewise, Ms. Wifaq Salah, a former supervisor at the 
UNFPA office, Sudan who believed that my passion to public health and research will help 
me achieve a unique mission. 
Of course, my little family deserve sincere regards. My wife, ‘Nafisa Hummaida’ , earnt 
the hard way how to live a life of an epidemiologist who is passionate about research. 
As my passion takes me from home, she remained supportive, shouldering the burden of 
looking after our kids and managing the house. Very few women can really take that part, 
silently. My kids, Rawah, Anas, Osman, Ahmed and Abdel Rahman, all paid their share in 
my successes from their times they deserved be spent with them. For so many times they 
sacrificed their entertainment time and kept quiet at home not to disturb my work in the 
research. 
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